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Notes
Alie11s' Right to Teach: Political
Socialization and the Public Schools
In recent years, aliens 1 have made great strides against state-imposed
employment discrimination. 2 Some commentators read recent Supreme
Court opinions in Sugarman v. Do11galls and In re Griffiths• as invalidating virtually all state laws that require United States citizenship
as a prerequisite to employment.;; Nonetheless, many states still bar
aliens from teaching in public elementary and secondary schools.
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of state-imposed restrictions
on the employment of alien teachers. It argues that Sugarman and
Griffiths, while greatly limiting the scope of permissible discrimination against aliens, recog11ize an exceQted area for jobs which have a
critical relationship to the identity and legitimacy of the political
community. Public school teaching might fit within this area of allowI. All references arc to permanent resident aliens. An alien is "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States." 8 U .S.C . § JJOl(a)(3) (19i0). To acquire permanent residence, an alien must possess an immigrant visa and thus have "been lawfully accorded the pri\'ilcge of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant
in accordance with the immigration laws . . . ," 8 U .S.C. § JIOl(a)(20) (1970). Virtually
all aliens permitted to be employed for an indefinite time ha\'e permanent residence
status. The only other aliens legally permitted to work in the United States do so
on a temporary basis. These persons arc lksignated "nonimmigrant" aliens. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(l5) (19i0). Telephone interview with Ralph Farb, Deputy General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Wash., D.C., Sept. 12, 1975.
2. The extent to which state and local law has restricted the employment opportunities of aliens can be seen in the limitations only recent!)' in\'alidated. Taggart v.
Mandel, 391 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 19i5) (state statute making citizenship a prerequisite
to licensing as a notary ~ ublic); Sundram v. City of Niagara Falls, 77 Misc. 2d 1002,
357 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup.t., Niagara Co. 1!)73) (city ordinance making citizenship a
prerequisite to licensing as a taxi cab d ri1·.c i:): Examining Bel. o[ Eng'rs, Architects &
Sur\'eyors v. Flores De Otero, No. 74-520 (D.P.R., Dec. 19, J9i4), prob. juris. noted,
95 S. Ct. 1988 (19i5) (Puerto Rico statute requiring that applicants be citizens in order
to be granted full licenses as en~eers, archi tects or s11 l'l'q:o rs) . The Supreme Court
is presently considering whether the fcdcrnl civil scn·ice can exclude aliens. Mow Sun
Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. grn11tcd, 417 U.S. 944 (1974).
For a discussion of the full scope o( these Jaws, sec M. KoN\'ITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE
ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946): Note, Comtit11tio11ality of Rcstrictio11s 011 Aliens' Right
to Worh, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1012 (195i); Note, Protectio11 of Alicu Rights Under the
Fourteenth Amcndmcnt, 1971 DUKE L.J. 583; Comment, Alic11s, Et11J1loyt11cnt, and Equa l
Protection, 19 V1LL. L. REV. 589, 590-95 (19i4).
3. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
4. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
5. See Das, DisC1'imination i11 Et11J1loy111c11t Agai,1st Alieus-T/Jc I111J1act of the Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Lau•, 35 U. J>rn. L. REV. 499 (l!Ji4); Comment, supra
note 2, at 590.
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able discrimination if the state has an inlerest in using its public
schools for such a critical political function-in particular, the education of students for participation in the political community. The
necessary assessment is whether the nature of a teacher's role in the
process of political socialization creates a substantial state interest
which could justify denying teacher certification on the basis of
alienage. The Note concludes that the states do have some legitimate
interest in the process of political socialization in the public schools.
But because of First Amendment considerations and the imprecision
of the certification laws in their present form, this interest is insufficient to validate current state laws discriminating against alien
teachers.

I

J. Alienage and Equal Protection
The right of the states to provide for and regulate public education
has long been recognized. 0 As part of this responsibility, all of the
states supervise the licensing of teachers in the public schools. 7 Twentyone states use United States citizenship as a qualification for certification as a public school teacher, 8 thus restricting an alien's opportunity to teach.
Two main types of restrictions are imposed. 0 In six states, a resident
alien is unable to secure a permanent license to teach whether or not
he or she plans to be naturalized. 10 In 12 other states, an alien may
6. See, e.g., Epperson , .. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (l!l68) (dictum); Pierce v. Society
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (dictum); Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922)
(dictum). Most states have constitutional provisions I·cquiring that the state legislature
create a system of public education. See A. MORRIS, Tur. CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
U>UCATION 1)3 (J9i4).
~
7. All 50 states require that a teacher be certified before teaching in a public school.
Su T. STINNETT, A J\IAl'\UAL ON STANDARDS AFFECTING SCHOOL PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (Nat') Educ. Ass'n 19i4). In addition, 29 states require certification of some
t<·aching personnel in private, parochial, or independent schools. See id . at 3, JO. Unless
otherwise noted, all references below are to certification requirements for public school
tnchcrs only.
J'or purposes of equal protection analysis, discrimination against aliens in the employment of public school teachers constitutes state action by ,·irtuc both of the state-imposed
rcnirication requirements and the public chan1cter o[ the municipality or school district
pro,iding the employment. Although this Note will focus on the mandatory certification
•niuiremcnts, the analysis would apply equally to any local policy to pass o,·er aliens in
hlring teachers.
8, The number of states requiring citizenship for certification has declined by onethh<l in the last eight years. (In 196i the number was 32.) See T. STINNETT, A J\IAl'\UAL
C:CR11F'JCATION REQUIRBIENTS FOR ScHOOL l'ERSONNEL IN THE UNJ"IED ST:\TES 28 (Nat')
Lluc. :\ss'n 19i0). In many states, the state board of education is authorized to set
't"quirrn,cnts for certification. Id. at 31. Thus, restrictions on aliens' right to teach arc
•p<>S(:<l both by statute and by the regulations issm'd by state departments of education.
9. The following sur\'cy of types of citizenship rcc1uirements was completed in
frlJruary, J9i5.
10. RCCL'LATIONS OF CONN. STATE .-\GENCIES § JO-H6-2(d) (19il); Mississippi (see T.

or

°'
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The Yale Law Journal
be certified provisionally upon declaring his or her intent to becornc
a citizen. 11 Cutting across these categories, in IO states an alien ca
be certified when participating in a federal or state exchange pro.
gram. 12 In addition, four states will grant a temporary certificate at
the request of a school principal or other official who is willing to
employ an alien. 1 s
The Supreme Court recognized in 1886 that the equal protection
clause extends to aliens.a Nevertheless, because of the courts' use of
the rational relation standard 15 and acceptance of the states' asserted

,.

'

STINNETI, mprn note 7, at 24); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § i5 -6004 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 391.060 (1965); South Carolina (see T. STINNETI, suprn at 24); cf. Rhode Island Requirements for Certification (on file with l'ale Law ]ormaal) (if an alien lacks citizenship
only hecause he or she has resided in the United States for too short a period to be
eligible for naturalization, the citizenship requirement may be waived).
II. IDAHO CODE § 33-1202(4) (1963); ILL. ANN. STA1". ch. 122, § 21-1 (Smith-Hurd
1972); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN . ch. 71 , § 38G (19i4); J\f1cH . CoMP. LAws ANN . § 340.852
(1975); N.J. REV. STAT. § 6.11-3.JO (1970) (including an exception for for eign language
teachers who have not declared their intention of becoming citizens and who have
resided in the United States for less than IO years); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3001, 3001 -a
(McKinney Supp. 1974); N .D . CEr-.T. CODE § 15 -36-07 (1971); DEP'T OF EDUC., OKLA,
TEACHER EDUCATION, CERTIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT HANDIIOOK 56 (1971) (on file with l'ale
Law Journal) (hereinafter cited as OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK); TEXAS EDUC.
CODE § 13.044 (1972); WASH. REv. Coo£ ANN. § 28A .67 .020 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18A-3- l (1971); Wyoming (see T . STJNSETI, suprn note 7, at 24).
12. REGS. OF C(?NN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-J46-2(d) (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.17(2)
(Supp. 1974); loAHO CoDE § 33-1202(4) (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 122, § 21-1 (Smith.
Hurd Supp. 1975); M1CH. CoMJ'. LAWS ANN. § 340.852 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 75-6005 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.070 (1968); OKLAHOMA CERTIFICATION HANDBOOK, suprn note II, at ' 56; WASH. REV. CODE ANN . § 28:\.67.020 (1970); w. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18A-3-l (1971).
8 U.S .C . § I IOI(a)(l!i)O) (1970) authorizes a nonimmigrant alien to work temporarily
in the United States if he or she is part of an exchange program . This applies to
any alien
having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of aba ndoning
who is a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, research assistant,
specialist, or leader in a field of specialized knowledge or skill, or other person of
similar description, who is coming temporarily to the United States as a participant
in a program designated by the Secretary of State, for the purpose of teaching,
instructing or lecturing. studying, observing, conducting rcsca1·ch, consulting, demonstrating special skills, or receiving training ....
13. REGS. OF CoNN. STATE AGENCIES§ I0-146-2(d) (1971); J\lo:-.T. REV . CODES .-\1'\N. ~ 756005 (1971); N .D . CENT. CoDE § 15-36-ll (Supp. 1973); letter to Lon S. Dabby from
W .H. Jones, Director, Div. of Teacher E<luc., State Dep't of Educ., Va., Dec. 24, 1974
(on file with l'ale Law Jo11rnn/).
There are two states that do not fit any of the categories abo,·e. In l'lorida, an
ali en may be certified if his or her services arc needed and he or she takes an oath
of allegiance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.17(1), (2), (3) (19i4). In South Dakota, any alien
who meets the usual qualifications may be temporarily certified. S.D . Regs. (on file
with }'ale Lnw Journal).
14 . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (in\'alidating refusal of San l' rancisco
board of supervisors to grant licenses for operation of Jaun<lrics to Chinese residents
of the city).
15. See Note, Pro(ection of Alien Rights Um/er the Fourteenth Ame11d111e11t, supra
note 2. at 588; Comment, s11prn note 2, at 590-99. The Supreme Court has traditionally
used a two-tier approach in e,·al11ating claims that a state statute violates the equal
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• .Right to Teach
in preserving jobs for their own citizens, 10 the early successes
in opposing employment discrimination were few and far
CCII-If Jn 1971, the Supreme Court stated in Graham v. Richarddausc of the Fourteent_h Amendment. Sec Gunther, Forc~·ord : /11 Sea.rel,
l)o</,-i11c On A Cha11g111g Cow·/: A Model foi· a Newer Equal Prot.ect,011,
1- Re,·. J, 8 (1972). Under the "rational relation" test, a state mnst <lemon.... the challenged classification rests on grounds reasonably related to the adol a permissible objective. Develofnncnls i11 the Law-Eq11nl Protection, 82
JlrY. )065, 1079 (1969). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)
iiutional safeguard is oCCendcd only if the classification 1·csts on grounds
er,dc°'-ant to the achievement of the State's objective"). However, a class ification
a "suspect" criterion in\'Okcs a more stringent level of judicial rc,·icw.
airingcnt standard of prolection is also in,·okcd when a classification touches
~mental in1erest.) The operative effect of declaring a classification suspect
dat ,uie must bear the "heavy burden" of showing a "compelling" interest to
dat Ltw. LO\ing v. \"irginia, 388 U.S. I, 9 (1967). See D eve lop111e11/s in the Law~t,on, supra at 1087-1120. In addicion, the state must demonstrate that the
ad,:mccs the interest with prcc1s10n.
pa naon·· of a cwsification is the manner in which it relates to the purpose
•· es..<·ntially the question is "whether all and only those persons similarly
• It ~pect to the purpose of the law" are treated equally by the classification.
A c):1',ification may be underinclusi,·c in that it does not include within the
similarly situated. Altcrnati\'ely, it may be o\'erinclush·c in that it in•ho arc not similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
a cb-.,ification is both o,·crinclusi\'e and underinclusfrc. See Tussman &: tenJlr, f,t 11 "l P.-otection of the Lnws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). A pcrfccL classifica11, impossible w atlain. Howc,·er, Lhe degree of allowable imperfection ,·arics
i'I WftoHl of classification. \\'hen a suspect category is invoked, the courts will
nmnce from a perfect classification and may demand that "less drastic
-.-cl 10 achic,·e tl1c statutory purpose. Sec Gunther, suprn at 21.
elii,r p&•t, the st.ates have tried to justify restriction of alien employment by
a -tf><"Cial p ublic interest" in prese1Ting jobs for state citizens. Heim v.
l'.S. 175 (1913); Truax ,·. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915); Rok "· Legg.
%IS, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1939). See Note, Co11stitutio11ality of Resll·ictions 011
to ll"onl:, supra note 2, at 1016-18. The rationale was best articulated by
In P~"<>ple , ·. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff'd su/J 110111. Crane v.
l 'S. 195 (1915):
J aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination, for
ol exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the adud profit of I.he mcml>crs of the state... ·)
~.E. at -429.
determining what use shall be made of its own moneys. may legit- - -· ---'1 lhe " ·clfarc of its own citizens rather than that of aliens. W"hate\'er
n1hcr tlu:n a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship. In its
po.n1y, th~ state is not required to dedicate its own resources to citialilc.
, .L at HQ.
'· Raich . ::!39 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court in\'alidatecl a state stalule which
~"1t of the •·mplo~ecs in any bu,incss l>c U .S. cililens. The Court
11,cht t«> work for a living in the common occupations of the com'") ~ c c of the personal freedom and opport'.11~ity that it was the
I11th) .\ m.m dmcnt to secure." Id . at 41. The dcc1s1011 was based both
~nd ~ the exclus.i\'c constitutional authority of the federal go\'ern1111~t•on and naturalization. Su note 18 infra.
•- · ~ I< Ca_mc Comm·n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), Lhc Conn rejected the
cul _Ci,hmg licenses to citizens. Again the decision was grounded
P'ot«tion clause and the federal goYcrnmcnt"s prccmptiYc regulation
1111111 tutuno.lization.
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-The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 85: 90, 1975

son that classifications based on alienage were "suspect," 18 and also

rejected the "special public interest" of a state in preserving jobs for
its citizens. 19 In so ruling, the Court paved the way for the two de.
cisions that have greatly narrowed the allowable area of restrictions
on alien employment.
A.

Sugarman v. Dougall: The Excepted Area

In 1973, in Sugarman v. Dougall,2° the Supreme Court considered
an equal protection challenge to a provision of New Y9rk State's
civil service law excluding aliens from jobs classified as "competitive."21 The state asserted a substantial interest in guaranteeing that
a civil servant who " 'participates directly in the formulation and ex.
ecution. of government· policy' " 22 be unimpaired in the fulfillment of
18. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (I9il) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, arc inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular"
minority ... for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.
Despite the Graham declaration, alicnage may be 'd istinguished from race as a
suspect category. First, alienagc is not an "unalterable trait." Rather, it is a "governm entally created status" from which a permanent resident alien can remove himself
voluntarily by applying for naturalization. (Once an alien has secured an immigrant visa
and thus has qualified for permanent residency, there are no further numerical quotas
to limit his or her chances for naturalization.) See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U .S. 56, ?!I
(1972) (dictum that earlier cases in\'oked strict scrutiny where "certain classifications based
on unalterable traits such as race and lineage" were used); Diaz ,·. " ' einberger, 361 F.
Supp. I, 8 (S.D. Fla. 1973) ("the fact that alienage is a governmentally created status
suggests that it may not constitute such a consistently illegitimate distinction as to
warrant mechanical application of the compelling interest test").
Second, alienage is a political status subject to Congress's power to regulate naturalization and immigration. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4: "The Congress shall have Power
. . . To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . . " Though many alienage
cases have turned on an . equal protection/suspectness analysis, always remaining in the
background is the possibility that a disability accorded aliens by the federal government
will be sustained by virtue of federal power to regulate naturalization and immigration
and that a disability accorded aliens by a state will be voided by virtue of its interference with that exclusive federal power. But sec note 37 infra.
19. 403 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1971). The Court gave several reasons for rejecting the
"special public interest" rationale. For one, it was based on a right/privilege distinction
that was no longer ,·iable. Second, the state's concern with limiting expenditures was not
sufficiently compelling. Third, the state could have no "special interest" in tax re\'enues
to which the alien also contributed. The rationale was under attack for many years
before G,·aha111; indeed it was originally Ull(krmined by Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948).
20. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
21. At the time of the action, New York ch·il ser\'ice employees were divided into
"classified" and "unclassified" positions. Of the four categories of classified positions,
only the competitive class (filled on the basis of a competitive examination) required
citizenship. The other categories of classified ci\'il ser\'ice (including upper echelon positions in the state exccuti\'e, municipal and judicial departments) and the unclassi(icd
ser\'ice (including clccti\'e offices, executh·e and kgislative appointments, and teaching
positions) did not require citizenship. Id. at 639-40.
22. Id. at 641 (quoting from appellants' brief).
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~he Court noted the states' interest in preserving "'the basic
~-~~ of 3 palitical co~n:iunity' " 25 and suggested that citizens~ip
·racation was perm1ss1ble not only for Yoters, but for elective
1
and "important nonelective executive, legislative, and ju:'-'• lillliiPlillA 'tiou.s .... " 26 The Court reasoned that incumbents of such
t"J2arc "officers who participate directly in the formulation,
,.,. ,, or review of broad public policy" and thus "perform func-,.., go to the heart of representative government." 2 1
ea...Mr1inar1 did not make clear ,vhether aliens may be flatly excluded
c pasitions of state or municipal employment which cannot
· ed as "offices" 28 and which do not involve the formulation
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..... ..

11 642-43. In view of the proffered justification, the restriction was both

,T and o\'erinclusi\'e. It was underinclusive because it did not require citi. . the upper·le\'el jobs in the classified and uncbissified civil service where

M!if"!- r was :irguably essential to effective performance. Similarly the, restriction was
T because it indiscriminately excluded aliens from jobs far remove'd from
lion and execution of governmental policy, such as sanitation workers and
#, at 645.
at 646-47. Despite the diffident wording of the last section of Sugarman
"._. . do ,.-e hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of positions,
ctwnuhip . . .. " 413 U .S. at 647), the Court's description of the excepted area
malty dicta . llather it was critical to the Court's holding that the New York civil
•IC excluding aliens was underinclusive. See id. at 642-4!1.
•
at 647, quoting Dunn v. Illumstein, 405 U.S. !130, 344 (1972). See 413 U.S.
fri ution omitted):
ire a State"s interest in establishing its own form of government, and in
participation in that government to those who are within "the basic cone( a political community." . . . ·we recognize, too, the State's broad power
Its political community. But in seeking to achie,·e this substantial purpose,
lmination against aliens, the means the State employs must be precisely
la light of the acknowledged purpose.
tlJ U.S. at 647 (emphasis added).
II (nnphasis added).
h nonclcctive positions constitute offices under state law Yaries considerably
lo llate. Among the characteristics considered in determining whether a po.. oHicc or employment are (I) the delegation of sovereign powers; (2) parIn important policymaking and decisionmaking in the governmental unit;
ttquimncnt of an official oath and official bond; :md (4) appointment for a
Ima, with authority conferred by law. See E . .l\IcQL,LLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICI·
- - ,.....,,•• TloNs § 12.!IO (rev. 3d ed. 1973). The lack of any clear standard for deterlio ii an "officer" and who is a mere "employee"' is a strong reason for not
rrma11's 1·efcrence to "officers" as exhaustin~ all permissible areas of dis-

~---.

are generally considered to be employees rather than officers. See cases cited
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of high-level policy. However, Sugarman's emphasis on the state's sub.
stantial interest in defining and preserving a political c9mmunity doei
suggest that exclusion is permissible when the position is, in some
sense, essential to preserving the identity of the political community.
The Court's explicit exception for "officers" may fairly be read ·as a
consequence of this underlying concern; the excepted area thus might
also include other jobs having a critical relationship to the preserva.
tion of the political community, even if those jobs cannot be classified
as "offices." 29
B.

In re Griffiths

In re Griffilhs, 80 decided the same day as Sugarman, may seem to
narrow the excepted area of employment for which citizensh'ip is a
permissible state-imposed qualification. The case concerned the ex.
clusion of an alien, a Netherlands woman named Fre Le Poole Grif.
fiths, from admission to the bar in Connecticut. 31 In an effort to meet
the " 'heavy burden' " 82 required to justify a classification based on
alienage, the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee pointed to the attorney's role as an officer of the court. The Court in turn recognized
the state's interest in ensuring that licensed attorneys be qualified,
but concluded that an attorney's _Eowers, whether to sign writs or take
depositions, "hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such
unique r~ s.£2,nsibjlity_ as to--;;:;'trust them only to citizens." 33 The Court
in Griffiths also refused to hold that the mere licensing of a lawyer
by the state was sufficient to place him "so close to the core of the
in 56 AM. JuR. 2o Municipal Cor/>orntions § 234, at 295 n.G (1971); 68 id., Schools § 129,
at 459 n.79 (1973) ; E . McQUILLIN, suprn § 12.31, at 184-85 n.49.
29. This reading of Sugarman is 1·einforccd by the Court's cryptic comment that it
was not ruling out the poss ibility that
on the basis of an individualized <letennination, an alien may not be refused, or discharged from, public employment, nen on the basis o[ uoncitizenship, if the refusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on kgitimate stale interests 'that relate to
qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee.
Id. at 646-47.
One might attempt to narrow S11garnu111 by pointing to the fact that it anchored the
right of slates to control the qualifications o[ officers :1ml ,·otcrs in the text of the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV, § 4. See 413 U.S. at 648. But the states· interest in political
socialization, if equally essential to effecti,·e government, coul<l be gi,"Cn the very same
textual support.
30. 413 U .S. 717 (1973).
31,- The plaintiff had lived in Connecticut for five years. She was eligible for naturalization, but had taken no steps toward becoming a citizen. Id . at 718. Th e Connecticut
supreme court upheld the exclusion. Ju ,·c Frc Le Poole Griffiths, 162 F onn . 249, 294
A.2d 281 (1972).
32. 413 U.S. at 721, quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 3i9 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); cf. 413
U .S. at 730 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Sec note 15 suprn.
33. 413 U.S. at 724.
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/d. :at i29.
/d. at i2~·25, 72i-29; Brief for Appcllcc at 19-21.
l.awycrs do indeed ocxup~ professional positions of 1·csponsibility and influence
. ., Impose on them dulio rorrl'iati,·c with their right of access to the courts. . . .
'ht. .&hr-)' arc not officials c,( gcr.crnmcnt hy , ·irtue of their being la\\1·ers.
:at 729.
SJ. The "excepted area" illr"'ed by Sugarman and G1·iffiths for state discrimination
tl aliens is probably DO( m.rrowcd by any preemptive effect of the federal gov__.nt'1 power to regulate immigration and naturalization. Suga,-man and G1·iffiths
... IIOI formally reach any ~.:.ion of preemption, as the civil service and bar comft'Strictions were rnidro oo equal protection grounds. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
&,!\, 6~6 (1973); In re Criffilhs, 413 U.S. 717, 718 n.3 (1973). Howner, the Court's
pUcit n.'{-ognition o[ the o.(tpttd area in S11gan11a11 seems to imply that once a state
llthlicd the standards of cqrul protection, it will have no difficulty in meeting the
«c of the su prcmacy cb05C.
long as the states sought 10 justify broad exclusion of aliens from employment
1k b:uis of the state's -,pccul public interest" in preserving employment for state
, the conflict with fnla..l power was potentially more acute. Under the Immiiain and !'.aturalization :\ct. the admission of some aliens is dependent on an assess.
, , . b)' the Secretary of ubrn- of the labor market conditions in the alien 's field of
tncnt. 8 U.S.C. § 118'.!i~/ I!) (1970) (aliens seeking entry "for the purpose of per..._ln,t 51..illcd or unskilled bbor- arc excluclcd unless the Secretary of Labor determines
. . •1hrrc arc not sufficient •orkers in the United States who arc able, willing,
,r~. and anilablc at tf,,e: time of application . . . aud at the place to which
al1m is destined to pcrl•xm such skilled or unskilled labor"). Reliance by a state
d.- "5)X'{ial public intcroC ntionalc imolvcd a conflicting conclusion that employ-.. In the state was nccda:f for state citizens. In addition, what the Tnrnx Court
In IAriling down ;a brw,J iutc-imposed restriction of aliens' prh-ate employment
apply :is well to brood 1ouiclions of state and municipal employment:
~ ~uenion of an auth~ty 10 deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a li.,·c- , c i \\·hen lawfully ad111Jtttd 10 the State would be tantamount to the assertion
ef the right to deny them rrurancc and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot
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political interests to uphold a restrictive statute is Perkins v. Smith
decided by a three-judge district court in Maryland and now on ap
Perkins. concerned the exclusion of aliens from service ort state
federal juries, an exclusion imposed respectively by state and fed
statutes. - The Perkins court sustained the exclusion, holding that a ju
largely unreviewable role as the arbiter of factual issues in crimi
and civil cases made it a critical decisionmaking body, "one of
institutions at the heart of our system of governm~nt." 8 ° Citizens
was necessary for effective performance as a juror because aliens,
a class, were less "conversant with the social and political instituti
of the society" and with the "nuances of local tradition and languag
In addition, an alien's foreign allegiance might distort the way
or she chose to apply the laws. 40 Since any independent attempt
ascertaining loyalty would undercut existing naturalization procedur
the use of citizenship as a gauge of allegiance was "compelled by cir,
cumstances."H
live where they cannot work. And, if such a p0licy were permissible, the practical
result would be that those lawfully admitted to the country under the authority
of the acts of Congress •. , would be segregated in such of the States as ch01e
to offer hospitality.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
38. 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aj1peal docketed, 43 U.S.L.W.
21, 1974).
39. 370 F. Supp. at 137.
40. A juror "who Jacked any concern for the fairness of the outcome could se,·erdJ
obstruct or distort the course of justice." Id. at 138. Indeed, a "single persuasi\'e a
unprincipled juror could C\'en direct the course of justice into channels deliberate
chosen for their deleterious effect on this country." Id. The fact that Pe1·ki11s deala
with what is arguably a political right and not with economic discrimination secq
significant to the validation of the restriction. One can view jury sen·ice as a political
right in that the jury, by utilizing its power of nullification, can modify the substantil-e
Jaw passed by the legislature. Thus, one can argue that restricting an alien's right
to serve on a jury is merely a recognition of "a State's constiunional responsibility
the establishment and operation of its own government . . . . " Sugarman \', Dougall.
413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
41. Judge Winter, in his concurrence, differed with the majority by finding that
there were "less drastic means" of ensuring that alien jurors were fluent in English and
familiar with American laws and institutions; nonetheless Winter strongly agreed that
allegiance and "commitment" to the United States were fundamental to a juror's quali,
fication. 370 F. Supp. at 140. "Citizens, as a rnlc, harbor positive feelings toward their
sovereign and possess a sense of identity with their fellow citizens." Id. al 141. Where
American law "resolves a question of public policy" or "dcfin[es] interpersonal relation·
ships" differently than the law of an alien's own country, it is
not unreasonable to belie\'e that 1·esident aliens may be likely lo permit their positive
feelings toward their foreign sm·ereigns and their sense of identity lo their fellow·
countrymen to impair their commitment to the enforcement and application of
American law in those situations ....
Id. In addition, native-born and naturalized jurors who are eligible to vote and run
for public office "have, at least theoretically, some influence upon the content of tht
laws" and would reasonably be expected to "ha\'C a greater commitment to their proper
application and enforcement than those lacking such influence." And of course such

. Aliens' Right to Teach
Perkins, recently echoed by a Fifth Circuit decision in United States
v. Gordon-Niklwr,4 2 has an important bearing on an alien's right to

teach because it establishes that at least some state positions which are
not high-level governmental appointments may fall within the Sugar-

man exception. The opinion recognizes that critical functions going
·• 'to the heart of representative government' " 43 are sometimes delegated to positions outside the upper levels of any governmental or
bureaucratic hierarchy. The Perkins court does fit jury service within
the explicit language of the Sugarman exception for offices, noting that
jurors hold " 'important nonelective ... judicial positions' " and "participate directly in the execution" of the law.H But Perkins makes no
mention of the term "office," and thus puts a more functional gloss
on Sugarman's language, judging the bounds of the excepted positions
by their actual relationship to the political community.

II.

Teachers and the State's Interest in Education

In order to place teachers within the Sugarman exception, the states
will have to show 4 G a close relationship between education, the teacher,
personal commitment "is not susceptible of objectiYe measurement." Id. at 141. Thus
Perki11s recognizes that formal allegiance may be important as a signal of the attitmlc of
persons im·oh-ed in making judgments that depend on an intangible sense of commitment.
42. 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975). Gordori-Nikkar concerned the exclusion of aliens
fron1 federal juries only. The issue was raised by the motion of a criminal defendant
to quash a jury panel on the ground that the exclusion of resident aliens deprived her
of the Sixth Amendment right tu trial before a jury reprcsentati,·c of the community.
The Gordo11-Nikkar court t1otnl the Supreme Court's dictum in Carter \". Jury Comm·n,
396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970), that states arc "free to confine the selection [of jurors] to
citizens .... " 518· F.2cl at 976 n.4 . But it also relied heaYily on Pcrki11s 's equal protection
analysis:
We agree with the [Perki11s] court's conclusion that there was a compelling interest
"in ensuring that pcrso1ls who scn·e as jurors arc personally committed to the proper
application and enforcement of the laws of the United States" which therefore
justifies the exclusion of aliens.
518 F.2cl at 976. Though the Gorcloll -Nikkar decision cited as an additional justification
Congress's plenary authority to regulate the entry and residence of aliens, a ground
peculiar to federal measures excluding aliens, the court explicitly noted that the Perki11s
ground was sufficient. Id. at 977. An interest in ensuring that jurors arc committed to
the "proper application of the laws" is applicable of comsc both to state and federal
.•
juries.
43. 370 F. Supp. at 137, quoti11g Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
44. Id., quoting and paraphrasing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 63·1, 647 (1973).
45. The arguments that follow in the text, which might support the denial of teacher
certification to aliens, ha,·e not been offered by any state in litigation. Howe,·cr, these
arguments are probably the only grounds left for a justification in light of Sugarman
v. Dougall and In re 9riffiths. The arguments arc dubbed the "state's position"
throughout the remainder of the Note.
There is only one court decision dealing with the restriction of the alien's right to
be certified as a public school teacher. In Miranda Y. Nelson, 351 F. Supp . 73::i (D. Ariz.
1972), aff'd me111., 413 U.S. 902 (1973), a three -judge district court imalidatcd both a
state constitutional proYision which denied aliens the opportunity to be employed in any
state, county or municipal job, and a state law enacted under the authority of that
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and the political community. The validily of the restrictions against
aliens will depend in the first instance on whether a public school
teacher performs functions that are so intimately involved with the
maintenance and identity of the political community as to make a 11
alien unsuitable in the part.
Education does have an essential role in forming and preserving the
character of the political community. 40 One primary function of l'du.

1

prov1s10n which made aliens ineligible for employment in any public institution, 111 •
eluding public schools. ~:,1 F. Supp. at 739-40. The court based its decision 011 hoth
equal protection and prt'<"mption grounds. Id . at 740. The state's only apparent lll'ICll•
mcnt in support of the bws was the ··special public interest" rationale (see 1101(• 16
suprn), which had been trt·atcd with lillle sympathy by the Supreme Court less than two
years earlier in Graham "· Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-75 (1971).
While Miranda voided an alien employment restriction grounded on the state's pt~ 1•
prietary interest in prcs<TYing jobs for its citizens, it sheds Jillie light on the g<'ll<'t'ul
status of restrictions against alien teachers. For one, Miranda dealt with a broad, 1111 •
precise exclusion of aliens from all state emplo):_mcnt, including teaching. Thus, while
the litigation happened to involve a teacher, the state's argument and the court's analyMla
did not focus in any way on the special functions of the teacher in political sod<·ty,
Secondly, the case preceded Sugarman and Gl"iffiths; hence the state's justification wu 1
not tailored to the standards articulated in those cases. Finally, the fact that Min1111/n
was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court limits the preccdcntial ,·alue of
the case. See Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (Summary affirmances whkh
preceded Edelman "obviously arc of prcccdcntial value . . . . Equally obYiously, thi•y
are not of the same p·recedcntial \'aluc as would be an opinion of this Court trcatin1t the
question on the merits"): Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C:.J.,
concmring) ("When we summarily affirm, without opinion, the judgment of a tht'l'C·
judge District Court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by wldch
it was reached . . . . Indet"<I. upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary n·vlcw;
the Court has not hesitat<-<l to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmanct•s 111uy
appear to ha\'c cstablisht-d."); Note, Summm-y Disposition of Supreme Co111·t AJifir,1/,1:
The Significance of Li111itt"d Discretion and a Thco,-y of Limited Pn:adent, 52 11.U,L,
REV. 373 (1972). As a rl'sult, Miranda cannot be said to provide much guidance foi·
analyzing a carefully drawn state statute requiring citizenship for teacher ccrtificntlon.
The only other determinations of the constitutionality of statutes denying nllcns
teaching certificates arc the formal opinions of three states' allorneys general. The Al•
torney General of California found a provision of the California Education Code l'X·
eluding alien teachers to be unconstitutional. 53 Or. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 63 (1970) (011 file
with Yale Law Journal). The opinion was based entirely upon the equal protection
reasoning of Pmdy & Fit1patrick "· State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1969), where the California supreme court struck down a broad exclusion of nll1•11N
from public employment because of the imprecision of the exclusion. As in J\lin1111/,1,
the Attorney General's :111alysis was not peculiar to the teaching profession; hence the
opinion pro, ides Jillie gui<lancc for resolving the present problem. The attorneys gl'11t•1·11l
of Pcnnsyh·ania and New )ency ha,·e also concluded that statutes excluding alien tearhct·N
arc void. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania, writing prior to S11garn1a11 and Grif/il/1.1;
reached tl1e significant condusion that teaching, like medicine, "is not a central go,·ern.
mental function ... " and hence could not support a citizenship requirement. 3 PA. llu1.1 ..
204 Uan . 27, 1973). The opinion of the Allorncy General of New Jersey relied on Sui:111·.
ma11 and G,·iffiths to find the statute 11nconstit11tionally imprecise. N.J. All'y Gen. Fo1·11111l
Op. No. 10. Sept. 2~. 1974.
For a related challenge 10 1·cstrictions on granting tenure to alien teachers on a coll1•1<e
faculty, sec Younus v. Shal>at, 336 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
46. In The Republic, S..>cratcs praises the role o[ cducati~ in determining the chnracter of a political comnni'inty :
Indeed . . . when a ~talc once has a proper start, it grows as a circle would
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cation is to provide the ot1zen with intellectual skills sufficient for
effective participation in the political system. A second function is
to t1.!,_n smit common values, attitudes, and political knowledj e. 47
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Aliens' Right to Teach

For a citizen to participate effectively in a political system that relies on the evaluation of ideas and on informed choice, it is important that he possess at least minimal skills of reading and writing. 48
But the restriction of teacher certification to those qualified to teach
reading and writing can more effectively be accomplished by testing
all applicants, including aliens, for verbal and written fluency. Exclusion of aliens from teaching positions in the public schools thus
is not substantially related to the educational task of ensuring that
citizens are literate.
·

B. Political Socialization
A more fundamental way in which education affects the political
community is in the process of political socialization-the transmission
of political knowledge, attitudes, and values from one generation to
grow. Training and education being kept good engender good natures; and good
natures holding fast to the ·good education become even better than those before
• · , . Then to put it shortly, this one thing needful-training and education-is
what the m·erseers of the city musl clea\'e to, and they must take care that it is not
corrupted insensibly. They must guard it beyond everything ....
l'uTo, THE REPUBLIC BooK IV, 424B (W. Rouse transl. 1956). The United States has
recognized since its inception the importance of public education to the political comlllunity. See, e.g., the Ordinance of 1787, art. lll, 1 Stat. 51-52 n.(a): "Religion, morality,
Ind knowledge, being necessary to good go\'ernment and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall fore,·er be encouraged." One reason frequently
suggested for providing public education is iL~ role in nurturing "good" citizenship. See
D. JAR.OS, SOCIALIZATION TO POLITICS 9-12 (1973); A. MORRIS, supra note 6, at XIV (197-1);
lkrkman, Students i11 Court: F,·ee Speech a11rl the F1111ctio11s of Schooli11g i11 America, 40
HA1tv. Eouc. REv. 567, 569 (1970).
f7. These purposes of education often arc not differentiated explicitly by the courts.
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, ,193 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local go,·ernments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
bot_h demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
SOc1cty. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
~~n service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
It. is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.
f8 .. The importance of general intellectual skills to political participation has been
• primary justification for the promotion of compulsmy public education. See, e.g.,
MINN. CoNsT. art. Vlll, § 1:
Th~ stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the inlcll1gence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools.
•
See In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 686, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168 (1961) (dictum). Educa-
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another. 40 This shaping of political culture can be critical to the
character and .stability of the political community, for each new gen.
eration "emerges upon the political scene as a tabula rasa
. upon
which a political system must seek to imprint its image . . . if it
to persist in some form."~ 0
With the family and the peer group, the school is recognized as a
crucial agent of political socialization. 51 A teacher's role in the process
of political and cultural learning becomes critical because a teacher
is quite often the first nonfamilial spokesman of society that a child
regularly encounters, and functions in the classroom as a model for
Lion seems Lo be positively correlated with nrious indices of political participation, such as
following politics and election campaigns, engaging in political discussions, belonging to
voluntary organizations, and believing oneself capable of influencing the government
G. ALMOND & s. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 317-18 (1965). Of course, such correlation
does not establish that literacy is the cause of or prerequisite to political panicipaLion.
49. Fred I. Greenstein, a leading sociologist, has defined political socialization as
follows:
Narrowly concei,·ed, politkal socialization is Lhe cleliberate inculcation of political
information, values and practices by instructional agents who have been formally
chargecl with this 1·esponsibility. A broacler conception woulcl encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate ancl unplanned, at every stage of
the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally
nonpolitical learning Lhat affects political ·behavior, such as the learning of politically
relevant social aLLitucles ancl the acquisition of politically relevant personality
characteristics.
.
Greenstein, Political Socialization, 14 lNT'L ENCYCLO. OF THE SOCIAL Sci. 551 (1968) . See
Easton & Hess, The Child's Political World, 6 J\[11nn:sT J . OF l'ou. SCI. 229, 230 (1962).
50. Easton & Hess, mprn noLe 49, at 232. Sr•e Greenstein, s11prn noLe 49, at 551.
51. On the role of Lhe school in the political socialization process, sec EDUCATION AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J. Coleman ed. 1965); R . DAWSON & K. PREWITT, POLITICAL
SOCIALIZATION (1969); D. EASTON & J . DENNIS, CIIILDREN IN TIIE J>oLITICAL SYSTEM : ORI·
GINS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (1969); R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN (Anchor Books 1968); i\L JENNINGS & R. NIEMI, THE
POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ADOLESCEI\CE (19i4); R. i\lERELMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND
EDUCATIONAL CLIMATES (1971); C. MERRIAM, T11E ~IAKING OF CITIZENS (1931); cf. Tapp
& Levine, Legal Socialization : Strntegies for a11 Ethical Legality, 2i STAN. L. REV . .I (19i4).
Indeed because Lhe school is the only major agent of the process subject Lo formal
control and clirecLion by the community, some commentators Yicw it as Lhc mosL important means of introclucing a child to the political system. See R . HESS & J. ToRNEY,
supra at 120; Greenstein, suprn note 49, at !i53-54. The school cleals with children
throughout impressionable and formaLi,·c periods of clc,·elopment and is insLrumenLal in
conveying early concrete perceptions of the political institutions, Yalues, and attitudes .
upon which the commtmiLy is based. R . DAWSON & K . PREWITT, m/1rn at 178. Justice
Douglas was quite likely correct in describing the school as the "cradle of our democracy."
Acller v. Bo~rd of Educ., 342 U .S. 48:i , 508 (l!l:i:?) (Douglas, J .• 1\issenLing).
Dawson and Prewitt have identified several ways in which the public school acLs as
an agent of political socialization. "Classroom ritual Jifc"-saltILing the flag, patriotic
songs, discussion of national heroes and events, and systematic exposure to other symbols
and ceremonies- may produce an atLachmcnt to the nation ancl iLs political Yalues and
institutions. R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, suprn at 155-58. A scconcl major instrument of
political socialization is the school curriculum. In deciding on the subjects which arc to be
taught and Lhe materials to be used, Lhe school system consciously attempts lo provide
the student with formal political knowledge. Id . at 147-55.
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Aliens' Right to Teach
cptable behavior and social attitudes."2 This special task of the
:acecher could place his or her employment within the excepted area
,~
f
f
.
. 1
.
recognized by S11~ar~an or unc~10ns essent1a. t~ ~ re~resenta~1ve
litical commumty. 03 The premise of the d1scnmmat10n against
~ens would be that an alien, who often has not been fully exposed
American political culture, cannot serve as effectively as the citizen
10
as :an agent of political socialization. 04
To examine the validity of that premise, it may be helpful to use
tlic models suggested by Robert Hess and Judith Torney 0 ~ Lo describe
the wap in which a teacher influences the political orientation of his
or her students.
l!. [f]or the child the teacher represents an authoritati,·c spokesman of society. The
ac:acher is often the first mo<lcl of political authority the beginning student encounters. How new this kind of authority is lo a child can be seen by comparing
,he p;uent and the teacher. When a child responds lo his parent as an authority
figure. he <locs not separate the role from the incumbent of the role . . • . The
public school teacher as an authority figure, on the other hand, is much more like
a p<>litical authority. The child learns that the authority role and incumbent of
,he role arc separate factors . . . . [H]e discovers that rewards and punishments
from authorities are affected by i<lcntifiablc constraints that operate on the parikular person in the role. The teacher, like the policeman, president, or mayor, is
put of an institutional pallern, a constitutional or<ler.
IL o,wsos 8: K. PRFwrrr, suprn note 51, at 158. In addition,
attitudes toward achie,·emcnt, toward change, toward fair play, toward manipulability of the em·ironmcnt, toward cooperation, as well as toward obedience and
competiti,·eness, can be shaped by the culture of the classroom. . . . [S] uch components of one's world have important "spill-over" effects and shape political
outlooks.
1'. at 165.
The courts have recognized the extraordinary 1·esponsibility that our society places on
w teacher. Su, e.g., Shellon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960), quoting Adler v. Board
o( Educ., !142 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (" 'A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom.
There he shapes the altitude of young minds towar<ls the society in which they live.
In this, the stale has a vital concern.'") Justice Frankfurter decribed teachers as "the
prinu o( our democracy" and emphasized their "special task" in society which must
be fulfilled "by precept and practice." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952)
(Jnnkrurter, J., concurring).
S,. The states would have to show that a purpose of the discriminatory statutes was to
"''ure dfcctivc political socialization. They might point LO provisions in their educational
b., concerned with the promotion of good citizenship. For example the stale of Vvashlniton might point LO the following rather straitlaced provision:
So person, whose certificate or permit authmizing him lo teach in the common
tehooh of this stale has been revoked due to his failure lo endeavor to impress on
the minds o( his pupils the principles of patriotism, or Lo train them up Lo the
Uuc:- comprehl'nsion of the rights, duty and dignity of American citizenship, shall
IJ(" permitted to teach in anv common school in this slate.
\\' ·" "· Rn. Conr § 28.-\.67.030 (1970).
s-4. Su, e.g., R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra note 51, at 160-61:
One major reason why teachers operate so effectively in this connection [as con\C}or1 of consensus values] is that they arc products of the same political socialiution for which they scn·e as agents. Teachers generally do not nec<l to be taught
10 bud the virtues of the nation. Their own political selves have been shaped in
a<co1dancc with the very consensus values they now transmit.
SS. R. HESS 8: J. ToRNEY, supra note 51, at 22-26.
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teacher certification to aliens must rest principally on tht'
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· usmg
·
· pu bl.1c sc h oo l s
• ~rtion of a compe 11·mg interest
m
its
pc,litical socialization. The courts may view the statutory requir~
(or naturalization-including five years' residence and demon~ familiarity with American history and government-as support
&he prop0sition that _a~ al~en _is ~ot sufficiently convers.ant with
.. -..-.-·1r.:1n mores and political mst1tut10ns to act as an effecuve agent
itical socialization in the public schools.61 As Justice Rehnquist
cd in his dissent in Sugarman, the major goal of the naturaliza.
pf'\>ttSS is to ensure that aliens demonstrate the familiarity with
·an culture which citizens as a class are presumed to gain fron1
-..-.... •t ~ucation and basic social contact." 62 The courts also may
to the rationale used in Perl<ins and in Gordon-Niklwr, whert'
, "·ere c:,..cluded from jury service because they were assumed to
familiar with national and local institutions.
l "ct the state's interest must be deemed sufficient to justify a suspect
'ficition. One consideration that might demote a legitimate state
&nut from status as a compelling one is the First Amendment probr.aiscd in the state's attempt to control the process of socialization.
addition, the means used by the state to advance the interest may
~ sufficiently precise.
use the teacher's role in the process of socialization encompasses
It . . t1on, 28 A~r. Soc. REV. 69. 73, 74 (1963). Litt stu<lie<l ci\'ic education in tlll'C\'

ltlsh w:hools, in upper middle class, lower mid<llc class, and working class neigh,
....._.,._ lie concluded that the influence of the formal ciYics curriculum was greatest
le "3, congruent with the attitudes towards goYernment and political participation
I hdd in the community.
I l ' .C. ~ 1'123 (1970) pro,·idcs that an alien seeking naturalization must show "an
-.ilrnbncl ing or the English language" and " a knowle::dge and understanding of tht'
antuh or the history, and of the principles and form of go,·ernment, of th~
Su1n..·· TI1e House Ju<liciarr commented on this pro\'ision :
h lhc 1yucm of citizenship classes sponsored by the Immigration and NaturaliSc-nicc :ind the local school system, the alien is aided in preparing himself fol'
••'--.. Ip, and e\'cry effort is made to give him fundamental and uniform know!·
el our political and social structure.
aa. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Scss. 78 (1952).
'-P1man \'. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 659 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting fron1
111t ity in both S11garn1an and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)).
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the distinct phenomena of identification and direct })'.lt~ , -.al teachin
the character of the state's interest should be assessed it ~ 1tt of eacf

A.

First Amendment Co11siclerntions

In educating the young in citizenship, there should he unusuall
scrupulous attention to the First Amendment, 63 "if ,,~ are not y
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth h, di~count i t~
portant principles of our government as mere platituctt","•H In ev:.
uating the requirements of the First Amendment in tht' present co .
text, 05 a distinction may be made between attempts by the state ~
exclude from its public schools political influences det'll\t•d to be u ~
favorable and efforts to i11cl11de socializing influences that transfer :.
litical information thought to be important.
p
1.

Identification with the Teacher

A fundamental value which lies at the core of the political syste
is freedom of speech and thought. It would be ironic incb·cl for stat:
concerned with the education of a critical citizenry to exclude in~
fluences from the public schools that might cast douht 011 the unthinking acceptance of generally held political values and attitudes.
Yet, at the heart of the argument based on the identification model
is the fear that the unconscious transfer of foreign pol it ital and cultural values will "distort" the political socialization pnx:c,s. Dcnyin
teacher certification to aliens on this ground necessarily amounts t!
an effort to exclude "unfavorable" influences from the l*K:tss of 0 _
litical socialization.
p
In Pierce v . Society of Sisters, in recognizing parenL<s' JJ~ht to have
their children educated in private schools, the Court 1ejc:cted the
state's use of the public schools to "standardize" the n<."Xt generation
of citizens. 66 Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 67 the C<1un invalidated
63. The rights guaranteed by the First Am endment, including frct:tl,,:u_ r,f ,pecch
protected against stale action by the due process clause of the Foun,-;.u:1 Amc.-nd ' arc
I> mcnt.
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U .S. 380 (1927) ; Gitlow "· New York, 268 U.S. f,'l,t
,·. Louisi_ana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Thus they arc applicable to t4'.. • r; ~lati~~c~;
the public schools.
64. West Va. Bd. of E<luc. \', Barnette, 319 U .S. 624, 637 (1943).
65. The arguments made below in regar<l lo the limits placed In " "' Pin t A
1d
ment on a slate's interest in political socialization in the puhlic scJ.,;;'.4 ;irl'lfv a frmcl~ .:
1011
1 -1·
. c1\1zens
. .
Iup
' f or tcac I1111g
.
. nonpuu
'-- •
,r
to any attempt Lo require
111
1c sc h <X>u.
66. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U .S. 510, 535 (1925) (emphasis ad!"~-:
.
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all goYernments in 11.r ~ '""" ,
cxclu<les any general power of the Stale LO sla11clm·dize its childrai \>' rrringLo accept instruction from l>llblic tcad1ers only. The child is not t1~ :llrr,• ,.
cm
~~ 1urc
of the Stale . . . .
67. 262 U.S. 390 (192:1). l\Icyer prl'C'l'dcd the express in corporatiou « J "' \mn.-lmcnl
rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.
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te schools, the Court rejected
) "standardize" the next genera·
,. Nebraska, Oi the Court invali
~mendment, including freedom of speech.
)l'Ocess clause of the Fourteenth Amend
w " · New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); D
us they arc applicable to state regulatiOI

>U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
rd to the limits placed uy the First A
ization in the public schools apply a f
·hing in nonpublic schools.
0, 535 (1925) (emphasis added):
which all go,·ernmcnts in this Union rcpol
to sl<111dardize its children by forcing lhcll
·s only. The child is not the mere crcat
the express incorporation of l'irsl Amend

. }light to Teach
·~

statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in the
,c}lools, spurning Nebraska's contention that allowing foreigndents to be taught their native language would "inculcate
l(U the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this
.... Interpreting ]\.feyer in a later decision, the Court has as&h3t 3 state may not conduct its schools to deliberately "foster
eous people." 00 The Court's strong support for academic
~ and careful restriction of loyalty oaths for teachers 71 also
,a..C\111111&
the view that the First Amendment will not tolerate laws that
p;ill of orthodoxy over the classroom." 72 Rather, students should
~ to "that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
cl a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of au•

73

selection.' "
C>'clusion of alien teachers out of a fear of the unconscious
of foreign attitudes and values is an effort to standardize and

:lll!l~tuU\'C

IL

al '98. See Farrington ,·. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (ill\'alidating refon-ign language schools in the Territory of Hawaii).
1'Wff ,·. Des l\foines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
Tinllrr, the Court restrained the defendant school district, on First Amendfmm disciplining two high school students for wearing black arm bands
&he \"ict Nam " 'a r in Yiolation of a school regulation. In citing Meyer,
9'()4C'd tJiat the dl'cision "expressed this Nation's repudiation of the principle
k might so conduct its schools as to 'fos ter a h omoge neo us people.'" Id.
• ~,., Keyishian ,·. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), i1walidating New
• tcinbcrg Law. The law required the stale board of regents to issue reguthc disqualification or rcmo\'al of faculty in the state educational system
·di~loyal" and to make a list of "subYersiYe" organizations, membership in
romt itute prima facic e\'idence of disqualification for employment. The
C,s,urt found the statute and implementing rt'gulations im·alid on First Amend• :rnd stressed the Yalue of academic freedom: "Our Nation is deeply com..afcauardi ng academic freedom, which is of tr:rnscendant \'alue lo all of
•"· at 603.
,. ~cl\· H ampshire, 35-1 U.S. 23! (1957), the Court reversed a contempt
Inn a uni,·ersity professor who refused to testify about the content of his
an inu-stigation comlucted hy the state allorney general. " ' hilc the Court
Wding on the Yagucnt'ss of the New Hampshire statute authorizing the atal to conduct such an i111piiry, the Com t also emphasized the importance
frttdom:
.
11.ould underestimate the \°ital rnlc in a dt'mocracy that is played by those
an<l train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
• our colleges and uni\'crsities would imperil the future of our Nation.
kt' I>rvcl0Jn11r11ts i11 the Law-.·lcndemic F,·ccdom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045
•

---~,cb,

'41p,cmc Court has consistl'lllly held the statutes requiring such oaths to be·

-1 uguc. See, e.g., f.lfhramll ,·. Rus.sell, 384 U.S. I 1 (l 966); Baggett v. Ilullit,
(l!l<>f); Cramp "· Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 2i8 (1961); cf. Key,d of R<-g<·nts, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See \'an Alstyne, The Co11stit11tio11al
7f'eelarn <111(/ J>rofr:s.rnrs, 1!170 DUKE L.J. 841; Note, Academic Frncdom i11 the
1: Tl,e Right tu Tearh, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV . ll76 (1973).
a,-. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
quoting l ' nited Stales \'. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
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homogenize the process of political socialization. As such, it is inconsistent with First Amendment values. Though there are some diffi.
culties with arguing that the citizenship requirements themselves
violate the First Amendment, 74 the inconsistency may well render
illegitimate any state interest based on the identification model of
political socialization. At the very least, such a justification is suffi.
ciently opposed to the spirit of the First Amendment to be properly
disqualified from status as a compelling interest.n

2.

Acquiring Political luformation

The accumulation model of socialization 1s concerned not with the
unconscious transfer of values and attitudes, but rather with the direct and formal imparting of political information. The states would
assert th~t the alien teacher performs this function less effectively
than the citizen for two reasons . First, aliens, as a class, are presumed
to be less conversant with the political information to be transferred.
Second, because the presentation of this material is more effective
when the content is in harmony with the political orientation of the
te~cher, aliens may be less successful in their presentation even if
they have the requisite knowledge. This aspect of political socialization focuses not so much on the exclusion of unfavorable influences
as on the affirmative task of conveying political information.

..I

'i,

I

•I

.I

74. The difficulties are several. l'or one, there is no explicit speech or line of thought
being repressed. Secondly, and more significantly, a decision invalidating these laws as
violative of the First Amendment would call into question all efforts at political so·
cialization. For in a real sense, all political socialization invo!Yes an imposition of values.
75. The Supreme Court used analogous reasoning in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968). In Williams, the Court invalidated several Ohio election laws that made it
yirtually impossible for any political party other than the Republicans or Democrats to
be placed on the state ballot used to choose electors pledged to candidates for the
presidency and vice presidency. Id . at 24. Two political parties challenged the statutes on
the ground that they denied equal protection to the parties' supporters. The Court
found that the questioned statutes "place[d] burdens" on the First Amendment right of
freedom of association . Id . at 30. As a result, the Court demanded that Ohio demonstrate
a "compelling interest" in order to justify the laws.
In an effort to meet this test, the state asserted that it had a compelling interc~t
in the promotion of a two -party system. However, the Court refused to classify th 15
interest as compelling for purposes of the equal protection analysis because the interest
itself was inconsistent with First Amendme nt values. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
stated:
(Ohio] claims that the State may validly promote a two-party system in order
to encourage compromise and political stability. The fact is, however, that the Ohio
system docs not merely favor a "two-party system"; it favors two particular parties
. . . and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course,
no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the rfght to
have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmental
- policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms . . . .
Id. at 31-32.
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The legitimacy of the state's concern with the harmonious relationship between the content of the curriculum and the personal political
orientation of the teacher is open to question, because of general
judicial disfavor for state inquiry into personal political beliefs. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of the state's
interest in using its schools for the shaping and preservation of the
political community by transfer of important political information. 70
Therefore, the state's interest in ensuring that its teachers possess the
requisite knowledge of the political system and political institutions
would appear to be compelling.
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B.

Imprecision

The Supreme Court in Sugarman noted that a statute restri_cting
alien employment must be drawn with great precision, excluding
aliens only where necessary to the protection of the state's compelling
76. Take, for instance, the flag salute cases. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld a state regulation requiring that pupils in
public school participate in a daily flag salute ceremony. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court, emphasized the state"s interest in using its schools for the promotion and
prcsenation of the political community.
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.
Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which
may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation
to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which
constitutes a civilization.
... The influences which help toward a common feeling for the common country
are manifold. Some may seem harsh and others no doubt are foolish. Surely, however, the encl is legitimate.
Id. at 596, 598. It was for this reason that the Court would not '"exercise censorship over
the conviction of legislatures that a' particular program or exercise will best promote in
the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions
of their country." Id. at 599.
In West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court overruled
Gobitis on the question of compelling students to salute the flag. However, the Court
Sttmed to question only the means by which the state sought to use its schools for
political socialization and not the legitimacy of the end itself. Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court, asserted:
As the present CHIEF JUSTICE [Stone] said in dissent in the Gobitis case, the State
may '"require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the
structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of ci\'il liberty,
lVhich tend to inspire patriotism and love of country." 310 U.S. at 604. Herc, howC\'er, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They are not
merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to
lVhat it is or even what it means. The issue here is whether this slow and easily
neii:lected route to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short cut by substil luting a compulsory salute and slogan.
d. at _631 (footnotes omitted). The courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere
CXt~ns1vely with the curriculum of the public schools, emphasizing that they arc illequipped to substitute for school boards or legislatures in the determination of what is
~ntial to a successful program of compulsory public educatio~. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Oder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v.
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interest. 77 Therefore, even if one concedes that the state's interest in
the accumulation aspect of political socialization is compelling and
that it places public school teaching within the Sugarman exception,
the analysis still is not complete. Discriminatory state statutes, as presently enacted, generally exclude aliens from all teaching positions in
the public schools, without regard to grade level or subject matter.
There are several more precise and "less drastic means" 78 for advancing the state's interest.
The statutes in their present form exclude alien teachers at all grade
levels. While the process of political socialization continues throughout
life, the most critical period seems to be between the ages of three
and 13. 79 The state's interest in political socialization, though arguably compelling in elementary school education, thus wanes considerably in the high school. The varying interest of the state in primary
and secondary education was recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 80 where
the Court held that a state could not compel the attendance of Amish
children in the public schools beyond the eighth grade. One com·
mentator concludes that this decision struck a severe blow to any
state interest in secondary education.st As such, the precision demanded
by use of a suspect classification would limit the permissible exclusion
of alien teachers to the elementary school level.
If the state's compelling interest in political socialization is limited
to the formal transfer of political information, it would also appear
that the exclusion of alien teachers must be limited to subjects in which
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1922.) Though the reluctance of the courts to intervene in
public school operations has been waning (su, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), one
still might expect considerable deference as to the content of curriculum.
77. See p . 95 & note 23 supra.
78. See note 15 supra.
79. See, e .g., R. HESS & J. TORNEY, supra note 51, at 131; M. JENNINGS & R. N1E~1.
supra note 51, at 181-206; Easton & Hess, supra note 49, at 236; Greenstein, supra note
49, at 554. These works suggest that much of one's basic political socialization occurs
before the end of the elementary school years. This, of course, is not 10 suggest that
political attitudes and orientation do 1101 ch:rnge after the eighth grade, but only lhal
the state's interest is stronger in primary education.
80. 406 U.S. 205, 227 (1972) ("[T)here is at best a speculati\·e gain, in terms of meet·
ing the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or two years of compulsory forrnal
education [beyond the eighth grade).")
.
81. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the Finl A mend111e11t s
Religious Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 229-30 (1973) . ll should be noted that even on
the elementary school level, the slate's interest in public education may be outweighed
by other concerns. Thus, in 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, the Court
held that the state's interest in public education must yield 10 the parents' right _ to
provide for equivalent education in prh·ate schools. The Court affirmed an injuncuon
restraining the slate of Oregon from requiring compulsory attendance at public schools.
Similarly, in concluding that teaching is not a "central gO\·crnmcntal function" and hence
unable lo support a citizenship requirement, the Allorney General of Pennsylvania noted
that leaching is often "entrusted lo pri\·ate inslilulions." 3 PA. BULL. 204 (Jan . 27, 197')·
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this information is most central, such as civics and history. 8 ~ Therefore, the statutes in their present form are overbroad in a second way,
for they exclude alien teachers regardless of the subject matter they
are to teach. Since, at the elementary school level, one teacher most
often teaches all subjects, if the state wishes to exclude aliens it should
be required to create specialist positions for teachers of history and
civics. Indeed, the state can probably protect its interest in the teaching of these subjects by testing the competence of individual teachers
at the certification stage, 83 thus invalidating any automatic exclusion
of aliens from public school teaching.
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82. Even in these subjects there is some contro\'ersy as to the impact of the teacher
on the political orientation of his students. See Jennings, Ehman & Niemi, Social Studies
Teachers and Their Pupils, in M. JENNINGS & R. NIEMI, mprn note 51, at 207.
83. All states require teachers to attend an accredited teacher education institution to
be eligible for certification. See T . SnNNETI", supra _note 7, at 35. This alone may
make unnecessary the exclusion of alien teachers from the public schools, for it ensures
an opportunity for the state to monitor competency .
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
February 18, 1977 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 76-808
NYQUIST

v.
Federal/Civil

Timely

MMARY:

This appeal presents the question whether the 3J DC erred in
olding unconstitutional a NY statute which excludes from public
teaching all aliens other than those who have applied for
United
..,__ State s c jtizQR s ~ ip .
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

C

Appees brought this action under §1983 to contest the validity
of Section 3001(3) of the New York Education Law, which provides that

-2no alien may be employed to teach in the public schools of NY unless
\

and until that alien has made application to become a United States
citizen and thereafter proceeds, in due course, to become a citizen.
Petrs,aliens who have el~ted to retain their native citizenship

.

:j

t

--------- - ---- -However, because they do not

(non-applicant aliens), have both applied .for certificatio~

-

in the public schools.

o~ ~

fit within the

limited exceptions to Section 3001(3) petrs have been denied certification. It is undisputed that, in both cases, the denial of certification has borne no relation to petrs' general character or qualifications,
but rather, is soley the product of their status as non-applicant aliens.
In a portion of the opinion not challenged here, the 3JC considered the question whether it should consider the constitutional
issues in light of this Court's admonition in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528 (1974), that a 3 JC should consider such issues only if nonconstitutional statutory Supremacy Clause issues, within the jurisdiction of a single judge, prove not to be dispositive.

Because of the

sweeping nature of the challenge here, the 3 JC, after extensive
citation of authority, concluded that Supremacy Clause claim here was ,
more properly viewed as a true "constitutional" argument beyond the
jurisdiction of the single judge.

The 3JC then proceeded to the equal

protection argument which it foun1 dispositive.
Citing this Court's recent decisions involving discrimination
against aliens, the 3 JD concluded that "any challenged State statute
or regulation placing aliens, as a class, at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
citizens must withstand the rigors of close judicial scrutiny."
App. at 10a.

JS,

The 3 JC recognized the state's interest in the qualifi-

--·---

- --

cations of those who shape the minds of the young and cited the

-

~
suggestion in Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 646-47 (1973), that a

-

••
.,

lot"

-3-

- --

state might require citizenship in "an appropriately defined class
of positions."

The 3 JC nevertheless

concluded that the NY statute

failed Sugarman's requirement that the "means the State employs must
be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose."

Id., at 653.

The court found the state's argument that a citizen presumptively has
an undivided allegiance while a resident alien has a potential conflict
of loyalties insufficient to save the statute.

The court found both

Sugarman and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), inconsistent with

such a sweeping justification.

The weaknesses of the argument in this

particular setting were described as follows:

•·"'

"As with the statute challenged in Sugarman, Section
3001(3) is damned by its imprecision.
It excludes all
non-applicant aliens, regardless of nationality, from
all teaching positions in the public school system,
regardless of grade level or subject matter.
It thus
bars British subjects seeking certification to teach
mathematics or physical education as well as Soviet
citizens seeking to teach civics or economics. The
statute's imprecision becomes even more glaring when one
considers that tpe prohibition does not extend to those
who. teach the thousands of New York children attending
private schools.
Indeed, even in the public schools,
under an amorphous exception to Section 3001(3), the
State would permit a non-applicant alien to obtain
certification to teach certain subjects requiring 'skills
or competencies not readily available among teachers
holding citizenship.' " JS, App. at 13a.
The court noted finally that the position of NY ~eemed "repugnant
to the ve:··y heritage the State is seeking to inculate" in that it

would tend to "cast a pall of orthdoxy over the classroom."
at 15a.

JS, App.

The court concluded that nothing that could save the statute

would come from an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, the further

enforcement of the statute was enjoined.
CONTENTIONS:

Appants argue that because both citizens and aliens can obtain

••
•

.

>

-4-

teaching certificates close judicial scrutiny is inappropriate here.
Appants further argue that this case falls within the area mentioned
in Sugarman where a state can require citizenship. This second position
is based on the general radiations about citizenship that are likely
to result from teacher/pupil contact, regardless of the subject matter
taught.

Finally, appants argue that the exceptions to the citizenship

requirement are only temporary.

For full-time employment a teacher

must meet the standards of the challenged statute.
DISCUSSION:
The inclusion of aliens who are well on their way to abandoning
that status hardly justifies the application of a less searching
scrutiny.

I think that the argument that all teachers necessarily are

involved in teaching citizenship, even if only indirectly, is not enough

(,

to save the statute.

The 3 JC was right that Griffiths and Sugarman

require the rejection of the argument.
There is a motion to affirm.
1/19/77
SN

Baker

DC Op in
JS, App.
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February 18, 1977 Conf~
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 76-808

Appeal from D.C. for
S.D.N.Y. (Feinberg, CJ;
Pierce; Connor; DJs}

Federal/Civil

Timely

time I prepared the memo in the above case I ~as not

--

on October 29, 1976, to note
No. 76-208, which presents a challenge to a NY statute
assistance to resident aliens under
circumstances to those in the instant case.

Although the

in certain respects, they are the same
against aliens can be avoided by the

)

alien's decision to apply for citizenship.

~

is likely to be a central consideration in Mauclet, the instant
case is an appropriate hold for that case~

1/24/77

C

Because that element

Baker

II.

No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick

(NPJ or revers
ummaril )

Appellees brought this action before a three-judge
District Court under§ 1983 to contest the . validity of§
3001(3) of the New York Education Law, which provides that no
alien may be employed to teach in the public schools of New
York unless and until that person has made application to
become a United States citizen and thereafter proceeds, in
due course, to take steps to become a citizen. Appellees are
aliens who have applied for certification to teach in New
York public schools; certification was denied, however,
because appellees have el_ectj!d to ! etain al,.i en status and
citizensh' of their native ountry.
The District Court declared the New York law
unconstitutional. Although that court recognized that under
Dougall the State may require citizenship for_ "an
appropriately defined class of positions," it concluded that
New York's complete ban on teaching by aliens was not
"precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose". In
particular, the District Court observed:
"As with the stat·ute challenged in Sugarman,
Section 3001(3) is damned by its imprecision.
,/JJ/·A
It excludes all non-applicant aliens, regardless
_,,/-A . (!"''~
of nationality, from all teaching positions in
the public school system, regardless of grade
t:.JJr-L
level or subject matter. It thus bars British
· .C/ fo-(]:--r
. )
subjects seeking certification to teach
, ~,
mathematics or physical education as well as
14 , f :,Jv - ~
Soviet citizens seeking to teach civics or
~
1il.,u
economics. The statute's imprecision becomes f/'I'./
~ f t rf _
even more glaring when one considers that the -~~
,.,.A~·
prohibition does not extend to those who teach tJtif JAJfl,~,Apf
the thousands of New York children attending
B'1 !J.JP"~'~:AA
private schools. Indeed, even in the public
('
~
schools, under an amorphous exception to Section c::;:)
~~
·
3001(3), the State would permit a non-applicant
alien to obtain certification to teach certain ~ subjects requ1r1ng 'skills or competencies not
readily available among teachers holding
citizenship.'"

;v~·
~&A

-,_,,~;c,e--

:'

ptr

I think that a state could legit·imately exclude aliens
from certain types of teaching positions; it seems undeniable
that many classes of teache-rs play an important -- and highly
discretionary -- role in forming the values of young students
and as "role models". Foley may not provide the District
Court with much guidance in this area. People can select
their doctors and lawyers but neither parents nor students
can pick their teachers.
Accordingly, I will vote either to note probable
jurisdi~tion or reverse summarily.

,,

76-808

Heretofore Held for No. 76-208 - Nyquist v. Mauclet

~

4. No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick.
e case is an appe 1
from a three-judge court determination of the unconstitutionality of
New York statute that excludes aliens from teaching in the public schools
unless the alien has applied to become a citizen and thereafter proceeds
to become one. Appellants claim that the statute does not discriminate
against aliens since some applicants for citizenship can qualify and that
the exclusion is valid since it is related to the inculcation of citizens i
in schools. These arguments echo arguments made in Mauclet. I th
however, the choice is between affirming or holding for No. 76-839, Foley
v. Connelie.
I am inclined now to favor the hold.

a.- ---

'/P
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76-808 Ambach, Commissioner of Education v.
Norwick, et al
A three-judge court invalidated the New York
statute that prohibited resident aliens from teaching in

,·'

.,,

the public school unless they had made application - as
they were privileged to do - to become American citizens.
As would be expected, the three-judge court
relied heavily on In re Griffiths, Graham v. ~ichardson,
and our decision during the 1976 Term jn Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 423

u.s.

1 (1977) (involving New York scholarships

and student loans) in holding that "strict scrutiny" is
the standard of analysis.
In MaucJet, that involved student scholarship and
loans, I dissented because I thought the New York plan of
financial assistance to college students did not
discriminate against a suspect class, and that therefore
strict scrutiny was not the standard.

The line New York

had drawn was not between aliens and citizens, but merely
between aliens who elected to retain foreign citizenship
and all others.

Although my view was subscribed to by the

Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, a
majority of the Court differed.

Thus, unless last Term's

decision in Foley v. Connelie (see below) affords a

.· .
~··

distinguishing precedent, stare decisis normally would

2.

require that I follow Mauclet in determining the
applicable standard of analysis.
At this time, and subject to further thought and
discussion, I believe I could sustain this New York
statute.

I could elect - as I rarely ever have - not to

follow stare decisis where I believe, as I do on a
constitutional question, that the Court is dead wrong.
I also might be persuaded that the exception
recognized in Foley v. Connelie - viewing poJice officers
as having essentially "political" responsibilities - is
applicable to public school teachers.

Although their role

is not political in the sense either of making or
enforcing laws, it is quite fundamental in responsibility
for educating young minds in the fundamentaJs of democracy
and in understanding and respecting the ruJe of Jaw.

>
<

'

Absent this education and respect, neither the holders of
political office who enact our laws nor those
responsibility for its enforcement can function

.,,

effectively jn preserving our system of freedom under law.
This is an area in which the sheer logic of past

'•

opinions can be viewed as pointing in directions that are

..

not easily harmonized.

I am not, certainly at this time,

entirely comfortable with any resolution . of this case in
terms of how one would write an opinion.

I have a rather

definite view (perhaps based on my long years of
association with public educatjon) that a state should
have the right to impose a citizenship qualification on

,.

.l!

,

3.

its teachers, especially where provision is made to

,.
'

accommodate the resident alien who makes the choice
available to h:i.m or her to become citizens.

.,,,
•·

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

.

'

.

Sept. 18, 1978

76-808 Ambach, Commissioner of Education v.
Norwick, et al
A three-judge court invalidated the New York
statute that prohibited resident aliens from teaching in
the public school unless they had made application - as
they were privileged to do - to become American citizens.
As would be expected, the three-judge court
relied heavily on In re Griffiths, Graham v. Richardson,
and our decision during the 1976 Term in Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 423 U.S. 1 (1977) (involving New York scholarships
and student loans) in holding that "strict scrutiny" is
the standard of analysis.
In Mauclet, that involved student scholarship and
loans, I dissented because I thought the New York plan of
financial assistance to college students did not
discriminate against a suspect class, and that therefore
strict scrutiny was not the standard.

The line New York

had drawn was not between aliens and citizens, but merely
between aliens who elected to retain foreign citizenship
a~s.

Although my view was subscribed to by the

Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, a
majority of the Court differed.

Thus, unless last Term's

decision in Foley v. Connelie (see below) affords a
distinguishing precedent, stare decisis normally would

2.

require that I follow Mauclet in determining the
applicable standard of analysis.
At this time, and subject to further thought and
discussion, I believe I could sustain this New York
statute.

I could elect - as I rarely ever have - not to

follow stare decisis where I believe, as I do on a
constitutional question, that the Court is dead wrong.
I also might be persuaded that the exception
recognized in Foley v. Connelie - viewing police officers
as having essentially "political" responsibilities - is
applicable to public school teachers.

Although their role

is not political in the sense either of making or
enforcing laws, it is quite fundamental in responsibility
for educating young minds in the fundamentals of democracy
and in understanding and respecting the rule of law.
Absent this education and respect, neither the holders of
political office who enact our laws nor those
responsibility for its enforcement can function
effectively in preserving our system of freedom under law.
This is an area in which the sheer logic of past
opinions can be viewed as pointing in directions that are
not easily harmonized.

I am not, certainly at this time,

entirely comfortable with any resolution of this case in
terms of how one would write an opinion.

I have a rather

definite view (perhaps based on my long years of
association with public education) that a state should
have the right to impose a citizenship qualification on

3.

its teachers, especially where provision is made to
accommodate the resident alien who makes the choice
available to him or her to become citizens.

L.F.P., Jr.
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Appeal from D.C. for
S. D. N. Y. (Feinberg, CJ;
Pierce; Connor; DJs)

Federal/Civil

Timely

time I prepared the memo in the above case I ~ as not

--

on October 29, 1976, to note
No. 76-208, which presents a challenge to a NY statute
assistance to resident aliens under
circumstances to those in the instant case.

Although the

in certain respects, they are the same
against aliens can be avoided by the

-·

-2alien's decision to apply for citizenship.

~

is likely to be a central consideration in Mauclet, the instant
case is an appropriate hold for that case.
1/24/77
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vs.

NORWICK

This is an appeal. Also motion to affirm.
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II.

No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick

(NPJ or revers
ummaril )

Appellees brought this action before a three-judge
District Court under§ 1983 to contest the validity of§
3001(3) of the New York Education Law, which provides that no
alien may be employed to teach in the public schools of New
York unless and until that person has made application to
become a United States citizen and thereafter proceeds, in
due course, to take steps to become a citizen. Appellees are
aliens who have applied for certification to teach in New
York public schools: certification was denied, however,
because appellees have el._,e ct~ d to retain a_!_ien status and
citizensh' of their native ountry.
The District Court declared the New York law
unconstitutional. Although that court recognized that under
Dougall the State may require citizenship for. "an
appropriately defined class of positions," it concluded that
New York's complete ban on teaching by aliens was not
"precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose". In
particular, the District Court observed:
"As with the stat·ute challenged in Sugarman,
Section 3001(3) is damned by its imprecision.
./JJ,·A
It excludes all non-applicant aliens, regardless
-1-~ . (!"''~
of nationality, from all teaching positions in
the public school system, regardless of grade
t:.~level or subject matter. It thus bars British
· .9/ JJb-t;:;--r
. >
subjects seeking certification to teach
, ~'
mathematics or physical education as well as
(/) , ~.-,Jv - ~
Soviet citizens seeking to teach civics or
. ~
ft 1J,v
economics. The statute's imprecision becomes ~
~ Y-f _
even more glaring when one considers that the ·~~
,.~,A~ ·
prohibition does not extend to those who teach /J'ffe! l AJf~ ~ , A ~
the thousands of New York children attending
6Yl. ~ ~ , ~ ~ A A ; ·
private schools. Indeed, even in the public
<
)(WI.·
schools, under an amorphous exception to Section c :~; ) ~
/ ..,..,
3001(3), the State would permit a non-applicant --,_,,0/-,11,"alien to obtain certification to teach certain ~
subjects requ1r1ng 'skills or competencies not
readily available among teachers holding
citizenship.'"

;v~·
r

p1r

I think that a state could legitimately exclude aliens
from certain types of teaching positions: it seems undeniable
that many classes of teache-rs play an important -- and highly
discretionary -- role in forming the values of young students
and as "role models". Foley may not provide the District
Court with much guidance in this area. People can select
their doctors and lawyers but neither parents nor students
can pick their teachers.
·
Accordingly, I will vote either to note probable
jurisdiction or reverse summarily.

76-808

Heretofore Held for No. 76-208 - Nyquist v. Mauclet

4. No. 76-808 - Nyquist v. Norwick.
e case is
from a three-judge court determination of the unconstitutionality of
New York statute that excludes aliens from teaching in the public schools
unless the alien has applied to become a citizen and thereafter proceeds
to become one. Appellants claim that the statute does not discriminate
against aliens since some applicants for citizenship can qualify and that
the exclusion is valid since it is related to the inculcation of citizens ~__.......
in schools. These arguments echo arguments made in Mauclet. I th flk,
however, the choice is between '!i!irming or hold ~ng for No. 76-839, Foley
v. Connelie.
I am inclined now to favor the h old.

a-----
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 76-808,

Ambach v. Norwick

I.

The Equal Protection Claim

A.

Applicability of the Rational Relationship Test.
I judge from your memorandum of September 18, 1978,

that no discussion of the caselaw background for the dispute
over the proper eaual protection standard is necessary.
1.

Nyquist v. Mauclet.

The distinction you drew in Mauclet between a statute
excludinq all aliens and one excluding only aliens who may but

2.

choose not to become citizens applies with equal force in this
case.
2.

Foley v. Connelie.

The appellants suggest that in view of the central
role that the public school teacher plays in the civic~
education of c hildren, Foley

y.

Connelie, 98 S.Ct. 1067 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ~

indicates that the proper standard of review for the equal

~~~~--------- -

protection challenqe is the rational relationship t§..st.

In

Foley, the Court upheld the constitutionality of New York's
statute limiting eligibility for appointment as a state trooper
to citizens of the United States.

After reviewing many of this

Court's decisions on the rights of aliens, Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court reached the following
conclusion:
"rwJe have recognized that citizenship
may be a relevant qualification for
-

=--------"

,---=.....,.,....___.-.,

_,.,....-.

--

ful._fillin 9-. t ~ se 'important nonelective
executive, legislative and judicial

-

positions,' held by 'officers who
participate directly in the
formulation, execution, or review of
broad public policy.'
Douoall,

rsugarman v.)

r413 U.S. 634,]

647

r(1973)1.

rwle must necessarily examine each
position in question to determine

~

3.

whether it involves discretionary
decisionmaking, or execution of policy,
which substantially affects members of
the political community.
"The essence of our holdinqs to
date is that although we extend to
a]iens the right to education and
public welfare, alonq with the ability
to earn a livelihood and engage in
licensed professions, the right to
qovern is reserved to citizens."
98 S.Ct. at 1071

(footnote omitted).

If the classification in

question affects eligibility for a position within the
"qovernance" category, the rational relationship test is
.......

-.,

applicable.

Id. at 1070, 1073.

In concludino that policemen fall within the
governance category because of their participation in the
exe~ution of broad public policy, the Court stressed that the

-

---

police function is "one of the basic functions of qovernment"

____________,

-

~

~~

and that "rtlhe police function fulfills a most fundamental
obligation of qovernment to its constituency."

Id. at 1071.

While police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy, the
Court observed, they have broad discretionary powers affectinq
many people in significant ways.

The Court especially stressed

the authority of police officers to intrude, through searches

and arrests, on the privacy of individuals.
New York has provided for public education since it
became a State; the State constitution has mandated free public +t!>
education since 1894.
-

=-~=-e::.;::

-==-·

~

The public education function has a

direct and fundamental impact on the lives of all the students
that are educated in the public schools.

Under New York law,

the public schools are charged not only with scholastic
/T)
It
v
education but also wit~ ducation in democratic values,
attitudes, and principles of behavior.

--.............

~

~~

~
This latter charge i s ~
~-~

expressed in the State laws governing curriculum.

These

~

require courses in civics, and New York and United States
history.

Children over eight years of age are required to

----------~....--~...._______

. .
. @)
· 1patr1ot1sm
· ·
h 1p,
· ). inc
·
1 u d 1n9
·
·
l
·
part1c1pate
1n
courses 1n
an d c1t1zens
__._.

......

study of the federal and state ~onstitutions and Declaration of
In~ epende ~ce in order to promote "patriotic and civic service
and ••. foster ..• qualities

essential •.• to meet the

objectives of citizenship in peace or in war."
Law §801(1), (2)~

nd (3).

N.Y. Education

In secondary education, there must

be instruction in "the principles of government proclaimed in
the Declaration of Independence and established by the
constitution of the United States", N.Y. Education Law
§3204(3)(a)(2); "instructional exercises" on the federal and
state bills of rights, the flaq, and patriotic holidays are
also required in all public schools.
There is no need to belabor the discretion of the

5.
{

teacher within these broad curricular requirements.

Even where

local school boards add further details to these requirements,
the teacher necessarily retains a great deal of control over
what is taught and how it is presented.

~~ls-

~~
To some extent, the
~

teacher's discretion in the teaching of academic subjects is
checked systematically by the use of standardized achievement
tests at various staqes in the educational process, e.g., the
Regents Examination in New York.

But the teaching of

democratic values and attitudes is not susceptible to such

-

sY.stematic measurement, and consequently it is difficult to
impose any check on the teacher's discretion in this area of
instruction.
I am doing some reading on the role of the public
school teacher in the political socialization of students, and
will summarize my findings in a supplemental memorandum.
The appellees offer several reasons why public s c h o o l ~ ,
teachers should not be regarded as similar to policemen u n d ~
the standard laid down in Foley v. Connelie.

They suggest that

all of the positions that can be reserved for citizens -jurors, voters, and police officers -- are governmental
monopolies, in contrast with those that cannot be so reserved,
such as civil servants, attorneys, and enqineers.
out that teaching ( or education)

They point

is not such a monopoly,

because New York allows private schools.

~

~&---

4--~

In each instance referred to by appellees, i n c l u a ~ ·

6.
I

those in which the appellees say that the qovernment "h~s no
monopoly," the case arose because the qovernment controlled
access to the particular job or jobs in question.

The same is

true of certification as a public school teacher; I do not see
that the possibility that some teachers may teach in a private
school without certification affects the function of the public
school teacher in executing the broad policies of public
education.
The appellees also note that under New York law,
public school teachers are considered "employees" rather than
"officers" in determining their eligibility to hold e l e c t i v e ~
public office.

In addition, they cite San Antonio School

District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973), where the Court
concluded that education is not a fundamental right.

Though

the appellees do not articulate the conclusion to be drawn from
this premise, I assume that it is that activity in the
execution of a public function not satisfyinq a fundamental
right cannot come within the "governance" exception of Foley.

r..L/~L . ._

Finally, the appellees arque that teachinq, unlike poljcing, i s - - ~ ~
vi-a_.

a "common occupation of the community" ana therefore falls
outside of the Foley exception.

The state law distinction between "officers" and
"employees" noted supra has no obvious bearinq on the Foley
classification, since Foley applies to non-elective positions.

'"·

7.
I

~V-1~,-

~~~u~
~ . ~ / ~·/_
IA-A-~~~

The important inquiry is whether the position of public schoo ~
teacher "involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of
policy, which substantially affects members of the politica~
community."

Foley, 98 S.Ct. at 1071.

I am not aware of any decision holding that there is a
fundamental right to law enforcement.

It

that the police function is a fundamental

------

government.

It seems to me that the same

-------------

_____..,.

education.
In Truax v. Raich,
invalidated an Arizona

more than five persons to employ not fewer than 80% qualified
electors or native-born citizens of the United States.

Other

than using the terms "common occupations of the community" and
"ordinary means of earninq a livelihood" interchangeably, the
Court does not give any indication of what counts as a "common
occupation."

In Foley v. Connelie, the Court indicated that

working as a policeman does not count as working at a "common
occupation."

98 s.ct. at 1072.

To the extent that some types of public employment may
count as employment in a "common occupation of the community,"
the relevant distinction between such public employment and
other public employment that is more governmental in nature is
drawn by Foley v. Connelie.

Any public employment that does

not fall within the Foley principle may be considered a "common

f..

•.

B.

occupation."

I prefer approaching the problem from the Foley

end, and leaving "common occupations" as the residual category,
because the criterion in Foley is defined more fully than the
Truax "common occupation" notion.

The appellees fail to stress their best argument
against the application of Foley in the present case.

Public

school teachers have nothing to do with qoverning the

-

community, that is, with makinq and applyinq laws, except to
t he extent that they must obey the laws detailina their duties
as teachers.

~

~ ~~
pt/ ~ J/k__ ~ ~ f - '1' ~
~f

~-~~~~~~

B.

The State';"P:;-;.~,

i~i'fi

~4--</C<.-~

The State says that its purpose in adoptinq §3001(3))
is to ensure that public school teachers are qualified to
impart effectively to their students the values and attitudes~ ,
fundamental to American social and political life.
The appellees do not attack the legitimacy of this
purpose.

They do make a diversionary attack by arguing that

the State has no legitimate purpose in encouraginq aliens to
become citizens.

The State, however, has never claimed this as

a purpose underlying ~3001(3).
The appellees do make several arguments intended to
show that the State has no substantial interest in the
exclusion of non-applicant aliens from certification.

First,

~

..
9•

.
•.

they point out that since 1967, the legislature has given the
Commissioner of Education the authority to alter by regulation
the exclusion at issue.

The appellees contend that this

delegation of authority to the Commissioner indicates that the
State has no strong interest in the maintenance of the
exclusion.

~

Second, appellees refer to the New York law

allowing alien parents of public school students to serve
~t:-~ ·

local boards of election.

0 ~

They argue that if aliens can gov ~
~

the schools, the state interest in excludinq them from teachin~~

"':?J/

in the schools cannot be substantial.

The appellants have not addressed these two points in
their Brief, but I imagine their rejoinders would be the
following.

The Commissioner of Education is the official

charged with implementing the Education Law.

Since the only

purpose of ~3001(3) is to advance the purpose of civic
education in the public schools, it makes sense to place
control over the exclusion in the Commissioner.

This

delegation in no way reflects on the substantiality of the

:.

10 •

.

'

State's interest in civic education.*

The curricular

requirements regarding civic education that are contained in
state law, and the exclusion of non-applicant aliens from
certification under state law, are immune from interference by

-

local school boards.

Admission of aliens to membership in

, - - - -·- -

local school boards, though responsive to other purposes than
civic eaucat1on of public school students, is not inconsistent
with the State's announced purpose for ~3001(3).

* The appellees also argue that a decision by the Commissioner
to retain the certification exclusion cannot be reqarded as a
decision by the State that the State has a substantial interest
in the exclusion.
In support of this view, the appellees cite
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wonq, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). The plaintiffs in
that case challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Service
Commission's rule excluding aliens from the competitive civil
service. The Court noted that adoption of the rule had not
been required by Congress or the President. The Court
therefore refused to allow the Commission to rely on policy
justifications for the rule that were drawn from outside the
scope of the Commission's responsibility for promotion of an
efficient civil service. This left only a sinqle proffered
iustification for the rule -- since some important and
~ensitive civil service positions must be restricted to
citizens, administrative expenses are minimized by excluding
all aliens from the civil service.
For reasons not here
important, the Court rejected this justification for the rule.
The contrasts between Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong and the
present case are apparent.
Here the State legislature has
explicitly delegated the authority over the exclusion of alien
from teacher certification to the Cornm1ssioner of Education.
Further, the reasons proffered by the Commissioner to justify
the exclusion fall within the area of responsibility with which
he is charged.
He argues that given his responsibility for
educatinq publ1c school pupils in the attitudes and values of
democratic society, the exclusion of non-applicant aliens is a
necessary rule.

~ ~1.

~~~L~

C.

The Fit Between the State's Purpose and §3001(3) ~

··.. ~ ....L.6!A,.ih .
The appellants claim that §3001(3) is related ~

rationally to the achievement of the State's purpose.

J:t4

c:...-i.. ~

statute excludes a group of teachers who are unqualified to ~
impart the values and attitudes of American social and

~ ~

political life to their students.

~a~~ '$,

Instruction in civic

and attitudes, just as in any other sets of values, must be as
-{~

~

~uch by e~mple a~by di~couE._.se.

Aliens who may but refuse to

. become citizens cannot provioe that example.
The appellees argue that §3001(3) is not related
rationally to the State's purpose because it allows the
certification of aliens who are ineligible to become citizens
or to declare their intent to become citizens.

But the failure

to exclude all unqualified teachers does not make a statute
that excludes some of them less than rational.

Further, aliens

who are ineligible for citizenship receive only temporary
certifications.
The Court defined the required fit between ends and
means, under the strict scrutiny test, in Nyquist v. Mauclet,
supra, 432 U.S. at 7.

"In undertaking this [close] scrutiny,

'the governmental interest claimed to justify the
discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to
determine whether that interest is leaitimate and substantial,
and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve ,,
the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.'"

(quoting

~

""

~~

Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976)).

The appellees raise several arguments nirected at showing that

12.

~3001 (3) is neither necessary to the State's purpose nor
precisely drawn to serve that purpose.
The appellees argue that the ~3001(3) restriction o n ~

~

certification is unnecessary because the oath required of all

teachers is sufficient to ensure that the State gets teachers , ~ , ,
who are committed to American political principles.

The oath,

prescribed by ~3002, is the following:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support the constitution of the
United States of America and the
constitution of the State of New York,
and that I wiJl faithfully discharqe,
accordinq to the best of my ability,
the duties of the ••• (title of
position and name or designation of
school, college, university or
~~~ .. "'-'
institution to be here inserted), to
~~
which I am assigned."
kJ ~ , - J

__ --

The State imposes many of the same requirements for

-

~

instruction in civics and State and national history on_, private
schools as it imposes on public schools.
pp. 12-13.

Appellants' Brief,

The appellees argue that if the State does not need

to exclude non-applicant aliens from teaching in private
schools, it does not need to exclude them from public schools
either.

-

The appellants respond that the interests of the State

in private education are different from those it seeks to
realize in public education.
'--

-----

In particular, it recognizes that

-..

private elementary and secondary education is devoted to the
inculcation of different kinds of values in students,
particularly religious values.

Whi]e the State imposes some

requirements regarding civic eaucation, it recognizes and
respects the _ different function fillen by private schools, and
so reauires only that their teachers by "competent."
The appellees argue that §3001(3) is under-inclusive
because it allows the certification of aliens who have not
identified with and become a part of American political

Appellees refer to several provisions of New York ~~

society.

l ,

...

law, including those allowing temporary certification of aliens' /
ineliqible for citizenship and of aliens with skills not

-----

available among previously certified teachers.

-----~
respond that because

The appellants

of the small numbers and limited duration

of these exceptional certifications, their impact on the
accomplishment of the State's purposes in civic education are
small.
The appellees also contend that ~3001(3) is overinclusive because it excludes non-applicant aliens who by
reason of their own national heritage are qualified to impart
to public school students the requisite civic values and
attitudes.

One of the appellees, for example, is a citizen of

Great Britain, and she argues that there is little or no
difference in the values and attitudes of social and political
behavior in that country and the United States.
The appellees assert that §3001(3) is over-inclusive
also because it bars non-alien applicants from teaching~
subject, including subjects such as mathematics and foreign
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languages where there is little or no place for civic
education.

The appellants point out that under the early

childhood and upper elementary certificate sought by appellees,
teachers instruct in all subjects, including reading, writing,
English, geography, United States and New York history, civics,
arithmetic, and science.

Teachers certified to teach at the

secondary level can be required to instruct outside of their
certification one day per week.

The appellants also argue that

every teacher, whatever his certification, teaches by example
on such matters as patriotism and citizenship.

The appellants

concludes that no practicable system of certification could
exclude resident aliens who have not applied for citizenship
from positions where they will shape the political values of
public schools pupils.
The appellees also point out that only ten other
states presently have and enforce a requirement that public
school teachers be citizens or aliens who have declared their
intent to become citizens.
II.

Other Constitutional Objections to §3001(3)
The three-judge DC based its holding on

~-hf
~ J/L-t'
the Equal
~
~

Protection Clause, and did not consider the other objections t ~
the statute advanced by the appellees.

I will describe and

discuss those claims briefly.
A.

Due Proce~s Claim.
Citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441

(1973),

v-u..,

c//J
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Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974),
and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), appellees arque
that the New York statute creates an unconstitutional .
irrebutable presumption that they are unqualified to teach in
the public schools.

They contend that because the operation of

the presumption turns on a classification -- alienage -- that
the Court has marked for special scrutiny, the presumption
violates the Due Process Clause.
All legislative classifications create irrebutable
presumptions.

The Due Process question in Vlandis, La Fleur,

and Stanley was not the existence of a legislative
classification, but the fundamental fairness of the challenged
classification.

The question in the present case, under the

Due Process Clause, is whether it is fundamentally unfair to
create an irrebutable presumption that non-applicant aliens are
unqualified to be public school teachers.
B.

First Amendment Claim.
The appellees argue that by excluding non-applicant

aliens from positions as public school teachers, New York
stifles the expression of various points of view, "cast[ing) a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."
Reqents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).

Keyshian v. Board of

New York does not exclude,

however, all aliens from serving as public school teachers, so
it is unclear what unique contribution to the exchange of ideas
would be made by non-applicant aliens.

The appellees do not

,.

•
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claim that they would put forth to their pupils the suggestion
that it is better not to be a citizen, or that it is better not
to adopt the civic attitudes and values that are held out to
school children as normative in our society.
Further, to the extent that appellees might claim the
First Amendment right to make this unique contribution, I would
conclude against such a right.

The notion that "[t]he

classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'", Keyshian,
supra, 385 U.S. at 603, rests on the assumption that all of
those participating in the market come to it with a common
basic understanding about the way the market works.

Ideas of

majoritarian rule within certain limits fixed to protect
minorities from abuse and exploitation, of attention to and
discussion of differinq points of view, and of toleration for
those with differing ideas, are the essential groundrules of
the marketplace.

To a large extent, these are the civic

principles and values that are imparted to school children in
the elementary grades, at least.

At this level, I do not think

that we are interested in exposinq children to other potential
sets of groun~ules, since we do not want to offer them a
choice.

It is no coincidence that Keyshian involved university

teachers.
C.

Supremacy Clause Issue.
The appellees contend that the New York statute is at

odds with the federal laws requlating immiqration, and is

•
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therefore invalid by reason of the Supremacy Clause.

They

argue, in qeneral terms, that Congress has not disabled aliens
from employment -- from "paying their way"

and that a state

law that does burden the employment prospects of aliens is
inconsistent with the federal law.

The federal Jaw provides

for consideration of questions of political allegiance and
intention to become a citizen
admitted to the country.

at the time that an alien is

For the State to make an inconsistent

determination, appellees contend, is also inconsistent with
federal law.
Appellees contend, more particular]y, that the New
York statute is inconsistent with federal law governinq the
admission of alien teachers to the country.

Since 1976, 8

U.S.C. §1182(a). (14) has provided that alien teachers with
qualifications superior to available resident teachers may be
admitted.

The New York statute, accoraing to appel].ees, is

inconsistent with this statute since it forbids certification
of such teachers in preference for less qualified resident
teachers.
This argument was raised in the appellees complaint,
but was not considered or decided by the three-judge DC.

In

the Jurisaictional Statement and the Motion to Affirm, all of
the parties treated this case as raisinq only equal protection
claims.

The Appellants' Brief on the merits continues with

this approach.

18.

Appellees argument that the New York statute is preempted by federal immigration laws does not seem to me to have
much to recommend it.

The appellees ao not cite any provision

of the federal law that is inconsistent with the New York
statute.

As the three-judge DC put it, "the purported conflict

underlying plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause argument is not between
Section 3001 (3) and any specific enactment of Conqress, but
rather, between Section 3001(3) and the exclusive power to
regulate immiqration and naturalization ve~ted in the federal
government by ••• the Constitution."

(JS Sa).

Appellees

general pre-emption argument proves too much, for it lea~s to
the conclusion that no alien, once admitted to the country,
could be excluded from any position because of alienage.

And

the more narrow argument, resting on 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(14),
does not show any real conflict between the federal and state
laws.

The federal statute does not purport to measure the

qualification of alien teachers to provide the civic education
that concerns New York and is said by it to underlie §3001(3).

Summary:

Though the appellees raise other

constitutional bases for sustaining the judgment of the DC, I
think that the case should be decided on Equal Protection
grounds.

__

_____________

The Equal..__......_,_____
Protection .....:...
question is a difficult one.
to the standard to be applied, the governance ex~tion of

As

1 9.

Foley is not an exact fit, since public schooJ teachers do not
participate in making or applying laws.

But the role of public

school teachers in instillinq civic values and attitudes is
important to the maintenance of the political community.
The appellees strongest point is their criticism of
the fit between the State's purpose and the means adopted,
~3001 (3).

I think it is a close question whether the

classifications established by the statute will survive strict
scrutiny.
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SUPPLEMENTAL .MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

Ambach ·v~ Norwick, No. 76-808:

Teacher's Role in

Political Socialization

The role of the public school and the teacher in the
political education and socialization of children has been the
subject of a number of studies by political scientists.

My

review of some of this literature did not uncover any consensus
on the major questions.
Not all of the observers agree that ' the school is of
any particular importance in teaching political attitudes and
values.

H. Hyman, Political ·socialization 69-74 (1959),

attributes political attitudes and values to a child's family
experience.

Diamond, "Studies and Projects in Citizenship," in

F. Patterson, ed., Adolescent Citizen 72 (1960), attributes
political value formation more to community structure, and the
"morale and spirit" of the school, than to classroom

7

2.

instruction.
Other writers appear to be convinced of the central
importance of the public school in political socialization.

v.o.

Key, Public ·opinion · and ·American Democracy 316 (1961),

comments that "all national education systems indoctrinate the
corning generation with the basic outlooks and values of the
political order."

Hess and Torney, Development of Political

Attitudes in Children 365 (1967), conclude that "the public
school is the most important and effective instrument of
political socialization in the United States."
As for the particular role of the teacher in
fulfilling whatever place the school may have in political
socialization, I have discovered nothing helpful.

Those

writers who view the school as important not surprisingly tend
to attach some importance to the teacher's part in the project.
E.g~, Hess and Torney, supra, at 217-18.

This linkage accords

with one's commonsense expectations, but I have not found any
convincing ernoirical confirmation of that intuition.
My reading has been limited to about a dozen books.
Perhaps more extensive research would turn up more helpful
information, but I doubt it.

Everything of recent vintage

appears to be the work of political "scientists" more concerned

---------------------

with measuring something than establishing precisely what it is
that we need to have the measure of.

As a consequence, the

studies tend to go off in various directions, and even the

3.

general summary statements in the foregoing paragraphs mask
significant differences in the purposes of the studies from
which they spring.
It does seem to me that many of the statements that
minimize the importance of the school stem from studies focused
on the transmission of fairly specific political information
and allegiances,

e~g~, political party allegiances.

The

schools may be concerned in the early years (though not in the
high school years) with much more basic political
socialization, especially in early years.

In those grades, it

seems to me, the primary purpose of civic education in the
schools is to inculcate basic attitudes about law, society,
public discourse, majority rule, and tolerance of minorities.
At least two of the studies that I read characterized the civic
education of the early years in just this way.

E. Friedenburq,

Coming ·of ·Age · in America~ · Growth ·ana ·Acquiesence 221-26
(1967), comments that schools attempt to generate support for
the political system by inculcating the most inclusive values
espoused by the system.

This approach to political

socialization limits the school's influence, but at the same
time strengthens it within that limited scope because it
stresses values, attitudes, and behavior that is approved
widely.

Similarly, Hess and Torney,

~

supra, at 217, notes that

"[c]ompliance to rules and authorities is a major focus of
civic education in elementary school.

Teachers' ratings of the

9
~

4.

importance of various topics clearly indicate that the
strongest emphasis is placed upon compliance to law, authority,
and school regulations."
Several of the studies cited supra, along with other
~

works by social scientists, are discussed in the attached Note
from the Yale Law Journal.
interest.

I think that you will find it of
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DRAFT OPINION
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FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
Ambach v. Norwick, No. 76-808
February 9, 1979

Mr. · Jastice · Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a State may,
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refuse to employ as elementary and secondary school
teachers aliens who are eligible for United States citizenship
;

but who refuse to seek naturalization.
I
New York Education Law~ 3001(3) forbids certification
as a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen
of the United States, unless that person has manifested an
1

intention to apply for citizenship.

The Commissioner of

Education is authorized to create exemptions from this
prohibition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not
2

yet eligible for citizenship.

Unless a teacher obtains

certification, he may not work in a public elementary or
3
secondary school in New York.
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject

2.

of Great Britain.

She has resided in this country since 1965

and is married to a United States citizen.

Appellee Dachinger

is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also
is married to a United States citizen.

Both Norwick and

Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher,
~ ~~~
but they consistently have refused to l ~
6 Itizenship in
<'." • .

spite of their eligibility to do so.

Norwick applied in 1973

for a teaching certificate covering nursery school through
sixth grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the
4
same grades in 1975.

Both applications were denied because of

appellees' failure to meet the requirements of§ 3001(3).
Norwick then filed suit in federal district court seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of§ 3001(3), and Dachinger obtained
leave to intervene as a plaintiff.
A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2281.

After briefing and the stipulation of

certain facts, but before the presentation of evidence, the
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Applying the

"close judicial scrutiny" standard of Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the court held that§ 3001(3)
discriminated against aliens in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.

417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

The

,..

3.

court believed that the statute was overbroad, because it
excluded all resident aliens from all teaching jobs regardless
of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's nationality,
the nature of the alien's relationship to this country, and the
alien's willingness to substitute some other sign of loyalty to
this nation's political values, such as an oath of allegiance.
Id;, at 921.

We noted probable _jurisdiction over the state's

appeal, 436 U.S. 902 (1978), and now reverse.
II
A

The decisions of this Court regarding the
permissibility of statutory classifications involving aliens
have not formed an unwavering line over the years.

State

regulation of the employment of aliens long has been subject to
constitutional constraints.

~-

In Yick · wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.

356 (1886), the Court struck down an ordinance which was ~
to prevent aliens from running laundries, and in Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community • •
~ , at 41.

At the same time, however, the Court also has

recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when

II

4.

aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment.

At

the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine permitted
States to exclude aliens from various activities when the
restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of the
public domain, or of the common property or resources of the
people of the State, . .

II

Id~, at 39.

Hence, as part of a

larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land, Fr\ck v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923);
(1923);

Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313

Porterfield v. Webb,
___. 263 U.S. 225 (1923);

Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);
(1901);

Terrace v.

Blythe v. Hinkley, 180 U.S. 333

Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880), harvesting

wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914);
Mccready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391

(1877), or maintaining an

inherently dangerous enterprise, Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S.
392 (1927), States permissibly could exclude aliens from
working on public construction projects, Crane v. New · York, 239
U.S. 195 (1915), and, it appears, from engaging in any form of
public employment at all, see Truax, at 40.
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have
- = . = - ~ h~ ~ ~ ~ ~

are free to exclude aliens.

The first sign that the Court would view with increased
skepticism discrimination against aliens even in areas affected
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyama v. California, 332

5.

U.S 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory
presumptions designed to discourage evasion of California's ban
on alien landholding discriminated against the aliz ~&" citizen

t>f~.
children/\

The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a

State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters "is
inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all aliens
who are lawful residents of the State from making a living by
fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting all others
to do so."
(1948).

Takahashi v. Fish · &· Game · Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 421

~~
This withdrawal from the former doctrine culminated in
,\

Graham · v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), which for the first
time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."

Id;, at 372.

Applying Graham, this Court has struck down statutes that
prevented aliens from entering a State's classified civil
service, Suqarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), practicing
law, In · re · Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), working as an
engineer, Examining · Bd; v. Flores · de · etero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976), and receiving state educational benefits, Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Although our more recent decisions have departed
substantially from the public interest doctrine of Traax's day,
they have not abandoned the general principle that some state

6.

functions are so bound up with the ~

f the State as

a political entity as to permit the exclusion from those
functions of all persons who have not become part of the polity
that comprises the State.

In Sugarman, we recognized that a

State could, "in an appropriately defined class of positions,
require citizenship as a qualification for office."

We went on

to observe:

"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its
obligation, already noted above,

'to preserve the

basic conception of a political community.' • • .
And this power and responsibility of the State
applies, not only to the qualifications of
voters, but also to persons holding state
elective or important nonelective executive,
legislative, and judicial positions, for officers
who participate directly in the formulation,
execution, or review of broad public policy
perform functions that go to the heart of
representative government."

Id;, at 647

(citation omitted).
The exclusion of aliens from such positions would
demanding scrutiny from this Court.
Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11;

Id;, at 648.

See also

Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.

Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
Applying this standard, we held last Term that New
York could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force.
Foley v. eonnelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).

Because the police

7.

function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government
to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with

~

substantial discretionary powers, we ~ega~e-eQ the police force
as being one of those appropriately defined classes of
positions for which a citizenship requirement could be imposed.
Id;, at 297.

Accordingly, the State was required to justify

its classification only "by a showing of some rational
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and
the limiting classification."

Id;, at 296.

The rule for governmental functions, which is an
exception to the general standard applicable to classifications
;

based on alienage, rests on important principles inherent in
the Constitution.

Broad-based classifications that exclude

aliens from various walks of private life ordinarily serve no
legitimate state interest, but the distinction between citizens

~k
and aliens lies -at.A the heart of the definition of a state and
its government.

The Constitution itself refers to the

distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman, at 651-652
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), indicating that the status of
citizenship was meant to h a v e ~ significance in the
structure of our government.

The assumption of that status,

whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an association with
the polity which, in a democratic republic, exercises the

8.

powers of governance.

See Foley, at 295.

association is important:

The form of this

An oath of allegiance or similar

ceremony cannot substitute for the unequivocal legal bond
citizenship represents.

It is because of this special

significance of citizenship that governmental entities ) when
~u~y7

~

i.--

~~~~

~ t h e f unctions
'
±' '
exerc1s~
o f government j p.:r:epe~ ±y-may1m1t
1
'

~

~~

5

the participation of non-citizens.
B

In determining whether teaching in public schools

~~ .t.e_

~Id.~~~,

constitutes a governmental functionA we look to the role of

-1-o

public education in our democratic society and the degree of
I\
;

responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling
that role.

See id~, at 297.

Each of these considerations

$

support the conclusion that public school teachers may be
~

regarded as performing a task "that go[es] to the heart of
representative government."

Sugarman, at 647.

Public education, like the police function, "fulfills
a most fundamental obligation of government to its
constituency."

Foley, at 297.

The importance of public

schools in the preparation of indiviouals for participation in
our democratic society, and in the preservation of the values
on which this society rests, long has been recognized by our
decisions:

9.

"Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local
governments.

Compulsory school attendance laws

and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society.

It is

required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces.

It is the very foundation of good

citizenship.

Today it is a principal instrument

in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment."

Brown v. Board · of · Education, 347

U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also Keyes v. School · Dist~ · No~ · 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring);

San · Antonio · Ind; · School · Dist~ v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973);
U.S. 205, 213 (1972);

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

~ , at 238~239 (White, J., concurring);

Abington · School · Dist; v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring);
U.S. 485, 493 (1952);
203, 212 (1948)

McCollum v. Bo 9 rq · of · Edacation, 333 U.S.

(Frankfurter, J., concurring);

Society · of · Sisters, 268
262

u~s.

Adler v. Board · of · Education, 342

390 (1923);

µ.s.

510 (1925);

Pierce v.

Meyer v. Nebraska,

Interstate · Consolidated · Street · R~ · co~ v.
6

Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907).

Other authorities have

perceived public schools as an "assimilative force" by which

1 0.

diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought

--

See, e~g;, J. Dewey,

together on a broad but common ground.
Democracy and Education 26 (1929);

N. Edwards

&

H. Richey, The

School in the American Social Order 623-624 (1963).

These

perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system have been confirmed by the observations of social
scientists.

See R. Dawson

K. Prewitt, Political

&

Socialization 146-167 (1969);

R. Hess

J. Torney, The

&

Development of Political Attitudes in Children 114, 158-171,

7

323-343 (1961).
Within the public

\_ -""""'f"'W111""~.,..---~

:;;.:t~ ~ ~~;;:ei:1:1:a;:ai•E---"d~e~ss.ii~g~oue-'1~

critical part in developing

w

p:r:emott!!.

play a

Alone among employees of the system,

At,J.

'4c..,

Hw, ~ ~ ;ti..vL;lw."1

in direct, day-to-day contact with
In shaping the

-4Jc, <~ i'ci,c .... ~
to achieve ~e~esin~ goals,

~,.,
•
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teachers by necessity have c0i'1~±:-rle~aele discretion over the way

a

~l!o

course material is~!!:";;!

tn..

"'

"1;; yQ @R~~ •

They are

responsible for presenting and explaining the subject matter in
a way that is both comprehensible and inspiring.

No amount of

standardization of teaching mat~rials or lesson plans can
eliminate the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in

11.

achieving these goals.

Further, a teacher serves as a role

model for his students, exerting a subtle but important
influence over their perceptions and values.
certain attitudes as his own, a teacher encourages the
nt of similar attitudes on the part of his student •
The discretion and control necessarily exercised b

a

teacher extends to all his classroom functions, including t e
development of attitudes and values critical to
,.,_i.c...~ I

'

in a democratic societ • ~ ,.through both the presentation of
course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has ~ ~

..........
~-~students'
-e., ""'~~.....
.u;..4-j
,( sllb~&a1"f~~wer to
attitudes toward '8ft6
~~rgg~tiSoRe--e-1: government, the political process, and a

.~~1-o

8

citizen's social responsibilities.

This

influence,~ ...s the

educational process itself, is crucial to 't:8e forwatsisA ...QE ~

slttlle aA~al~e~ o" whieh the continued good health of a
9

democracy, depe~~@.
Furthermore, it is clear that all public school
teachers, and not just those responsible for teaching the
courses most directly related to government, history, and civic

-Ir,;, • • ..1. ti -

.,,.

.

~

duties, help fulfil the Qriti£a~ soci;;1iJ. function of the school
system.

10

"

~

~ost teachers, regardless of their specialty,

-

may be called upon to teach other subjects, including those
I

expressly dedicated to poltical and social subjects.
'\

11
S@c~Ae..,.

1 2.

~

s /jfo re importantly, a State properly may regard all
-

a., ....,t

*

..,f,....1al1,1~

J'4 .. , . .

teachers as having an obligation to promote civic virtues ~ in
their classes, regardless of the subject taught.

Certainly a

~

State may take account of a teacher's function as a role model,
I\

which exists independently of particular classroom topics.
.,

~~

In

J.L,_,114, u'-" ~

light of thea.e considerations, we soli@~e that public school

~

~

~

..... ~,L,_ W1,,,,l,,J.,~.....,

teachers :H:t on:thi1~ the "governmental function"~
in Sugarman and Foley.

r ~... ,.~
e recognized

Accordingly, the Constitution requires

only that a citizenship requirement applicable to these jobs
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
III

it seems clear that the restriction embodied in§ 3001(3) and
the related regulations is constitutional.

The restriction is

carefully tailored to its purpose, as it bars from teaching
only those aliens who have affirmatively demonstrated their
12

unwillingness to obtain United States citizenship.

As such

it represents a judgment by the people of New York that a
person who has manifested his unwillingness to join the
political community of which they are part should not
ordinarily be entrusted with the responsibilities and powers a
teacher enjoys in the classroom.

13

This decision reflects a

rational weighing of the alternatives, rejecting the advanta es

,,,,....

_
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III

As the state's interest in furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it
remains only to consider whether §30001(3) bears a
rational relationship to this interest.

The

restriction in carefully tailored to the state's
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who
have demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United
.

.

.

States c1t1zensh1p.

12

Appellees, and aliens similarily

situated, in effect have chosen to classify themselves.
They prefer to retain citizenship in a foreign country
with the obligations it entails of primary duty and
loyalty.

13

They have rejected the open invitation

extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country.

The people

of New York, acting through their elected
representatives, have made a judgment that citizenship
should be a threshold qualification for teaching and
instructing by example the young of the state, and

~

§3001(3) directly furthers that judgment.
Reversed.

13 •

a more cosmopolitan and culturally diverse class of teachers
might provide in favor of the promotion of the patriotic and
14

civic values of which citizenship is an affirmation.
Whatever the wisdom of such a judgment, it is one the State i
entitled to make, and accordingly its constitutionality must

Reversed;

lfp/ss 2/12/79
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Paul

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

•

\

.

'<

'

Feb. 12, 1979

76-808 Ambach v. Norwick
I like your draft of 2/9/79, which I have
reviewed with some care.

In addition to editing, and a

•.

','
'•

suggested revision of Part III, I add the following
l

t

comments and suggestions.
1.

The dissent undoubtedly will use In re

Griffiths against me.

I agree that we should deal with

this after we see exactly what the dissent says.
2.

The dissent also probably will make a "big

thing" over the fact that §3001(3) applies only to public
school teachers when a high percentage of New York
children attend parochial and other private schools.

In

addition to the answer you have in the draft, I suggest possibly in the text - relying on the doctrine that a
state does not have to embrace an entire area or utilize

·"'
···'

the limit of its power in furthering a state interest.
There are a number of cases on this point.

I do not

recall having made it in any of my decisions, although
you might take a look at McGinnis v~ Royster which may be

,

,: .i

'

a "see also".

·.•

~

. '•
-~

2.

3.

As an old hand as a school board member, I

have expanded note 13 as a rider to page FN-6.
4.

I also have dictated a none too artful

footnote that should be a counter-weight against
inferences in our opinion that appellants' loyalty to the
United States may not be of the highest order.

This is

marginal, and I would like your independent judgment - as
usual.
5.
teachers.

The draft uses the word "he" to refer to

It is a bit awkward to use "he or she"

throughout an opinion, but I do not want to offend the
female contingency - which no doubt substantially
outnumbers male teachers in the New York system as
elsewhere.

In this connection, it might be worthwhile to

ask our library to obtain from the Library of Congress
the most recent annual report of the Superintendent of
Education in the State of New York.

This should give us

the total number of public school teachers, and their
division between the sexes.

Subject to the foregoing, I suggest that you
proceed with the customary review by an editor, bringing

;

1.

3.

\,·

to me before a Chambers draft only substantive changes.

ss

...'

.'

,

;

Rider A, FN -4:
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Appellees argue that the state cannot

'I

rationally exclude aliens from teaching positions and yet
permit them to vote for and sit on certain local school
boards.

See App., pp. 27, 29.

.....,

We note, first, that the

state's policy as to service on school boards applies only
in New York City and to aliens who are parents of students

f'~L,..,.,1
in the public schools· / t'he argument misconceives the
distinction between the role and function of teachers and
school board members.

Although board members possess

substantial responsibility for the administration of the

l

schools, they teach no classes, and rarely if ever are known
or identified by the students.

~ heir influence on students

i ~ effected indirectly only through textbooks and teachers'J
'1. \ ,-; ~ ~ <CJ
.:J
~ local boards, within limits prescribed by the
!

i

~

islature and regulations of the state board of education,

/ select or approve textbooks and instruction materials.

•

;

,,

Without minimizing this responsibility, it is one
necessarily discharged by reliance in major part on
recommendations from committees of professional educators
composed of teachers and public school officials.

As noted

above, the textbook - particularly in the social science
classroom - usually is less influential than how the
material therein is taught and interpreted by the classroom

•'"··

2.

teacher.
Moreover, the number of teachers in the New York
public school system for the 19

totalled

See

Annual Report, NY Superintendent of Public Education (??)
The number of school board members is, by comparison, almost
minimal.

LFP/lab 2/12/79
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I

As our cases have emphasized (Paul - here cite
cases including, as I recall, In re Griffith), resident
aliens pay taxes, serve in the armed forces (?), and have
made significant contributions to our. country in private and
public endeavors.

No doubt many of them, and we do not

exclude apoellees, would make excellent public school
teachers.

But the leqislature, having in mind the

imoortance of education to state and local qovernments, see
Brown v. Board o~ucation, supra, at 493, may determine
eliqibility for. the key role in dischar.qinq this function on
the assumption that generally citizens of the United States
are better qualified than are citizens of a foreign country.
We note in this connection that requlations promulgated
pursuant to Section 3001 (3) do provide for situations where
a particular alien's special qualifications as a teacher
outweigh the policy primarily served by the statute.
NY Code, Rules and Reg., Section 80.2(i)(1).

See 8

Although one

may think that in certain disciplines (such as mathematics,
the physical sciences, and foreiqn lanquages) at the hiqh
school level, an alien often would bring to the teachinq of
the subject highly desirable qualifications.

The state

informs us, however, that the a u thority conferred by this
regulation has not been exercised .

n.*.

Brief for appellant 7
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III

As the state's interest in furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it
remains only to consider whether §30001(3) bears a
rational relationship to this interest.

The

restriction in carefully tailored to the state's
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who
have demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United
. .
h.
12
States c1t1zens 1p.

.
. .
.
Appellees, and aliens s1m1lar1ly

situated, in effect have chosen to classify themselves.
They prefer to retain citizenship in a foreign country
with the obligations it entails of primary duty and
loyalty.

13

They have rejected the open invitation

extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country.

The people

of New York, acting through their elected
representatives, have made a judgment that citizenship
should be a threshold qualification for teaching and
instructing by example the young of the state, and
14

§3001(3) directly furthers that judgment.
Reversed.

,,
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As our cases have emphasized (Paul - here cite

cases including, as I recall, In re Griffith), resident
aliens pay taxes, serve in the armed forces (?), and have
made significant contributions to our country in private and
public endeavors.

No doubt many of them, and we do not

exclude appellees, would make excellent public school
teachers.

But the legislature, having in mind the

--

importance of education to state and local governments, see
Brown v. Board of Education, supra, at 493, may determine
eligibility for the key role in discharging this function on
the assumption that generally citizens of the United States
are better qualified than are citizens of a foreign country.
We note in this connection that regulations promulgated
pursuant to Section 3001

(3) do provide for situations where

a particular alien's special qualifications as a teacher
outweigh the policy primarily served by the statute.

See 8
.,

NY Code, Rules and Reg., Section 80. 2 ( i) ( 1).

Althotigh ~ ne

may think that in certain disciplines (such as mathematics,
the physical sciences, and foreign :\.ang~-ages) at the high
school leve { , an alien often ~ uld bring to the teaching of
the subject highly desirable· qualifications.

The state

informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this
regulation has not been exercised.

n.*.

Brief for appellant 7

FN 6.

10.

At the primary school level, for which both appellees

sought certification, teachers are responsible for all of the
basic curriculum.
11.

All certified teachers, including those in the secondary

schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of
teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty.

8 N.Y.

Code Rules & Reg.§ 80.2(c).
12.

See n. 2 infra.

made this judgment, as it permits aliens to vote for and sit o
certain local school boards.
~

See app. 27, 29.

But the State'

-1-o

~

,

olicy ~ t participation in school boards, which applies on y
o New York City and extends only to aliens who are parents o
tudents in the public schools, is not necessarily inconsistent
ith its restrictions on alien teachers.

Members of local

chool boards, although possessing substantial responsibility

)fii • a 4£_£1 re
or the administration of the schools, do not enjoy direct,
ndividual contact with students.

They accordingly do not hav

the same opportunity immediately to influence students as do

14.

The regulations promulgated pursuant to§ 3001(3) do

provide for the case where a particular alien's special
qualifications as a teacher outweigh the policy which the

FN 7.

general prohibition serves.
80.2(i) (1).

See 8 N.Y. Code Rules

&

Reg. §

The State informs us, however, that no

certificates have been issued pursuant to this exception.
Brief for Appellant 7 n. *

PBS-2/9/79

1.

The statute provides:

"No person shall be employed or authorized to
teach in the public schools of this state who is:

"3.

Not a citizen.

The provisions of this

subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien
teacher now or hereafter employed provided such
teacher shall make due application to become a
citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed
by law shall become a citizen.

The provisions of

this subdivision shall not apply after July
first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien
teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted
by

the Commissioner of Education permitting such

employment."

N.Y. Educ. Law§ 3001(3).

The statute contains an exception for persons who are
ineligible for United States citizenship solely because of an
oversubscribed quota.

Id;,§ 3001-a.

Because this statutory

provision is in all respects narrower that the exception
provided by regulation, seen. 2, infra, as a practical matter
it has no effect.
The State does not certify the qualifications of
teachers in the private schools, although it does require that
such teachers be "competent".
2.

N.Y. Educ. Law§ 3204(2).

The following regulation governs here:

FN 2.

"Citizenship;

A teacher who is not a citizen of

the United States or who has not declared
intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a
provisional certificate providing such teacher
has the appropriate educational qualifications as
defined in the regulations and (1) possesses
skills or competencies not readily available
among teachers holding citizenship, or (2) is
unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen
for valid statutory reasons."

8 N.Y. Code of

Rules and Regulations§ 80.2(i)
ough § 3001 by its literal terms appears to apply to
all New York public schools, including colleges and
Certification by the Commissioner of Education is
~

not required of teachers at state institutions of higher
education and the citizenship restriction accordingly does not
apply to them.

Brief for Appellants 13 n. *

We express no

view as to the permissibility of a citizenship requirement

l#./.1...~

applicable to the faculty of s u c h ~ -

"

4.

At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met the

post-graduate educational requirements for a permanent
certificate and accordingly applied only for a termporary
certificate, which also is governed by§ 3001(3).

She since

has obtained the necessary graduate degree for full
certification.

Dachinger previously had obtained a temporary

certificate, which had lapsed at the time of her 1975

FN 3.

application.

The record does not indicate whether Dachinger

previously had declared an intent to obtain citizenship or had
obtained the temporary certificate because of some exception to
the citizenship requirement.
5.

That the significance of citizenship has constitutional

dimensions also has been recognized by several of our
decisions.

In Trop v. Dalles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a plurality

of the Court held that the expatriation of an American citizen
constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of
desertion in time of war.

In Afroyim v. ~ , 387 U.S. 253

(1967), the Court held that the Constitution forbade Congress
from involuntarily depriving a person of his citizenship for
any reason.
6.

As San · Antonio · Ind~ · School · Dist; v. Rodriguez, supra,

recognized, there is no inconsistency between our recognition

~~
. . .
t significance

o f t he ~

.

.

.

of public education and our holding

that access to education does not constitute/

a fundamental

right for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.

We observed

in Rodriguez that "social importance is not the critical
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict
scrutiny."
7.

Id;, at 32.

The curricular requirements of New York public school

system reflect some of the ways a public school system promotes

~+<.~~di
lo i..-k~~1 ~1-j a . . . , , ~
rl,_;;;#'

H.....

£.(....

~ n,IAA-<ICA"4L.Jt

the development of
Q•~

ms s t ~ ~ ·

in a democratic~ e y.

The schools are required to provide

instruction "to promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service
and obligation and to foster in the children of the state moral
and intellectual qualities which are essential in preparing to
meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in war, . • • "
N.Y. Educ. L. § 801(1).
also are prescribed}

Flag and other patriotic exercises

Id~,§ 802.

In addition, required

courses includes classes in civics, United States and New York
history, and principles of American government.

Id; §

3204(3)(a)(1),(2) <:J{ Although private schools also are bound by ;
~

most of these requirements, the State has a stronger interest
in ensuring that the schools it most directly controls, and for
which it bears the cost, are as effective as possible in

al-ti,e11~~Jo+QJJ.1-C.OPG1J..u.. iv._ reinforce the commonsense

~ 4••-'-" H..f.. ~~ °'( .......... f - ( ""'-',#
#'"~

· t hat a teacher exerts considerable influence over

"

the development of fundamental social attitudes in students,
including those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the

term may be termed political.

See, e;g;, R. Dawson

Prewitt, Political Socialization 158-167 (1969);

&

K.

R. Hess

&

J.

Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 162-

FN 5.

163, 217-218 (1967).

Cf. Note, Aliens' Right to Teach:

Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L.J.
90, 99-104 (1975).

~,~

9.

Appellees contend that restriction; on aliens
I\

freedom to

A

'
LA.,J
teach in public schools,.... contrary to principles of diversity
of thought and academic freedom embodied in the First
Amendment.

See also Note, supra n. 8, at 106-109.

We think

the~ attempt to draw an analogy between choice of citizenship
and political expression or freedom of association is wide of
the mark.

1zenship requirement limits classroom

diversity no more than any
articular social and civic value

School · Dist;, ··· U.S.

Section 3001(3) does not

(1979);

ML · Healthy · City

School Dist~ v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
of · Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

Pickering v. Board

Nor are applicants

discouraged from joining with others to advance particular
political ends.

Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1957).

~~

~~ -'-f ~

~t(.

The only 1 liberty of appe llees wb.iee ~- ~iRf~iR~<id is theci'{

1

.,,....,.

~

~

~

f

~ .J<, +4if~~ H..c.,,,-:.i<d<d-114'""'-IIY~ .,. C l,
£r<iedom -t.o d~1,.4.ce--wieea Sta-~. eit'izeos-hip, e. !'rivH.ege w~ch

M• 7 ~ ..4,, ..-,

f

A-s-.~
~~~~~_,
o.i:mot. he--R\ade -4:.b.g ~ £ in" ie 1-otH, e iS"et imi>f\e.td8"R bw.t

"f

;4~..., ~ .

cJ:.c.7'

~

w -4.-c~.LLy

4-'

~ ..~

~ . e ~ a n d , ~ ~ PG c0-R.Sti~ei'O"'l1a:t= rnoee~~R -

~

f;,, ••J., . ..., 7us ~•a'•· ~ i ~o·e~ ~ ;,.,..-tz,,.«J.._..(
Hl ~ ,a..:.-_....~e .L ~~~~~~k~

•

· J'o: The Ch.1 0 ... J

"'

Mr. Juat1·ce
r .

/0

uati ce
D
.
O,l'.;;1\na,n

Ir. Justice Stewart
lfr. Justice White
Mr. JUetfoe lll.arshall
.Mr. Juat1ce BJ.aokmun
.Mr. Justi ce Rahnqu1at
lfr. Justice Stevens
From: Mr

J

· Ust1oe Powell
Ciroulated: l 6 FEB 1979

____

Beoiroulated: ,__
1st DRAFT

SUP1UOfE COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~
No. 76-808
,•

Gordon M. Ambach, Individually
and as Commissioner of the
On Appeal from the
New York State DepartUnited States District
ment of Education,
Court
for the Southern
et al., Appellants,
District of New York.

v,

Susan M . W. Norwick et al.
[February - , 1979]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a State may, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refuse to employ as elementary and secondary
school teachers aliens who are eligible for . United States
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization.

I
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of
the U11ited States, unless that person has manifested an
intention to apply for citizenship.' The Commissioner of
1 The st atute provides :

" No person sl111ll be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools
of this stat e who is ;

"B. Not a citizm . The provi~iom; of this subdivision shall not apply,
howrvn, to an ali en teacher now or hereafter employed provided such
t•f'acher shall makr due applica.tion to become a citizen and thereafter
within the time pre:,;cribed by la.w :shall become n eitizen. The provisions
of t.his subdivision 8hall not apply after July fin;t , nineteen hundred sixtyseven, to an aJien teu.cher emJ)loyed pur~uan1, t.o regulation:, adopted by

... 1;
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohibition. and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet
eligible for citizenship. 2 Unless a teacher obtains certification,
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school
in New York. 3
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of
Great Britaiu. She has resided in this country since 1965 and
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger
is a Finuish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also
is married to a United States citizen. Both N orwick and
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher,
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a
the Commissioner of Education permitting such employment." N. Y.
Educ. Law § 3001 (3)
The statute C'ontains an exc<'ption for persons who are ineligible for United
St.MPs ritizen:;hip solrly becausf' of an over::mbscribed quota . Id., § 3001-a.
BN·ause this statntor~· provi,;ion is in all re:;pccts narrower than the
exception provided by regulation, ::,'Ce n. 2, infra, as a practical matter it
ha<1 no effect .
The State doel:I not certif~· the qualifications of teachers in the private
schools, alt hough it, doe,-, rHJ11ir<' that ::mch teachers be ·'competent."
N. Y. Educ. Law § ;3204 (2) (Mr Kinney 1970). Accordingly, we are not
presented with the que,.,tion of, and express no view as to, the permissibility of a citizenship requirement pertaining to teachers in private schools.
2 The following regul:1tion gove rns here:

"Citizenship . A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who
ha<1 not declared intention of becoming a citizen ma.y be issued a provi$ioual certifirate providing snch teacher ha.,; the appropriate educational
qualifications a,- defined in the regulation,- and (1) pos::;c::;::;e::; skills or
competencic:i not, readily available among t{'acher::; holding citizenship,
01· (2) is 11nable to declare intention of becoming a cit.izen for valid
::;tat11toD· rca::1ons." 8 ~ . Y. Code> of RuleH and Regulations § 80.2 (i)
a Certifit'atiou by the CommiH,.:iorn,r of Education i::1 not required of
teacher::; at, state institution" of higher education and the citizenship
restriction accordingly does nut, appl~· to tlwin. Brief for A1ipellants

13 n. *.
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth
grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the same
grades in 1975. 4 Both applications were denied because of
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3).
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of § 3001 ( 3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as
a plaintiff.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28
U. S. C. ~ 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" standard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the
court held that ~ 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was overbroad, becaurn it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this country, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction
over the State's appeal, 436 U. S. 902 ( 1978), and now reverse.

II
A
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an
unwa.vering liue over the years. State regulation of the employment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional
4 At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met, the postgrnduato educational rrquiremrnt;; for a permauont certificate aud accordingly applied only for a temporary crrtificntr, which al;;o is governed by
§ 3001 (3) . She since ha,; obtamed the necr~~ary graduate degree for full
certification . Dachingn prrv10usly had obtained a temporary certificate,
which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does
not indirate whether Dachiuger previously had declared an intent to
obtain citizenship or had obtamed the temporary certificate because of
somr applicablP Pxcept10n to the r1t1zen~hip requiremrnt.

·'
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886),
the Court struck down au ordinance which was applied to
prevent aliens from running laundries. and in 'l'ruax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be
an unconstitutioual infringement of an alien's "right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community .... "
Id., at 41. At the same time. however, the Court also has
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment.
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine permitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of
the people of the State, . . ." Id., at 39. Hence, as part
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land,
Frick v. Webb , 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley,
180 U. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483
(1880), harvesting wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877),
or maintaining an inherently dangerous enterprise, Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927) , States permissibly could.
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects,
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), and, it appears,
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see
Truax, at 40.
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens.
The first sign that the Court would view with increased
skepticism discrimination against aliens even in areas affected
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyarna v. California, 332
U. S. 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory pre~umptions designed to discourage evasion of California's bail
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
all others to do so." Takahashi v. F-ish & Game Comm'n,
334 U. S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this
Court has struck down statutes that prevented aliens from
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U. S. 634 (1973). practicing law. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.
717 (1973) , working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Although our more recent decisions have departed substantially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they
have not abandoned the general principle that some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those
functions of all persons who have not become part of the
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that
a State could, "in an appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office." We
went on to observe:
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community. ' . . . And this power and
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the
qualifications of voters. but also to persons holding state
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly

;
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy perform functio11s that go to the heart of representative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted).
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions
would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court.
Id., at 648. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11;
Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426
u. s. 913 (1976).
Applying this standard, we held last Term that New York
could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force. Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291 (1978). Because the police function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government
to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with
substantial discretionary powers, we viewed the police force
as being one of those appropriately defined classes of positions
for which a citizeriship requirement could be imposed. Id.,
at 297. Accordingly, the State was required to justify its
classification only "by a showing of some rationa.1 relationship
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting
classification." Id., at 296.
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception
to the general standard applicable to classifications based on
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Constitution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the
definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v.
Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indicating that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our government. The assumption
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic,
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connelie,
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an
~ath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for

:
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the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is because of this special significance of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions of government,
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens. 5

B
In determining whether teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental function that may be limited to citizens,
we look to the role of public education in our democratic
society and to the degree of responsibility and discretion
teachers possess in fulfilling that role. See id., at 297. Each
of these considerations supports the conclusion that public
school teachers may be regarded as performing a task "that
go [es] to the heart of represeu tati ve government." Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 647.
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.''
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation in our democratic
society, and in the preservation of the values on which this
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions:
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required iu the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda"That. the significanc(• of citizenship ha;; con~tit.utional dimrn:sions also
ha:; bPPn rPcognizPd by srveral of our deci~iom;. In Trop v. D'UUes, 356
U.S. 86 (Hl58), a plmality of tbP Court held that thr expatriation of an
American citizen constituted rrnPI. and 1111u:;ual punishment for the crime
of desertion in time of war. In Afruyim v. R'Usk, :387 U. S. 253 (1967),
the Court. held that the Constit,utiou forbade Congre:ss from depriving a
person of hi~ eitizen:ship against his will for a.uy rPason,

;
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tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.''
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973)
(POWELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHrrE, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230
(1963) (BRENNAN, J .. concurring); Adler v. Board of EdU;cation, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). 0
Other authorities have perceived public schools a.s an "assimilative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in o~r
society are brought together on a broad but common ground.
See, e. g., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929);
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social
Order 623-624 (1963). These perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system have been con..
firmed by the observations of social scieptists. See R. Dawson
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. ij:ess
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in
6 A8 San Anton:io ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, recognized,
there is no incom;istency between our recognition of the vital significance
of public education and our holding tha.t. access to education does not
constitute a fundamental right. for purposrs of the Equal Prot,c>ction
Clause. We observed in Rodriguez that "social importance i8 not the
critical determinant for :;ubjerting st1;1te legislation to strict scrutiny.'"

[,J;.,, at 32..
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Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. 0. Key, Public
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 (1961). 7
Within the public school system. teachers play a critical
part in developing students' attitude toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers a.re in direct, day-today contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the
students' experience to achieve educational goals. teachers by
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to students. They are responsible for
presenting and explaining the subject ma.t ter in a way that is
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he sets. a teacher has an
opportunity to influence his students' attitudes toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsiThe curricular requirement" of N'ew York public school system reflect
some of th<' wa)'S a public school :system promotes the development of the
understanding that i8 prerequisit•e to intelligent. participation in the
democratic proce88. Th<' school:,; arc required to provide in;:;truction "to
promote a spirit of patriotic and civir service and obligatjon and to foster
in the children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are
es.~ential in preparing to meet the obligation" of citizenship in peace or in
war, . .." N . Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (McKinney 1970). Flag and other
patriotir exercises abo are prl'scribed, as loyalty is a characteristic of
citizr11<,hip rssential to the preservation of a country. Id.,§ 802. In addition , requirrd course:; include clas~l's in civic:s, United States and New York
history, and principles of Aml'rican government. Id.,§ 3204 (:3) (a) (1), (2).
Although privatl' school:,; also are bound b~· mo:st, of the:se requirements,
the Statr ha,; a :stronger intere,;t. iu ensuring that the schools it most
direct]~, controls, :md for whirh i1 l)('ar,.: the cost., are as ~ffective as
possibk in t.earhini? the,,(• ro1u·.~<1;;;.
7

;
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bilities. 8 This influence~
cial to the continued good
health of a democracy. 0
Furthermore, it is clear that aU public school teachers, and
not just those responsible for teaching the courses mos:t
directly related to government, history, and civic duties, should
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system. 10
Most teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be called
upon to teach other subjects, including those expressly dediAlthough the findings of scholars who have written on the subject are
not conclusive, tlwy generally reinforce the commonsense judgment, and
the experience of most of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence
ov,er the development of fundamenta1 social attitudes in ;;tudent;;, including
thos0 a.ttitude;; which in the broadest sense of the term may be vic>wed as
political. See e. g. , R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization
158-167 (1969); H. Hes,; & J. Torrwy, The Development of Political
Attitudes in Children 162-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Alien,;' Right
to Teach: Political Socialization a1:d the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90,
99-104 (1975) .
0 Appellees coutcnd that restriction of an alien'::, freedom to tench in
public :;chools is contrary to principles of divrrsity of thought and
academic freedom embod:ed in the First Amendment. See also Note,
supra, n. 8, at 106-109. We think the attempt to draw an analogy
between choice of citizen~hip and political expre:,;sion or frpedom of
association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by
thP State to promote particular va.lue,; and attitudes toward governmE'nt.
Section :3001 (:3) does not inhibit aPiwllers from expressing freely their
political or ,;ocial views or from a,;sociating with whomever they please.
U. S. - , Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist, (1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle: 429 U. S. 274 (1977~. i-- /4,fl>,rl{...E6' 5
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (19(i8). Nor are ~
~ di:;couraged from joining with other,; to advance particular political
ends. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, ;354 U. S. 479 ( 1957). The onl~· atl::erted
lib::•rty of appellee8 withheld by the New York 8tatute is the opportunity
to 1ectch in the Statr's school;; 80 long a8 they elect not to become citizens
of thi;, country. This is not a liberty that i8 accorded con8titutional
protection .
10 At the primary ;;chool level, for which both appellec8 sought certification, teachers are rc;,pon8ible for all of the hRsic curriculum.
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cated to political and social subjects. 11 More importantly, a
State properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation.
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes,
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may
take account of a teacher's function as a role model, which
exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light
of the foregoing considerations, we think it clear that public
school teachers come well within the "governmental function"
principle recognized in Sugarma:n and Foley. Accordingly,
the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement
applicable to teaching in the public schools bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.

III
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship
to this interest. The restriction is carefully tailored to its
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citizenship.12 Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails
of primary duty and loyalty. 1'i They have rejected the open
In New York, for exam pl 0 , all certified teachers, including those in the
secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of
teaching a week in subj ect8 outside their specialty. 8 N. Y . Cede of
Rules & Regulations §80.2 (c) .
12 See n. 2, infra.
rn As our cases hnve emphasized, resident alie11s pay taxes, serve in the
armed forces , and ha,ve made 8ignificant, contributions to our country in
private and public endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graham v.
Richardson, 40:3 U. S. 365, 376 (1971) . No doubt many of thrm, and
we do not exclude appellres, would make excellent public school teachers.
But the leg1~lature, having in mind the imJ)ortance of education to state
11
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invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for
teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.14

Reversed.

and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U. S. 483,
493 (1954), may determine eligibility for the key position in discharging
that funrtion on the assumption that generally persons who are citizens,
or who have not declined the opportunity to seek United States citizenship,
are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens.
We note in this connection that reguL1tions promulgated ptmuant to
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations whPre a particular alien's special
qualification:,; as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily servied by the
statutP. See 8 N. Y. Code of Rules & Regulations§ 80.2 (i) (1). The State
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation ha.s
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 n. *.
14
Appellees argue that the StatP cannot ra.tionally exclude aliens from
teaching position:; and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain
local school boards. See App. 27, 29. We note, firnt, that the State's
policy as to i:;ervice on school bonrds applie,;; only in New York City and
only to aliens who also are parents of public school students. Further,
the argument mi:;ronceives t,he distinction between the role and function
of teachers and school board members. Although board members possess
substantial responsibility for the adminiHtration of the schools, they teach
no classes, and rarely if ever are known or identified by the students. It
is true that local boards, within limits prescribed by the legislature and
stato board of education, normally ;;elect or approve textbooks a11d
instruction materials. Without minimizing this responsibility, it, is one
nece~s:1rily discharged in large part by reliance on recommendations from
profe~sional educators, including teachers. And as noted above, the
textbook-particularly in the social ,-cienoe classroom-usually is less
influential than how the material therein is taught and interpreted by the:
teacher,
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Susan M . W. Norwick et al.
[February -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Cour~
This case presents the question whether a State ~ sistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refuse to employ as elementary and secondary
school teach~rs aliens who are eligible for . United States
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization.

"'

I
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of
the United States, unless that person has manifested an
intention to apply for citizenship.' The Commissioner of
1 The sta.tute provides :
"No person slrnll be employed or authorized to teach in the pnblic schools
of this state who is:
"a. Not a citizen. The provi,,fons of this subdivision sha.11 not apply,
howevn, t.o an alien teacher now or h0reafter employed provided such
teaclwr shall make due applica.tion to b0comf' a citizen and thereafter
within the time prescribed by law shall b0come n citizen. The provisions
of this subdivision ,;hall not apply after July first, nineteen hundred sixtyseven, to an alien tea.cher employed pursuant, to rrgnlations adopted by

' '
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohibition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet
eligible for citizenship. 2 Unless a teacher obta.ins certification,
he Amay not work in a public elementary or secondary school
in New York. 3
Appellee N orwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 and
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick and
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher,
but th~y consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a
the Commissioner of Education permitting such employment." N. Y.
Educ. Law § 3001 (3) .
The statute contains an exception for persons who are ineligible for United
St.ates citizenship solely because of an overnubscribed quota.. Id., § 3001-a.
Brcause this statutory provision is in all respects narrower than the
exception provided by regulation, see n. 2, infra, as a practical matter it
has no effect.
The State does not cert.if.\· the qmLlifications of teachers in the private
schools, although it does rrquire that such teachers be "competent."
N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3204 (2) (McKinney 1970). Accordingly, we are not
presented with the question of, and express no view as to, the permissibility of a citizenship requirement pertaining to teachers in private schools.
2
The following regulation goV1erns here:
"Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who
has not declared intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a. provisional certificate providing such teacher hai:; the appropriate educational
qualifications as defined in the regulations and ( 1) possesses skills or
competencies not readily available among t,eachers holding citizenship,
or (2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid
statutory reasons." 8 N. Y. Code of RuleR and Regulationti § 80.2 (i)
3
Certification by the Commis::;ioner of Education i::; not required of
teachers at state institutions of higher education and the citizenship
restriction a.ccordingly does not apply to them. Brief for Appell.ants
13 n. *.
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth
grade, and Dachinger s'o ught a certificate covering the same
grades in 1975! Both applications were denied because of
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3).
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of§ 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as
a plain tiff.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" standard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), the
court held that § 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was overbroad, becam:e it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this country, and the alieu's willingness to substitute some other sign
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction
· over the State's appeal, 436 U. S. 902 ( 1978), and now reverse.

II
A
The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the employment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional
At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met, the postgraduate educational requirements for a permanent certificate and accordingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which also is governed by
§ 3001 (3). She since has obtained t,he nece.s~ary graduate degree for full
certification . Dachinger prrvioui,;ly had obtained a temporary certificate,
which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does
not indicate whether Dachinger previously had declared an intent to
obtain citizenship or had obtamed the temporary certificate because of
somr applicablr rxcrpt1011 to the c1tizen::-hip requirement .
4
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886),
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to
prevent aliens from running laundries. and in Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be
an unconstitutional infringement of an a.lien's "right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community .... "
Id., at 41. At the same time. however, the Court also has
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment.
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine permitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of
the people of the State, . . . " Id., at 39. Hence, as part
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land,
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley,
180 U. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483
(1880) , harvesting wildlife , Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877),
or maintaining an inherently dangerous enterprise, Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), States permissibly could.
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects,
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915). and, it appears,
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see
Truax, at 40.
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens.
The first sign that the Court would view with increased
skepticism discrimination against a.liens even in areas affected
with a "public interest" appeared in 'Oyama v. California, 332
U. S. 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory pre·s.u mptions designed to discourage evasion of California's ban
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding a.ny or all
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
all others to do so." Takahashi v. Fi.sh & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 365 ( 1971) , which for the first time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this
Court has struck down statutes that prevented aliens from
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U. S. 634 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.
717 ( 1973) , working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Although our more recent decisions have departed substantially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they
have not abandoned the general principle that some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those
functions of all persons who have not become part of the
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that
a State could, "in an appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office." We
went on to observe:
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation , already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.' . . . And this power and
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state·
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted).
The exclusion of
would not invite
Id., at 648. S-ee
Perkins v. Smith,

aliens from such governmental positions
as demanding scrutiny from this Court.
also -Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11;
370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426

u. s. 913 (1976) .~ --:--=-----~----.-.:-:---::-:--1

Applying-tm"S standard, we eld last Term that New York ~H,_t_
could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force. Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291 (1978). Because the police function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government
to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with
substantial discretionary powers, we viewed the police force
as being one of those appropriately defined classes of positions
for which a citize1iship requirement could be imposed. Id.,
at 297. Accordingly, the State was required to justify its
classification only "by a showing of some rational relationship
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting
classification." Id., at 296.
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception
to the general standard applicable to classifications based on
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Constitution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the
definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v.
Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indicating that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our government. The assumption
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic,
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connelie,
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an
{)ath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for
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the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is because of this special significance of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions of government,
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens. 5

B
In determining whether teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental functionc.that..may ..he limited to citizen .
we look to the role of public education in our democratic
society and to the degree of responsibility and discretion
teachers possess in fulfilling that role. See id., at 297. Each
of these considerations supports the conclusion that public
school teachers may be regarded as performing a task "that
go [ es] to the heart of representative government." Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 647.
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.';
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation in our democratic
society, and in the preservation of the values on which this
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions:
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda"That the significance of citizen~hip has con~tit.utional dimensions also
has been recognized by several of our clecisiom,. In Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958), a plurality of the Court held that. the expatriation of an
American citizen constitut,ed rruf'l and unu;;ual punishment for the crime
of desertion in time of war. In Afruyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967),
the Court. held that thf' Con,,tit.ution forbade Congre::;s from depriving ti
pen;on of his citizfn:,;hip against his will for a.ny rt>ason.
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tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.''
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973)
(POWELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHITE, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Edt(,cation, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J .. concurring); Pierce v. SoC'iety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). 0
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimilative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our
society are brought together on a broad but common ground.
See, e. g., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929);
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social
Order 623-624 ( 1963). These perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a "democratic political system have been con ..
firmed by the observations of social scieµtists. See R. Dawson
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in
6

As San Anton-io Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, recognized,
there is no inconsi;;tency betwren our rrcognition of the vital significance
of public education and our holding that. access to education does not
constitute a fundamrntal right for purposes of the Equal ProtPction
Clause. We observed in Rodriguez that "social importance is not the
critical dctenninant, for subjerting state legisla,tion to strict scrutiny~••

fr//.,. at 32.
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Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 ( 1967); V. 0. Key, Public
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 ( 1961) .7
Within the public school system. teachers play a critical
part in developing students' attitude toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-today contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the
students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to students. They are responsible for
presenting and explaining the subject ma.t ter in a way that is
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he se s. a teac er as an
opportunity to m uen
· @tsw~etits' attitudes w
government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsi7 The curricular rrquirrment::; of , ew York public school system reflect
some of the ways a public :,;chool system promote::; the development of the
understanding that is prerequisite to intelligent, participation in the
democratic procc,-i:;. The schools arc required to provide instruction "to
promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service and obligatjon and to foster
in t.!1e children of thr statr moral and intellectual qualities which are
essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in
war, ... " N. Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (:\,fr Kinney 1970). Flag and other
pat riotir cxerciHPS niHo are pre:;cribcd, as loyalty is a characteri:;tic of
citizen"hip Msentml to the pre:servation of a country. Id., § 802. In addition , required coursr:s include clas:;e~ in civics, United States and New York
history, and principle;; of Ammcan government. Id., § 3204 (8) (a) (1), (2).
Although private srhoob also are bound by most, of the,;c• requirements,
the State hm, n. ,-tronger intrre~t, iu en:suring th,it the schools it most
directl~· cont rob, and for wl11rh it hear~ the cost., are a~ effectjve as
possihlr m tRnrhini:t the~e rour.~,1~.

.... ,
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bilities. 8 This influence, is crucial to the continued good
health of a democracy. 9 o-Furthermore, it is clear that aU public school teachers, and
not just those responsible for teaching the courses most
directly related to government, history, and civic duties, should
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system. 10
Most teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be ca.lled
upon to teach other subjects, inchiding those expressly dediAlthough the finding,; of ::;cholars who have written on the subject are
not, conclusive, th<>y generally reinforce the commonsense judgment, and
the experience of mo::;t of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence
ovier the development of fundamental social attitudes in student;;, including
those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the term may be viewed as
political. See e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization
158--167 (1969); H. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political
Attit11des in Children Hi2-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens' Right
tu Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90,
. 99-104 (1975) .
0 Appellees contend that re::;triction of an alien's freedom to teach in
public ::;chool::, h, contrary to principle:s of diversity of thought and
academic freedom embud:ecl in the First Amendment.. Sre also Note,
supra, n . 8, at 106-109. We think the attrmpt to draw an analogy
bet.ween choice of citizentihip and political expre:ssion or frredom of
association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by
thP State to promote particular value:s and attitudes toward governmen .
Section 3001 (3) does not inhibit appellee::; from expressing freely their
political or ::;ocial views or from a:ssociating with whomever they please.
Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist, U. S. - , (1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977);
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 5(13 (1968). Nor are ~
sa~ di:scouraged from joining with other:s to advance particular political
ends. Cf. Shelton v. 'Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ( 1957). The only as2erted
lib::,rty of appellee:s withheld by the New York 8tatute is the opportunity
to teach in the State's school::; so Jong as they elect not to become citizens
of this country. This is uut a liberty that is accorded con::;titutional
protection.
10 At thr primary ::;chool level, for which both appellees sought certification, teacher:; are responsib\,e for all of thr basic curriculum.
8

.,-J
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cated to political and social subjects. 11 More importantly, a
State properly may rega.rd all teachers as having an obligation,
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes,
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may
take account of a teacher's function as a role model, which
exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light
of the foregoing considerations, we think it clear that pubUc
school teachers come well within the "governmental function"
principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley. Accordingly,
the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement
applicable to teaching in the public schools bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state iHterest. - - - - - - - - - -

III
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship
to this interest. The restriction is carefully 4:ailgred;tM its
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citizenship.12 Appellees, and alieus similarly situated, in effect
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails
of primary duty and loya]ty.1:i They have rejected the open
11 In New York, for example, all certified teachers, including those in the
secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of
teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty. 8 N. Y. Code of
Ruleoi & Regulations § 80.2 (c) .
12 See n. 2, infra.
1 " As our case::; lmve emphasized, resident aliens pay taxes, serve in the
armed forces, and have made significant, contributions to our country in
private and publir endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722
(1973); Sugarman v. DougaU, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graham v.
Richardson, 40:3 U. S. 365, 376 (19il). No doubt many of them, and
we do not exclude appellees, would makr excellent public school teachers.
But the legi~lature, havrng in mind the importance of education to state

;
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invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for
teaching the young of the State iu the public schools, and
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.14
Reversed.

and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483,
493 (1954), may detit>rmine eligibility for the key position in discharging
that function on the assumption that generally persons who are citizens,
or who have not declined the opportunity to seek United States citizenship,
are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens.
We note in this connection that regulations promulgated pursuant to
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations where a particular alien's special
qualifications as a tt>acher outweigh the policy primarily served by the
statute. See 8 N. Y. Code of Rules & Regulations§ 80.2 (i) (1). The State
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 11. *.
14 Appellees argue that the State cannot rationally exclude aliens from
teaching positions and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain
local school boards. See App. 27, 29. We note, first, that the State's
policy as to service on school boards applies only in New York City and
only to aliens who also are parents of public school students. Further,
the argument misconceives the distinction between the role and function
of teachers and school poard members. Although boa.rd rµembers possess
substantial responsibility for the administration of the schools, they teach
no classes, and rarely if ever are known or identified by the students. It
is true that local boards, within limits prescribed by the legislature and
state board of education, normally select or approve textbooks and
instruction materials. Without minimizing this responsibility, it is one
necess:trily discharged in large part by reliance on recommendations from
professional educators, including teachers. And as noted above, the
textbook-particularly in the social science cla8Sroom-usually is less
influential than how the material therein is taught and interpreted by the·
teacher.
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I,

MR.

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a State, consistently with thf' Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. may refusf' to employ as elementary and secoudary school teachers aliens who are eligible for United States
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization.
JUSTICE POWELL

I

...

New York Education Law~ 3001 (3) forbids certification as
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of
the United States, unless that person has manifested an
intention to apply for citizenship. 1 The Commissioner of
1

The statute proYides:
" No pcr~on :;hall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools
of thi:-: state who is:
"3. Not a cit izm. The provi,:ioub of thb subdivision shall not apply,
however, to an alien teacher uow or hereafter employed provided such
tt>achcr ;,hall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter
within the time prescribed by la.w :;hall brcome a, citizen. The provisions
of this subdivision shall not aJJply after July fir:;t, nineteen hundred sixtyseven, to an alien teacher emplo ed pur~uanL to regulations adopted by

,.
I

;

.,.'
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohibition, and has done so ,vith respect to aliens who are not yet
eligible for citiienship. 1 Unless a teacher obtains certification,
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school
in New York. 3
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 and
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also
is married to a, United States citizen. Both Norwick and
Dachi11ger currently meet all of the educational requirements
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher,
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship iii spite
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a
the Commi,.;,;ioncr of :E:duca tion 1wrmitting such employment ." N. Y.
Educ. Law §3001 (3).
Th e sta.tute contain" an f'Xcrption for per~om, who arf' ineligible for United
Stat.e" citizt>n,;hip solely beC'attS<" of an ovC'r~11bt:icribed quota.. Id., § 3001-a..
H~wa.u,ie t.l1is /:, ta tutory provi,;ion .is ill all re::,pect::; narrower than the
exception provided by regulation , :,;ee 11. 2, infra, as a practical ma.t ter it
has no effect.
The State doe,; not certify the qualification,; of teacher::; in the private
schools, although it, r!Of':'l requirf' tlrnt "ueh tearlwr,; be ·'<'ompeteut."
N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3204 (2) (.McKinney 1970) . Accordingly, we are not
presf'nted with the qm'stion of, and expres,; no view a,; to, the p<•rmissibility of a citizenship requirf'ment pertaining to teachers in private i,chools.
2 The following regulation gov,ern,; herf' :
"Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who
has not declared iutPntion of becoming a citizen ma.y be i8.':ittf'd a. provisional certificate providing such teacher ha.~ the appropriatf' educational
qualifications a;; defirwd in the rPgulntion:< and (1) posses;,e::; ,,kill,, or
comprteucies not readily av,Lila ble among t,eacher;, holding citizeuship,
or (2) i;, unable to declare intmtiou of becoming a, citizen for valid
:Sta.t utor~· rc•aso11s." R N. Y. Code of Hules. and HegulH tion;, § 80.2 (i)
3
CPrtification br the Commis,;ioner of Education is not reqt1ired of
teachn:,; at. state inst,itution:,; of higllf'r t'<l11cation and the citizenship
rest riction accordingly does not apply to them. Brief for Appellants..
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth
grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the same
grades in 1975." Both applications were denied because of
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3).
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of § 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene a,s
a plaintiff.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28
U. S. C. ~ 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" standard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 ( 1971), the
court held that ~ 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was overbroad, because it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this country, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction
over the State's appeal, 436 U.S. 902 (1978), and now reverse.

II
A

The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the employment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional
'1 At the time oi her application Norwick had not yet met, the postgraduat.e educational requirement:; for a permanent certificate and accordingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which abo i::: govemed by
§ 3001 (a). She since has obtained the necc:::sary graduate degree for full
certification . DachingPr previously had obtained a. temporary certificatl',
which had lapsed Ht the time of her 1975 application. Tim n'cord does
not, indicate whet her DachingPr previously had declared an intent to
obtain citizenship or had obtained the temporary certificate becnu~e of
§OtnP applicable exception tQ the ritizen~hip requirm1ent ,

;
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886),
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to
prevent aliens from running laundries. aml in Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community .... "
Id., at 41. At the same time, however. the Court also has
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment.
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine permitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when
the restriction pertained to "the regulatio11 or distribution of
the public domain , or of the common property or resources of
the people of the State, . . ." Id., at 39. Hence, as part
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land,
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 ( 1923); Blythe v. Hinkley,
180 F. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483
(1880), harvesting wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), .
or maintainiug an inherently dangerous enterprise. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927). States permissibly could
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects,
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), and, it appears,
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see
Truax, at 40.
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens.
The first sign that the Court would question the co11stitutio11ality of discri111iuatio11 agia11st aliens even in areas affected
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyarna v. California, 332
U. S. 633 (1948). The Court there held that statutory presumptions designed to discourage evasion .of California's ban

'.
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all
aliens who are la.wful residents of the State from making a
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
all others to do so." 'l'akahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U. S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this
Court has held in valid statutes that preveutcd aliens from
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 l1. S. 634 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973). working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Although our more recent decisions have departed substantially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they
have not abandoned the general principle that some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those
fuuctions of all persons who have not become part of the
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that
2. State could, "in an appropriately defined class of positi011s. require citizenship as a qualification for office." We
went on to observe :
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obliga.t10n, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.' . . . And this power and
responsibility of the State applies. not only to the
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding sta.te
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and .i udicial positions, for officers who participate directly
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in the formulation. execution, or review of broad public
policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative goV('rnment." Id., at 647 (citation omitted).
The Pxclusion of aliens from such governmental positions
· would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court.
Id., at 648. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11;
Perkins v. S'/11,ith , 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 426
913 (1976) .
Applyi11g tlw rational basis standard. WP lwld last TPrm that
Kew York could C'xcl ude aliPns from the' ranks of its police
forcC' . Foley\' . ('01111elie, 43.'i C ~. 291 ( Hl78). Bc,cause the
polic<' function fulfill<'<! "a most fundarnpntal obligatiou of
gov<'r1111w11t to its constitue11cy'' and by nPcPssity cloaked
police111c•n with substantial discretionary powns. we viewed
the police fore<' as b<•ing on<· of thos<:' appropriately defined
classes of positions for which a citizellship requirement could
he imposPd. Id., at 2\.)7. .\ccordingly, thl' State was required
to .i ustify its classification only "by a showing of some ratio11al
relationship lwtw('C'n thP i11tcrest sought to b1' protf'cted and
the limiti 11g classificatio11. ., Id .. at 296.
The rule for governmental functions , which is an exception
to the gf'neral standard applicablf' to classifications based on
alic11age, rests on important priuciples inherent in the Constitution. Tlw distinction bf'tweell citizens and aliens, though
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the
definition and government of a State. The C'oustitution itself
refers to th e distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v.
Dougall, s-upra, at 651- 652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). indicating that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in thr structure of our government. The assumption
of that status. whether by birth or naturalizatiou, denotes an
association with thf' polity which , in a democratic republic,
exercises the powers of govPrnancr. See Foley v. Connelie,
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an
oath of alle1?:iance or similar ceremony calluot substitute for·

u. s.

,.

',
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'

~

the uuequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is because of this special significance of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions of government,
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens. 5

B
In deterrniniug whether, for purposes of equal protection
analysis, teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental
fuuctio,i. we look to the role of public education and to the
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role. See id., at 297. Each of these considerations
supports the' conelusio11 that public school teachers may be
regarded as p('rfonning a task "that goles] to the heart of
represC'utative government. " Sugarman v. Douyall, supra,,
at 647.
Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most
fmidamental obligation of government to its constituency."
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the
preparatioll of individuals for participation as citizens, and
in the preservation of tht• values on which our soci<"ty rests,
long has beell recognized by our decisions:
"Today, education is p<"rhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda" That the significance of citizen:,;hlp ha s con~tit.utional dimensions also
has been recognized by several of our decisions. In 'Prop v. D'Ulles, 356
U. S. 86 (1958), a, plurality of the Court held thai the expatriation of a11
American citizen const1tut,ed cruel and unusual punishment for the crime
of desert10n in time of war. In Afroyim v. R'U,Sk, 387 lT . S. 253 (1967),
the Court, held tha1, the Constit,ul10n forbade Congre8s from depriving a
person of his <·1t1zen~h1p agam~t Im will for any rew:;on .

·,

,.•r
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tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values. in
preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.''
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. 493 (1954).
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,246 (1973)
(POWELL, J., concurring); Sa:n Antonio Ind. School D·ist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1_,29-30 (H)73); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHITE, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollurn v. Board of
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. 1\'ebraska, 262 U. S. 390 ( 1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). 0
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimilative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our
society a.re brought together Oll a broad but common ground.
See. e. y., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929);
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social
Order 623- 624 ( 1963). These perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system have bee11 confirmed by the observations of social scientists. See R. Dawson
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in
Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. 0. Key, Public
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 (1961). 7
n A,, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. supra, recognized,
there is no incon~istency between our rPcognition of the vital :;ignificance
of public C'd11ent1011 and om holdiug that ac·res;; to <·clurnt10n j,.; 1101 g11arnnt<'<'<l IJ.,· thr Con:;tit11t1011. Id., ,it :30-:35.
7 The c11nic11lar n'quirement:; of New York public school sy8tem reflect
some of the ways a public r;,chool ,y:;t('m promoteB the development of the

.

.....

,,.
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Within the public school system, teachers play a critical
part in developing students' attitude toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-today contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the
students' experience to achieve educational goals. teachers by
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to students. They are responsible for
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is
both comprehensible a11d iuspiring. No amouut of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his
students. exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an
opportunity to influ{'11ce th{' attitudes of students toward government. the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilit1es.k This infiue11c(' is erucial to the continued good
health of a democracy.')
uncler~tandmg that id prerrquis1t,e to intelligent. part1c1pat10n in the
democratic. procr,;s. The ::<C'hoob are rrq11ired to provide 1rn,trnction "to
promote a SJ)ll'it, of patriotit and C'ivic· 8erv1ce and obligatjon and to fo8ter
m thr eluldrC'n of tlw ~late moral and intellrrtual qunlitm, which are
p,;"ential in pn•parmg to mPPt thC' obligation" of citizenship in pC'aCP or in
war, . . .' X. Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (:\,fcKinnp~· 1!1i0). Flag aml other
pat notic C'X<'l'CI><rs a],;o arC' prr,;cribed. a;-; loyalty is a ehararteri;-;tie of
e1t1zpn,;l11p r,;8entrnl to tlH' Jll'PHPrvation of a count r~·. Id .. § 802. In addition. n•q1111·pd cour,;e,; 111cl11d(• C'la""l'" in e1vic:,;, United Statr~ and X<·w York
h1"tury. and prmciple,; of AmPnc·an government. Id .. § :{20-! (3) (a) ( 1), (2).
Although privatP ,.;('boo],; also are bound hy most, of the,;t' n•quin'ments,
tho StatC' ha" a ,;1ronger 111lC're,;l in Pll><Uring that th<' Hl'hools it mo"t
dm·etl~· eoutro],;, nml for whid1 1t bear,- the rosl, arc ai,; efkctive HS
po,;s1blC' 111 lPaehmg the"C' c•our,.;(•:~ Although the find111!!:·' or ,.;cholars who havt> wnlten on thr suh.Jl'<"t arts
I Pool 110/ t' .'J ,s 011 Ji 1(1 J
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Furthermore, it is clear that all public school teachers, and
not just those responsible for teaching the courses most
directly related to government. history. an<l civic duties, shoul<l
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system. 10
Teachers, regar<lless of their specialty. may be calle<l upou
to teach other subjects, inclu<liug those expressly dedicate<l
to political and social subJects. 11 More importantly, a State
not conclu,;ivP, 11wr grnrrnlly reinforce the commonsen::;e judgmen1, an<l
the cxprriC'nce of most of us, that a teacher exert:; com;iclerablr influencr
ovier the ck•velopmrnt. of fm•damental ::;orial attitudr:,; in ;,tudent::;, including
tho:,;r attitude•,; which m the broadrft ::;rn:;(' of the trrm may be viewPd a,political. Sc•c e. (I. , H. Dnw~on & K. l'rrwitt. Politicnl Socialization
158-Hii (Hlti!l); H. He·~,, c\: .J. Torn<•y. Tlw DPvc•lo1rn1ent of l'ohtical
Attitude:,, in Children 162-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Xotc, Aliens' Hight
to Teaeh : Poli1ic-al Soctahzation and the Public Schoob, 85 Yalr L. J . 90,
91J-104 ( 197,5)
0 Appellrp::; eo1itend that re,;tndwn of an alien's freeclcm to teach m
publie :,;ehool::; i,; eo11trary to principle•;, of divPr::;ity of thought and
ncadrmic frc•Pdom embod:e<l m t hr First AmendmPnt. See also Note,
su71ra, 11. 8, at lOG-109. WP thi11k the Httempt to draw an a11alogy
betwern choiro of citizen:;hip and political expre::,sion or frredom of
a:;sociation i~ widP of the mark, a:; tlw argument would bar any effort by
thP State to promote particular valur;:; and attitudes toward gowrnnwnt.
Sect10n ::!001 (:3) clors 11ot inhibit appellre:; from rxpn->:;:;ing frrely their
politiC"al or .,oc ial virws or from associating with whonwver they plea~e.
Cf. Givhan ,·. Westem Li11e Consol. School Dist, U. S. - , (HJ79); Mt. Ilea/thy City 8clwol Dist. \'. Doyle. 4:29 l 1. S. :274 (1977);
Pirkeri11r, ,·. Board of Education , ;391 l 1. S. 5(i:{ (19{iH). '.\or arC' apprllPe;:; di:-;eouraged from joining with other::; to adv1111ee particular political
Pnds. C'f'. Shelton ,·. 'l'urker. :3f-i4 F. S. 479 (1957). ThP only a,;: crted
librrt~· of appPJlC'e:,; withheld b~: tlw Nrw York :,;tatute ii:; the opportumty
to t('arh in the State's :,;choob so long a~ the~· Pleet not to brcomr citizen::,
of thi,; eountry. Thi,; i:,; not a liberty that i:,; accorded con,;titutional
protc•dio11
1 " At, thP primary ,:chool levrl, for which both appellee:; sought certification, teaclwr,; arp n•:-pon:,;ible for all of the hasie curriculum .
11 ln ;\'rw York, for Pxample, all crrtifird teacher::;, including tho::;e in the
sc•coudar~· srhool,;, an• required to be• availablc' for up to fiv(' hours of
tearhing a wc•(•k m ;,ub.i<'ct,; out,;idr their specialty 8 K .. Y. Cede of
Hu]p,; & He,i;ulation" § X0.:2 (c)

'
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properly may regard all teachers as having an obligatioH
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes,
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may
take account of a teacher's function as an example for students, which exists independeutly of particular classroom subjects. lu light of the foregoing collsiderations. we think it
clear that public school teachers come well within the "governmental function'' principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley.
Accordingly, the Constitution requires ouly that a citizellship
requireme11t applicable to teaching in the public schools bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
314 (1976).
Ill
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship
to this in tcrest. The restriction is carefully framed to serve its
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citizensh:p.12 Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails
of primary duty and loyalty. 1 a They have rejected the open
Seen. 2, infra.
As our cases have emphasized, resident aliers pay taxes, servr in the
'/urned forces. and have made :;ignificant, contributions to our country in
private and public endea.vorn. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougal,{, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graharn v.
Richardson, -10;3 U. S. 365, :376 ( 1!:)71). No doubt many of them, and
we do not exclude appellee:;, would make excellent public school teachern.
But the leg1~Iaturc, having in mind the importance of eduration to state
and local government~, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483,
493 (1954), may clrt,ermine eligibility for the key position iu discharging
·that function on the a8sumpt1011 that generally person~ who are citizens,
•Qr who have not clPeli11ed the opportunity to ~t'~'k Pn11ed Stnte~ ritiz<·n~hip,
1.~

13

.,
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invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for
teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment.1 '1
Reversed.

are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens.
We note in this connection that regulations promulgated pursuant to
§ 3001 (3) do provide for Hituations where a particular alien's special
qualificaticns as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily served by the
statutP. See 8 N. Y. Code of RuleH & Regulations§ 80.:.! (i) ( 1). The State
informs us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 n . *.
14 Appellees argue that the State eannot rationally exclude aliens from
teaching position.· and yet prrmit them to vote for and sit on certain
local school boards. Sec App. 27, 29. We note, first, that the State's
policy as to service on school boards applies only in New York City and
only to aliens who ali;-o are parents of public school students . Further,
the argument misconceives the distinction between the role and function
of teacher,; and school board members. Although board members possess
substantial responsibility for the administration of the schools, they teach
no classes, and ra.rely if ever are known or identified by the students. It
j;; true that in many jurisdietion~ local board:,;, within limits prn;cribrd b~·
the legislature and stat<' board of rducation, arr involved in the selrction
or :ipprornl of trxtbookH and instruction matNiab. Without minimizing
thi,, rrsponsibility, it is onr oftrn di"rharged iu large part by r('liance Oil
recommendation::, from profr:s,;ional educator:s, i11cl11diug teachrrs. And a:s
notrd abov<', it i~ not irrational for N'Pw York to ronrluclr that trxtboohJH1rticularl)· ill thr ~ocial ~cirncr cla::l8room-may be le:ss influe11tial than
how th(' m_atrrial therrin i:,; taught and intrrprrted by the teaeh('r.

...

'

'

.

ii!'•

Chief:
Thank you for your letter commenting on fn 14
my opinion.
',

As Harry is writing a dissent, and probably will
address the school board argument (relied upon by
appellees), I will await his circulation before making any
change in my note.
I see your point, and believe I can accommodate
Sincerely,

.....
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",

'•

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart

Kr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Powell

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
M~. Ju~tice Stevens
From: Mr. Justice Black.mun
c1roulated:~-7~_
M_AR~~1S~Z-S_
No. 76-808 - Ambach v. Norwick

Recirculated:~~~~~MR. JUST ICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

Once again the Court is asked to rule upon the constitu-

tionality of one of New Yor}.c's many statutes that impose a requ~re-

ment of citizenship upon a person before that person may earn

Jj
his living in a specified occupation.

These New York statutes,

for the most part, have their origin in the frantic and overreactive

days of the first World War when attitudes of parochialism and

fear of the foreigner were the order of the day.

This time we

are concerned with the right to teach in the public schools of the

Slate, at the elc1ncntary and secondary le ve ls, and with the citizen-

ship requirement that N. Y. Educ. Law § 3001. 3

'

'!:_I
quoted by the Court, at 1, n. 1, imposes.

(Mc Kinney),
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As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 3, its decisions

regarding the permissibility of statutory classifications concerning

ll
aliens "have not formed an unwavering line over the years.

11

Thus, just last Term, in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978),

the Court upheld against equal protection challenge the New York
,.
.. ;t,

statute limiting appointment of members of the state police force

to citizens of the United States.

The touchstone,

·t:i;-.

~.:

the Court indi-

cated, was that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for ful-

filling "'important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial

\ ..

...

~

,

•.

...

positions' held by 'officers who participate directly in the formula-

tion, execution, or review of broad public policy."' Id. , at 296, quoting

Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).

For such positions,

a State need show only some rational relationship between the

No. 76-808
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interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification.

Police, it then was felt, were clothed with authority to exercise

an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers that could

seriously affect members of the public.

435 U.S., at 297.

They thus fell within the category of important officers who part-

icipate directly in the execution of '.'broad public policy." The

Court was persuaded that citizenship bore a 'rational relationship

to the special demands of police positions, and that a State there-

fore could constitutionally confine that public responsibility to

citizens of the United States.

Id., at 300.

The propriety of

making citizenship a qualification for a narrowly defined class

of positions was also recognized, in passing, in Sugarman v.

Dougall, 413 U.S., at 647, and in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,

11 (1977).
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On the other hand, the Court frequently has invalidated

a state provision that denies a resident alien the right to engage

in specified occupational activity!

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S,

356 (1886) (ordinance applied so as to prevent Chinese subjects

from engaging in the laundry business); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S,

33 (1915) (statute requiring an employer's work force to be composed

of not less than 80% "qualified electors or native born-citiz<!ns");

Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm 'n, 334 U.S. 410 ( 1948) ( limitation

of commercial fishing licenses to persons not "ineligible to

citizenship''); Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, (New York statute

relating to permanent positions in the "competitive clas s"of the

state civil service); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (the practice

of law); Nelson v. Miranda,

413 U, S. 902 (1973), summarily

affirming 3 51 F. Supp. 73 5 (Ariz. 1972) (social service worker and

;
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teacher); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976)

(the practice of civil engineering).

See also Nyquist v. Mauclet,

supra, (New York statute barring certain resident aliens from state

financial assistance for higher education).

Indeed, the Court has

held

more than once that state

classifications based on alienage are "inherently suspect and

subject to close judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richardson, 403

U.S. 365, 372 (1971).

See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero,

426 U.S., at 601-602; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721; Sugarman

v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 642; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S., at

7.

And "[a]lienage classifications by a State that do not withstand

this stringent examination cannot stand. " Ibid.
~

..
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There is thus a line, most recently

recognized in F0ley v. Connelie, between those employments

that a State in its wisdom constitutionally may restrict to United

States citizens, on the one hand, and those employments, on the
-~

other, that the State may not deny to resident aliens.

For me,

the present case falls on the Sugarman -

Flores de

Otero -

Griffiths -

Mauclet side of that line, rather than on the narrowly

isolated Foley side.

'

'

We are concerned here with elementary and secondary

education in the public schools of New York State.

We are not

concerned with teaching at the college or graduate levels.

It seems constitutionally absurd,

to say the least,

that in these lower levels of public education a Frenchman may

'

I.

~.•''

No. 76-808
- 7 -

not teach French or, indeed, an Englishwoman may not teach

the grammar of the English language.

The appellees, to be sure,

are resident "aliens II in the technical sense, but there is not a

word in the record that either appellee does not have roots in

this country or is unqualified in any way, other than the imposed

requirement of citizenship, to teach.

Both appellee Norwick and

appellee Dachinger have been in this country for over 12 years.

Each is married to a United States citizen.

Each currently meets

all the requirements, other than citizenship, that New York has

specified for certification as a public school teacher.

Tr. of Oral

4/
Arg. 4.

Each is willing, if required, to subscribe to an oath to

5/
support the Constitutions of the United States and of New York.

Each lives in an American community, must obey its laws~ and must pay

all of the taxes citizens are obligated to pay.

Appellees, however,

;
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have hesitated to give up their respective British and Finnish
lawyer
citizenships, just as Fre Le Poole Griffiths, the subject of In re

Griffiths, supra, hestiated to renounce her Netherlands citizenship,

although married to a citizen of the United States and a resident of

Connecticut.

But the Court, to the disadvantage of appellees, crosses

the line from Griffiths to Foley by saying, ante, at 6, that the

"distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant

to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government

of a State.

11

It then concludes that public school teaching "constitutes

a governmental function,

11

ante, at 7, and that public school teachers

may be regarded as performing a task that goes ''to the heart of

representative government." Ibid.

The Court speaks of the importance

of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as

No. 76-808
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citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society

rests. (One, of course, can agree with this observation.

One may con-

cede, also, that public schools are an 11•assimilative force' by
l.

which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought

together on a broad but common ground," ante, at 8, and that the

inculcation of fundamental values by our public schools is necessary

to the maintenance of a democratic political system.) After then

'·

observing that teachers play a critical part in all this, the Court

holds that New York's citizenship requirement is constitutional

because it bears a rational relationship to the State's interest in

furthering these educational goals.

I perceive a number of difficulties along the easy road the

Court takes to this conclusion:

"
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First, the New York statutory structure itself refutes the

argument.

Section 3001. 3, the very statute at issue here, pro-

vides for exceptions with respect to alien teachers "employed

pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education

permitting such employment.

11

Section 3001-a provides another

exception for persons ineligible for United States citizenship be-

cause of over- subscribed quotas.

Also, New York is unconcerned

with any citizenship qualification for teachers in the private schools
;

of the State, even though the record indicates that about 18% of the

pupils at the elementary and secondary levels attend private schools.

The education of those pupils seems not to be inculcated with some-

;

.

'
thing less than what is desirable for citizenship and what the Court

calls an influence "crucial to the continued good health of a democracy."

Ante, at 9,

The State apparently, under § 3001. 3, would not hesitate

No. 76-808

- 11 -

to employ an alien teacher while he waits to attain citizenship,

even though he may fail ever to attain it.

And the stark fact that

the State permits some aliens to sit on certain local school boards,

N. Y. Educ. Law § 2590-c. 4 (McKinney) (Supp. 1978-1979), reveals

how shallow and indistinct is New York's line of demarcation be-

tween citizenship and noncitizenship.

The Court's attempted

rationalization of this fact, ante, at 12, n. 14, hardly extinguishes

the influence school board members, including these otherwise

"disqualified" resident aliens, possess in school administration,

in the selection of faculty, and in the approval of textbooks and

instructional materials.

Second, the New York statute is all-inclusive in its dis-

qualifying provisions: "No person shall be employed or authorized

to teach in the public schools of the state who is • • • [n]ot a citizen.

11
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It sweeps indiscriminately.

precise in its application,

11

It is "neither narrowly confined nor

nor limited to the accomplishment

of substantial state interests.

at 643.

Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U, S.,

See Note, Aliens I Right to Teach:

Political Socialization

and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90, 109-111 (1975).

Third, the New York classification is irrational.

Is it better to employ a poor citizen-teacher than an excellent

resident alien teacher?

Is it to be preferable to have a citizen

who has never seen Spain or a Latin American country teach

Spanish to eighth graders and to deny that opportunity to a

resident alien who may have lived for 20 years in the culture

of Spain or Latin America?

The State will know how to select

its teachers responsibly, wholly apart from citizenship,

~/
and can do so selectively and intelligently.

way to accomplish the desired result.

That is the

An artificial citizenship
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bar is not a rational way.

It is, instead, a stultifying provision.

The route to "diverse and conflicting elements" and their being

''brought together on a broad but common ground, " which the

Court so emphasizes, ante, at 8, is hardly to be achieved by

disregarding some of the diverse elements that are available,

competent, and contributory to the richness of our society and

of the education it could provide.

Fourth, it is logically impossible to differentiate between

this case concerning teachers and In re Griffiths concerning attorneys.

If a resident alien may not constitutionally be barred from taking a

state bar examination and thereby becoming qualified to practice law

in the courts of a State, how is one to comprehend why a resident

alien may constitutionally be barred from teaching in the elementary

and secondary levels of a State's public schools?

One may speak

No. 76-808
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proudly of the role model of the teacher, of his ability to mold

young minds, of his inculcating force as to national ideals, and

of his profound influence in the impartation of our society's values~

Are the attributes of an attorney any the less?

He represents us

in our critical courtroom controversies even when citizenship and

loyalty may be questioned.

in which he practices.

He stands as an officer of every court

He is responsible for strict adherence to

the announced and implied standards of professional conduct, to

the requirements of evolving ethical codes, and to honesty and

integrity in his professional and personal life.

Despite the almost

continuous criticism leveled at the legal profession, he, too, is

an influence in legislation, in the community, and in the role model

figure that the professional person enjoys.

The Court specifically
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recognized this in In re Griffiths:

"Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions

of responsibility and influence that impose on them
duties correlative with their vital right of access to
the courts.

Moreover, by virtue of their professional

aptitudes and natural interests, lawyers have been
leaders in government throughout the history of our

7/

country." 413 U.S. ·, at 729.-

If an attorney has a constitutional right to take a bar examinaand practice law,
tion despite his being a resident alien, it is impossible for me to see

why a resident alien, otherwise completely competent and qualified, as

these appellee s concededly are, is constitutionally disqualified from

teaching in the public schools of the great State of New York.

The

District Court expressed it well and forcefully when it observed that

New York's exclusion "seems repugnant to the very heritage the State

is seeking to inculcate." 417 F. Supp. 913, 922 (SDNY 1976).

I respectfully dissent.
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One of the appellees in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S, 1

( 1977), submitted a list of the New York statutes tla t required

citizenship, or a declaration of intent to become a citizen, for

no fewer than 37 occupations.

Brief for Appellee Mauclet, 0. T

..

1976, No. 76-208, pp. 19-22, nn. 8-44, inclusive.

Some of

.,,\

those statutes have been legislatively repealed or modified, or

judicially invalidated.

Others are still in effect.

Among the

..•.·'

· .~

latter are those relating to the occupations of inspector, certified
'",l·

shorthand reporter, funeral director, masseur, physical therapist,

and animal technician.
..,. '
"

.(,

....
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This particular citizenship requirement had its origin

in 1918 N. Y. Laws, ch. 158, effective Apr. 4, 1918.

'.
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"To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the

employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unswerving

one." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 720 (1973).

f

I,
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Appellee Norwick is a summa cum laude graduate of a

Massachusetts college and received an A average in full-time

graduate work in the State University of New York at Albany.

'

She

ji~

has taught both in this country and~eat Britain.

Appellee Dachinger is a ~ laude graduate, with a major

in German, of Lehman College, a unit of the City University of

New York, and possesses a Master's degree in Early Childhood

Education from that institution • . She has taught at a day care center

in the Bronx.

Each appellee, thus, has received and excelled in educational

training the State of New York itself offers.

No. 76-808

2./

See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 726, n. 18.

No. 76-808

~/
In In re Griffiths the Court significantly has observed:

"Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case- by

case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training
and familiarity with Connecticut law.

Apart from such

tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both
an 'attorney's oath ' to perform his functions faithfully
and honestly and a 'commi.ssioner's oath' to 'support
the constitution of the United States, and the constitution
of the state of Connecticut. '

Appellant has indicated her

willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of
both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct
a character investigation to insure in any given case
'that an applicant is not one who ''swears to an oath pro
~~

while declaring or manifesting his disagreement

with or indifference to the oath." Bond v. Floyd, 385
U, S, 116, 132. '

Law Students Re search Council v.

Wadmond, 401 U.S,;at 164.

Moreover, once admitted to

the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by the
organized bar and the courts.

In addition to discipline

for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission

.

'
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(footnote 6 cont'd)

sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal
prosecutions and disbarment.

In swn, the Committee

simply has not established that it must exclude all aliens
from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted
interest in high professional standards." 413 U, S., at 72572 7 (footnotes omitted).

,

.

'
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In order to keep attorneys on the nongovernmental side

of the classification line, the Court continued:

"Yet, they are not officials of governrr.ent by virtue
of being lawyers ·.

Nor does the status of holding a

license to practice law place one so close to the
core of the political process as to make him a formulator of government policy.

11

413 U.S., at 719.

See also Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. 232, 247 (1851); Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-515 (1947) (~oncurring opinion); Schware

v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (concurring

opinion); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (dissenting opinion);

J. Story, Miscellaneous Writings, Value and Importance of Legal

Studies, 503-549 (W. Story ed., 1972 ); H. Stone, The Public Influence

of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1934); W. Brennan, Jr., The

Responsibilities of the Legal Profession (1967); A. de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 321-331 (Schocken ed. 1961); J. Rogers, The
Lawyer in American Public Life, in Morrison Foundation Lectures 40,
61 (1940).
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MR.

PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case prese11ts the question whether a State. consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, may refuse to employ as elementary and secondary school teachers aliens who are eligible for United States
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization.
JUSTICE

I

...

New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of
the United States, unless that person has manifested an
intention to apply for citizenship. 1 The Commissioner of

•~-

'The sta.t ute provide~ :
" No per1:,on 1:,hall bP rmployed or authorized to tea.ch in the public schools
of thii; :;fate wlw 1s :
"a. Not a citizPn. Thn provi1:,iom, of thitl 1Subdivision shall not apply,
however, to a11 alien teachrr now or herca.fter employed provided such
teacher ~hall make due npplication to become a citizrn and thereafter
wi1,hin the time prrscribed by la,w 1sha,ll become a cit.izf'n. The provisions
of this :;uhdivi8ion tlhall not apply after July fir8t, nineteen hundred sixtytleven, to an alien teacher rmployc-d puri;11ant to regt~a.tions a.dopt,ed by
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohibition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet
eligible for citizenship. 2 Unless a teacher obtains certification,
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school
in New York. 8
Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since 1965 and
is married to a United States citizen. Appellee Dachinger
is a Finnish subject who came to this country in 1966 and also
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick and
Dachinger currently meet all of the educational requirements
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher,
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a
the Commissioner of Education permitting such employment." N. Y.
Educ. Law § 3001 (3) .
The statute contains an exception for persons who are ineligible for United
States citizenship solely because of an oversubscribed quota. Id., § 3001-a.
Because this statutory provision is in all respects narrower than the
exception provided by regulation, see n. 2, infra, as a practical matter it
has no effect.
The State does not certify the qualifications of teacherl:I in the private
schools, although it does require that such teachers be "competent."
N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3204 (2) (McKinney 1970). Accordingly, we are not
presented with the question of, and express no view as to, the permissibility of a citizenship requirement pertaining to teachers in private schools.
2 The following regulation gov:erns here :
"Citizenship . A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who
has not declared intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a provisional certificate providing such teacher has the appropriate educational
qualifications as defined in the regulations and (1) possesses skills or
competencies not readily available among t€achers holding citizenship,
or (2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid
statutory reasons. " 8 N. Y. Code of Rules. and Regulations § 80.2 (i)
8 Certification by the Commissioner of Education is not required of
teachers at state inst.itutions of higher education and the citizenship
restriction accordingly does not, apply to them, Brief for Appellants
13 ll , *.

,.
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth
grade, and Dachinger sought a certificate covering the same
grades in 1975. 4 Both applications were denied because of
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3).
Norwick then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of § 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervene as
a plaintiff.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28
U.S. C. § 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny" standard of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), the
court held that § 3001 (3) discriminated against aliens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Supp. 913
(SDNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was overbroad, because it excluded all resident aliens from all tea.ching
jobs regardless of the subject sought to be taught, the alien's
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this country, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath
of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction
over the State's appeal, 436 U. S. 902 (1978), and now reverse.

II
A

The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of
statutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the employment of aliens long has been subject to constitutional

.
,:

At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met, the postgraduate educational requirements for a permanent certificate and accordingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which also is governed by
§ 3001 (3). She since has obtained the necessary graduate degree for full
certification. Dachinger previously had obtained a temporary certificate,
which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does
not indicate whether Dachinger previously had declared an intent to
obtain citizenship or had obtained the temporary certificate because of
some applicable exception to the citizenship requirement.
4

..

.,..
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constraints. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886),
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to
prevent aliens from running laundries, and in 'Pruax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 80% of the
employees of certain businesses to be citizens was held to be
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community .. .. ''
Id., at 41. At the same time, however, the Court also has
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when
aliens were sought to be excluded from public employment.
At the time Truax was decided, the governing doctrine permitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of
the public domain, or of the common property or resources of
the people of the State. . . ." Id., at 39. Hence, as part
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land,
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley,
180 U. S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483
(1880), harvesting wildlife, Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877),.
or maintaining an inherently d;:u1gerous enterprise, Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), States permissibly could
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects,
Crane v. New York , 239 U. S. 195 (1915), and, it appears,
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see
Truax, at 40.
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens,
The first sign that the Court would question the constitutionality of discrimination agianst aliens even in areas affected
with a "public interest" appeared in Oyama v. California, 332
U. S. 633 (1948) . The Court there held that statutory pre13umptions designed ·to discourage evasion of California's ban

.•

..

•.
'•

,.
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen childrel\
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
all others to do so." Takahashi v. F-ish & Game Comm'n,
334 U. S. 410, 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny." Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this
Court has held invalid statutes that prevented aliens from
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U. S. 634 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973), working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and receiving state educational
benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
Although our more recent decisions have departed substantially from the public interest doctrine of Truax's day, they
have not abandoned the general principle that some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those
functions of all persons who have not become part of the
process of self-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that
2, State could, "in an appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office." · We
went on to observe :
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.'. . . And this power and
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the
qualifications of voters, but a.Isa to persons holding state
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and judicia.I positions, for officers who, participate directly

'·
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted).
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions
would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court.
Id., at 648. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, at 11;
Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff'd, 126
u. s. 913 (1976) .
Applying the rational basis standard, we held last Term thllt
New York could exclude aliens from the ranks of its .police
force. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). Because the
police function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of
government to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked
policemen with substantial discretionary powers, we viewed
the police force as being one of those appropriately defined
classes of positions for which a citizenship requirement could
be imposed. Id., at 297. Accordingly, the State was required
to justify its classification only "by a showing of some rational
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and
the limiting classification." Id. , at 296.
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception
to the general standard applicable to classifications based on
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Constitution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the
definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v.
Dougall, supra, at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indi. eating that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our government. The assumption
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic,
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connel-ie,
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important: an
oath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitut~ for

76-808-0PINION
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the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is because of this special significance of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions of government,
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens. 5

B
In determining whether, for purposes of equal protection
analysis, teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental
function, we look to the role of public education and to the
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role. See id., at 297. Each of these considerations
supports the conclusion that public school teachers may be
regarded as performing a task "that go[es] to the heart of
representative government." Sugarman v. Dougall, supra,
at 647. 6
5

That the significance of citizenship has com\titutional dimensions also
has been recognized by several of our decisions. In 1'rop v. Dul,les, 356
U. S. 86 ( 1958), a plurality of the Court held that the expatriation of an
American citizen constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the crime
of desertion in time of war. In Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253 (1967),
the Court held that, the Constitution forbade Congress from depriving a
person of his citizenship against his will for any reason.
u The dissenting opinion of ~IR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, in reaching an opposite conclusion, appears to apply a different analysis from tha,t employed
in our prior de<"ision~. Rather than consider whether public school
teachl'rs perform a significant government, function, the inquiry mandated
by Foley v. Connelte. 435 U . S. 291 (1978), and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U. S. (i34 (1973), the dissent focuses instead on the general societal
importance of primary and secondary school teachersh both public and
private. Thus on the one hand 1t depreciates the importance of New
York's c>itizenship requirement because 1t i8 not applied to private school
teacher:;, and on the other hand it argues that the role teacher::; perform
in our :society is no morr ;;ignificant than that filled by attorney,; . This
misHes the point of Foley and Sugarman. New York ',, citizenship requirement is limited to a governmental fundion becau,;e it applies only to
teacher::; employed by and acting a::; agents of the State. The Connecticut
s1atu1e held uncon::;t1tutio11al in In re Griffiths, -!13 U. S. 717 (1973), by
contrast, apphrd to all attorneyH, mo~i of whom do not work for the

",
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Public education, like the police function, "fulfills a most
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency."
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests,
long has been recognized by our decisions:
·
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultura.I va.Iues, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.''
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,246 (.1973)
(POWELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., a.t 238-239 (WHITE, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollurn v. Board of
government. Tlw rxclusion of alwn from access to the bar i~ated
the nght to pur:;ue a chosen occupation, not acce:;:; to public employment.
Cf. Nyq'Uist v. Ma'Uc/et, 4:32 U. S. 1, 15-16, n. * {1977) (POWELL, .T., di8seutmg). Thr distinct10n between a private occupation and a government function was note!.expre:;8ly
m Griffiths :
,.
" Lawyer:; do indeed occupy prof'es:;ional positions of responsibility and
influence that 1mposr on them duties correlative with their vital right of
acce:;s to the court;;. Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes
and natural mterests, lawyer:; have been leader8 in government throughout
the hu;tory of our country Yet, they nre not officials of government by
,·htm• of bemg lawy<'I'~ " 41:3 U S, at 72\:l .

..
'

!.
,.

..
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Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 ( 1907) .7
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimilative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our
society are brought together on a broad but common ground.
See, e. g., J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 26 (1929);
N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Social
Order 623-624 (1963). These perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. See R. Dawson
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess
& J. Tomey, The Development of Political Attitudes in
Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. 0. Key, Public
Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 ( 1961). 8
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical
7 As San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, recognized,
there is no inconsistency between our recognition of the vital significance
of public education and our holding that access to education is not guaranteed by the Constitution. Id., at. 30-35.
8 The curricular requirements of New York; public school system reflect
some of the ways a public school system promotes the development of the
understanding that is prerequisite to intelligent participation in the
democratic process. The schools are required to provide instruction "to
promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service and obligatjon and to foster
in the children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are
essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in
war, ..." N. Y. Educ. L. § 801 (1) (McKinney 1970). Flag and other
patriotic exercbes also are prescribed, as loyalty is a characteristic of
citizenship essential to the preservation of a country. Id., § 802. In addition, required courses include classes in civics, United States and New York
history , and principles of American government. Id ., § 3204 (3) (a) (1), (2) .
Although private schools also are bound by most, of these requirements,
the State has a &tronger interest. in ensuring that the schools it most
directly controls, and for which 1t bei.Lrs the cost, are as effectjve as
possible in t-0aching the:-;e coun,es"

;
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part in developing students' attitude toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-today contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the
students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by
necessity have wide discretion over the way ' the course material is communicated to students. They are responsible for
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate
the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities.0 This influence is crucial to the continued good
health of a democracy. 10
v Although the findings of scholars who have written on the subject are
not conclusive, they generally reinforce the commonsense judgment, and
the experience of most of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence
oy,er the development of fundamental social attitudes in students, including
those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the term may be viewed as
political. See e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization
158--167 (1969); R. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political
AttitudPs in Children 162-163, 2ff-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens' Right
to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L. J. 90,
99-104 (1975) .
10
Appe!lees contend that re~triction of an alien's freedom to teach in
public schools is contrary to principles of diversity of thought and
academic freedom embodied in the First Amendment. See also Note,
supra, n. 8, at 106-109. We think the attempt to draw an analogy
between choice of citizenflhip and political expression or freedom of
association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by
the State to promote particular values and attitudes toward government. .

!<

'.

,.
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Furthermore, it is clear that all public school teachers, and
not just those responsible for teaching the courses most
directly related to government, history, and civic duties, should
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system.1 1
Teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be called upon
to teach other subjects, including those expressly dedicated
to political and social subjects. 12 More importantly, a State
properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation
to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes,
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may
take account of a teacher's function as an example for students, which exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light of the foregoing considerations, we think it
clear that public school teachers come well within the "governmental function" principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley.
Accordingly, the Constitution requires only that a citizenship
requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307,
314 (1976).
Section 3001 (3) does not inhibit appellees from expressing freely their
political or social views or from associating with whomever they please.
Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist ., U. S. - , (1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977);
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Nor are appellees discouraged from joining with others to advance particular political
ends. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1957). The only as:erted
liberty of appellees withheld by the New York statute is the opportunity
to teach in the State's schools so long as they elect not to become citizens
of this country. This is not a liberty that is accorded constitutional
protection .
11
At the primary ;,chool level, for which both appelleei:; sought certification, teachers are responsibJ,e for aII of the basic curriculum.
·12 In New York, for example, all certified teachers, including those in the
secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of
teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty. 8 N. Y. Gode o(
Rules & R<.>gulations § 80.2 ( c) .
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III
As the legitimacy of the State's interest in furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted, it remains only
to consider whether § 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship
to this interest. The restriction is carefully framed to serve its
purpose, as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have
demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain United States citizenship.18 Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect
have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails
of primary duty and loyalty. 11 They have rejected the open
invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country. · The people of New
York, acting through their elected representatives, have made
a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for
teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and
§ 3001 (3) furthers that judgment. 15
Reversed.
1s See n. 2, infra.
H As our case1 have emphasized, re:;ident aliens pay taxes, serve in the
armed forces, and have made significant contributions to our country in
private and public endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 645 (1973); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971). No doubt many of them, and
we do not exclude appellees, would make excellent public school teachers.
But the legislature, having in mind the importance of education to state
and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483,
493 (1954), may determine eligibility for the key position in discharging
that function on the assumption that generally persons who a.re citizens,
or who have not declined the opportunit~, to seek U11ited States citizenship,
are better qualified than are those who · have elected to remain aliens.
W o note in this connection that regulations · promulgated pursuant to
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations where a particular alien's special
qualifications as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily servro by the
8tatute. See 8 N . Y. Code of Rules &Regulations§ 80.2 (i) (1). The State
mforms us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has
not been exercised . Brief for Appellant 7 n. *.
' ~ Appellee~ argue that the Statr cannot rationally exclude aliens from
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teaching positions and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain
local school boards. We note, first, that the State's legislature has not
expre;;sly endorsed thi:s policy. Rather, appellants as an administrative
matter have mterpreted thr :otatute governing New York City's unique
community school board:o, N. Y . Educ. Law § 2590-c (McKinney Supp.
1978-1979), to permit alien>, who arr the parents of public l:lChool studenti:;
to participate m tl1ese beard>,. See App. 27, 29 . Further, in applying the
rational basi:,; standard wr have ob~Nvecl that "mere underinclusivenes8" i:,;
not fatal to the validity of a law under the Equal Protection Clause.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 471 n. 33
(1977); Erznoznik \'. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 215 (1975);
cf. Geduldig v. Aiello. 417 ll. S. 484, 495 (1974). We also may assume,
without havmg to decide, that there is a rational ba:si:o for a distinction
betwren teacher8 and board members ba:oed on their re:opective responsibilities. Alt hough posse::;smg substantial responsibility for the administration of the ;;choob, board members teach no classe,;, and rarel~· if ever are
known or 1dent1fied by the st udrnts.
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delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents thP question whether a State,. co11sistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourtee1tth
~-\mendnwut . may rdusP to employ as Plenw11tary and secondary school tPachers aliens who are eligible for l · nitPd States
citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization,
MR.

JuS'l'ICE PowELL

I
New York Education Law§ 3001 (3) forbids certification as
a public school teacher of any person who is not a citizen of
the enited States, unless that person has manifrsted an
intention to apply for citizenship.' The Commissioner of
The statute providt':- :
".\!o pt•r,-011 ;,;hall be nnployed or a11thol"ized to Ira.eh in the public 'Cl1001s:
of t hi,: ;,;!,ate who i:- •
"8. Not, a eitizetL Th<~ provi,-;ion,; of thi:- subdiv1,.:ion shall not apply,
how(•w•r. to an nliPn !t'ac·hrr uow or herPaftPr <'mplo~ t•d prov1drd such
ttrn:hrr >'hall make• due> applieatiou to ht><'ome a eitiz1•.11 and thrreafter
withi11 tlw rime J)l'f',.:cribc><J by li1w ,:hall bt·<·omf' a f'ifoPtL The provisions:
of thi~..,ulJCli\'i,-1011 .,hall not, .ipply a.ftrr ,Jul~· ffr,-t, nitW1P('ll hundred sixty.•{! YPU, to an alie11 l(•,tcher employed pursuant, to r<'f!\l)ation.~ adopted by
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Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prol11bitioi1, and has done so with respect to alie11s who a.re not yet
eligible for citizenship. 1 Unless a teacher obtains certificat10H,
he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school
in New York. 3
Appellee N orwick was born i11 Scotland and is a sub.1ect of
Great Britain. She has resided in this country since H!lif> aud
is married to a United States citizen. Appellce Dachinger
is a Finnish subject who came to this country iu 1966 and also
is married to a United States citizen. Both Norwick atJd
Dachinger currently meet. all of the educational requirements
New York has set for certification as a public school teacher,
but they consistently have refused to seek citizenship in spite
of their eligibility to do so. Norwick applied in 1973 for a
the Commi8sioner of Educat1011 p<>rm1tting :;uch employment .'' N l
Educ. Law § :~001 (3) .
The statute rontam,; an exrPpl1011 for per,;ons who are inelig1ble for Urnted
State:;' citizen,;hip solely becau,;e of an oversub~crilwd quota. Id., § aOOl-n.
Becau1:1e t.l1is ,;ta tutory provision is in all re:spt·<:t~ narrower lhan the
exception provided by regulat10n, see 11 . 2, infra, a:,; a pructiC'al ma ttcr 1t
ha11 no effect
The State doe,; not errt.Jfy the riualifica.tion::1 of lPacher,; Ill the pnvate
:-chool:>, although It doe::: require that ,;uch teacher:< be '"c•om(wtent "
N. Y. Educ. Law § :3204 (2) (:\foKinney 1970). AccorJingly, WP an• not
pre:sented with the que:::tion of, and C'Xpres::; no view a,,, to, the 1wrm1:::s1bility of a citizenship rrqmrement pertaining to teacher,; in pnv;1tP :;rhooh,
2 The following regulation governs here :
''Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the Ut11ted States or who
has not declared intention of bccommg a citizrn may be i,;,;ued a prov1siona I rertificate providing such teacher ha1< the :tppropriatP edueat 10nal
qualificnt10ns a::; defined in the regulation,; :t11d (I) pos::1e::;,;p,, ,.fol!~ or
competencies not, rradily available among t,eacher~ holding c1t1zen:,;hip 1
or (2) i:; unable to drclare intention of becoming a cit,iz(•n for valid
qtat11tory reasons." 8 N. Y. Code of Huie,; and Hcgulation" § 80.2 (1)
3
Certification by the Commi:s,;;ioner of Educatiou is uot requireci of
rt•acher~ at. ,:tatc mstitut1ons of higher edttcat1011 and the c1tiz<'n~l11p
1·estrkt10n a.ccordmgly does not appl) to them. Bnef for Appdlants
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teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth
grnde, and Dachi11ger sought a certificate covering the same
grades in 1975. 4 Both applications were denied because of
appellees' failure to meet the requirements of § 3001 (3).
Nor wick then filed this suit seekiug to enjoin the en forcPmen t
of ~ 3001 (3), and Dachinger obtained leave to intervPne as
a plain tiff.
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28
U. S. C. ~ 2281. Applying the "close judicial scrutiny'' sta1Jdard of Graham"· Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), the
court held that ~ 3001 ( 3) discriminated against aliells ill violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 417 F. Rupp. Hl3
(~DNY 1976). The court believed that the statute was overhroad. because it excluded all resident aliens from all teaching
jobs regardless of the subJect sought to be taught, the alien's
nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to this couutry. and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign
of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath
of a.Jlegiance. Id ... at 921. We noted probable Jur·isdiction
over the State's appeal, 436 U.S. 902 (1978), and now reverse.

II
A

The decisions of this Court regarding the permissibility of
sttttutory classifications involving aliens have not formed an
unwavering line over the years. State regulation of the employmeut of al.iens long has been subject to constitutional
4 At the time of hPr application Norwick had not yet met, thr postgrnd11a tc cduc::itional requ irrmen t:,; for a permanent certificate and acco rdmgly applied only for a temporary ecrtifieate, which also is governed b~·
§ 3001 (3). She ;.;ince has obtainrd t,he ncce~,,arr graduate degree for full
certification. Dachmger prt>v1011sl~· had obtained a temporary rertifira le,
which had lnpr;ccl at the time of her Hl75 ,1ppliration. The re1•ord does
not, mdicate wheth<'r Dachinger previously had declarPd an intent to
obtain citizrnship or had obtained the temporary certificate because of
.:;omc :ipp licnblc ex<"eption to the rit izen::;hip n•quirement.
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constraints. In Y-ick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. R. 3,56 (1886).
the Court struck down an ordinance which was applied to
prevent aliens from running laundries. and in Trua:i· v. Rairh,
239 U. S. 33 (1915), a law requiring at least 800;1<- of the
employees of certain busin('sses to be citizens was held to be
an unconstitutional infringement of an alien's "right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community ... ."
Id., at 41. At the same time. however, the Court also has
recognized a greater degree of latitude for the States when
aliens were sought to b(' excluded from public employmellt.
At the time Truax was decided. the governing doctrine permitted States to exclude aliens from various activities when
the restriction pertained to "the regulation or distribution of
the public domain. or of th(' common property or resources of
the people of th(' State . . . . " f d., at 39. Hence. as part,
of a larger authority to forbid aliens from owning land.
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 32n (1923); Webb v. ()'Brien. 263
U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 22,5 (1923);
Terrace v. Thmnpson, 263 U.S. Hl7 (1923); Blythe v. Hinkley.
180 U. S. 333 < H)Ol) ; H a:uenstein v. Lynharn, 100 U. S. 483
( 1880), harvesting wildlife. Patsone v. Pennsylvall'ia. 232
tJ. S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virrrinia, 94 lT. S. 391 (1877),
or maintaining an inhere11tly dangerous enterprise. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), States permissibly could
exclude aliens from working on public construction projects,
Crane v. 1Vew York, 239 F. S. 195 (1915). and, it appears,
from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see
1'rua~t, at 40.
Over time. the Court's decisions gradually have restricted
the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens.
Thf' first sign that tlw Court would q uestio11 tlw cunstitutio11ality of discriminatio11 agia11st aliPns f'Wn i11 an•as affected
with a "public interest" appeared in OyaH1.a v. Californ'ia, :132
U. S. 633 (1948 ). The Court there held that statutory presumptions designed to discourage evasion of California's ban
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on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children
of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership'' a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters
"is inadequate to justify California in excluding auy or all
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a
living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
all others to do so." Takahashi v. F-ish & Game Comm'n,
334 U. S. 410. 421 (1948). This process of withdrawal from
the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, 403
r. S. 365 ( 1971), which for the first time treated classifications based 011 alicnage as "inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny."' Id., at 372. Applying Graham, this
Court has held in valid statutes that preve11 ted aliens from
entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 t:. R. 634 ( H>7:3). practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 tT. S.
717 (1973), working as an engineer, Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 4261:J. S. 572 (1976). and receiving state educational
bP11cfits, Xyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) .
Although our more recent decisions have departed substantially from thc> public interest doctrine of Trua:r's day, they
h:1vc not abandoned the general principle that some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as
a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those
functions of all persons who have not become part of the
process of srlf-government. In Sugarman, we recognized that
::,, State could. "in an appropriately defined class of position~. require citizenship as a qualification for office." 'We
went 011 to observe .
''S uch power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation. already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conceptwn of a political community.' . . . And this power and
responsibility of the State applies, not only to the
qualifi<'at1ons of voters, but also to persons holdmg state
elective or important nonclect1ve executive. legislative,
nn<i ,1udwinl positions, for officers who participate directly

;
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government." Id., at 647 (citation omitted).

The exclusion of aliens from such governmental position!:"
woukl 11ot invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court.
Id., at, 648. See also .Yyquisl v. Mauclet, supm, at 11:
Perkins v. Smith , 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. Hl74), affd, 42(,
F . S. 1113 (1976).
.\pplyin~ thr• rational ha:-is standard. we held la::::t T1·n11 Uwt
l\""ew York could excluc!P aliens from the ra11k~ of rt:- polic<'
force'. Foley"· Co1111el·if<. 43fi r. ~- 201 (197S). B(•caust• tlw
polic<' functi(ln fulfil)p<) "a most fundamf•11tal obligation of
governnrnnt to its constitunrcy'' and by 11t•cessity cloakt-•d
policnnen with substantial discretionary pow(•rs. WP view,•d
the police force as bei11g one• of those appropriately di>firH·d
classes of positions for which a citizenship n·(1uin•11w11t could
he imposed. Id ... at :2fl7. Accordingly. the f-tat<> wa~ n•quin-•d
to .i ustify its classification 011ly "by a showing of so11H· ratiunal
relationship betwee11 the interest sought to hf' prott•ctPd am!
the limiting c·lassific11tio11. " lrl .. at 290.
The ruh• for governnwntal functions, which is an exception
to the general standard applicable to classification:.; based on
alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Com;titution . The distinction between citizens and alie118. though
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to tlw
definition and government of a State. The Co11stitution itself
refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugorn,.an "·
Douga.ll, supra, at 651- 652 (Ih,HNQU1ST, J.. dissPntiug1. indicating that the statm, of citizenship was meant to hav0 siguificance in the structure of our government. Thi> assumption
of that status, whether by birth or naturalization. denotes an
association with the polity which, in a democratic republic,
exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Co1111eti'e.
supra, at 295. The form of this association is important : an
oath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for
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the unequivocal legal bo11d citizenship represents. It is because of this sprcial significance of citizenship that governnwntal entities. when exercising the functions of government,
have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens. 5

t

I,

B
In df'lerrnining wl1rther. for purposes of equal protection
analysis. teaching i11 public schools constitute:- a governmental
function, we look to the rolP of public <'ducation and to the
degreP of responsibility a11d discretion tf'achns possess in fulfilling that role. ~t'<' id., at 207. Each of thf'sf' c·onsidf'rations
supports th<' condusion tliat public school tf'achrrs may he
regarded as perforrni11g a taRk "that goles I to the heart of
represP11tative ~overnnw11t." Sugarma.11 "· Do'Uga.ll. s-upra,
at 647.U
:, That, the s1gmfirantl' of c1t1zc•11:;l11p l1a,; <·on~t1tut1onal dimerwons al:;o
has bren rerognizrd h~ :;f'vetal of our d!'t'i::<ion::<. In 7'rop ,·. Dulles, 356
l ·. S. R(i (1958), ;i pluralit~· of tlw Court lwld that thl' expatriation of an
Amrri<'an citizm con,tttutl'd cru<'l and 1mu~11al puni,hmrnt for the crime
of d1-..,prt1on in timC' of war. In Afroyim '"' Rusk. 3~i l:. S. 25:3 (H)67),
the ourt Jwld that thP Constit,1111011 forhad<' Co11gn'"~ from d<'pri,·ing a
1w r;:nn of his citi zPn ,hip agam"t l11s will for an~· rc•a:<on.
"Tlw di:':'Pnting op111io11 of \[n . .11 "'l'l<'E B1.A< 'KJ!l·,._, 111 rPad1i111,( all oppo,ik l'Olll'lll:'iou. :q>p1•11r., In appl~· :1 diff<'l'<'lll :111:il~"i" from 1h,,t <·1uplo~·t'<I
m (lllt prior d1't·1.-io11,. B:ttlll'r 1ha11 1·011:'ldt'l' \\'ht'tl1t•I' p11l,li1· .,('hool
1eael1t' 1', p(·rfom1 a :'ig11ifi1·:tnl go,·1 ·rn111t•11r hin<·I io11, 1h<· intiuir., · 111a11datt·d
l,.,· 1-'oley , . ('on.n1'iit'. -1:{.'i L 8. :291 (HJi:-.), :111d :,u1111r111a11 ,. lJuuoall. -H:{
I" . :-:. i;;; .1 (HJ7a). ll1t · di,,t•III ft1t·11,t·~ 111:'l(':td Oil ilw )!('ll('l'HI ~ut·it·ral
llllpor1:111ct• of prima r~· and ,;1•eo11dar~ .-!'houl i t•aclwr, hot h p11bh<· a11d
pnv:111'. Thu, 011 ilH' 011t· hand 1i dl'pn•c·i:if1·, tlu · 1111porta1H·1 · of .'PW
) 01k '., 1·it1zp11ship n·q11in•111Pnt l,1·t·a11,<· II i, IIPI applu·d to pnvai< ' , ('hool
h•ac·ll!'r.-. 1111d 011 I hl' ollwr hand 11 aq~lll'" tha1 t hl' rol<· lt'al'll('r,; pl•rform
Ill 011r .•o<·wt ~· i~ 110 mon• ,1g-11ifi<·anl lh:lll 1hal fillnl l.,~- altot1H·., ·"· Tlu~
1111.-~1·~ tht• point of F,,/,,y and ,',uyur11uw . '.\P\\' York '~ eitiz('[1,,hip l'<·quin'·
n11·11i i.- limilPd 10 a g;o1·1·r11111t•llia l f11n!'t1011 U<··tallM' ii app(ip,- oul.1 lo
it·adl('r., PlllJ)IO~<·d h~ aml a('fiug a., ag;\·llt:' of thc> St:1t\'. Tiu· ( 'omwcti\'ut
,•tatllt<· hPld u1H·o11.,1ir u1iunal 1n /11 /'(' Orifjillus. -Ha l'. :-:. 717 (197:{), b~·
,·0111 t·a., f, applied to all :1llOl'lll·y,. llJ<J,-( nf ll'hom do 1101 work Jur I he
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Public education. like the police function, "fulfills a most
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency."
Foley, at 297. The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens. and
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests,
long has been recognized by our decisions:
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principa1 instrume11t in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.''
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 1.7. S. 189, 246 (1973)
(PowELL, J., concurring); San Antonio Ind. School D·ist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 213 (1972); id., at 238-239 (WHITE, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 n. S. 485, 493 (1952); McCollurn v. Board of
govPnJ1ne11t. The excln~ion of aliens rrom :1cce"'"' to iht· bar 1111plH·a1pcl
the right to purtitte a eho:sen oc1·upation, not acn·ti~ to public t'tnpluymnll.
Cf. Nwruist \', Maw·let. 432 CS. 1, 15-16 , ll. ,;; (1!-lii) (POWELL,./., d1,-;"'(:'lltlllg). Tlw di,-;tinction betwC'en a privatP occupatio11 and a go\'('J'llllH·11t. f1111etion w11~ not!'CI Pxprp,-"(y Ill Oriffit!tN.
'·Law~·pr,- do mdPt'<l oc·c11p~· profp:,;:,;ional po::;i1ion:s of rPtipon,-ib1lit~· 1111d
mll11e11c1• that m1pu~e 011 them dutie:s correlt1t1v1· with tlwir vit11l righ1 or
atet•,-;,- to the court~. ;\loreovPr, b~· v1rt11l' of rlu-·1r prot'P~~iorntl aptitudP~
and natural mten•,-t", la w~·pr,- ha vr b1•p11 lf·ader,- m gov1·nnrH·111 t hro1111:hou t
the hi:story of our ('UUn1 r~ . Y<·t, thl'~· an· 11ut oflieiali, of 1ron·rnm1·11t by
virtue of being lawyt·r~:· .i13 C". S., at 7:!9
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Education, 333 F. , . 203. 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pierce v. SoC'iety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v . .Vebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); lntersta.te Consolidated Street R. Co.,·. Massachusetts, 207 1·. R. 79 (1907).~
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimilative force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our
society are brought together on a broad but common ground.
See. e. y., J. Dewey. Democracy and Education 26 (1929);
N. Edwards & H. Richey. The School in the American Social
Order 623-624 (1963). These perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. See R. Dawson
& K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hes
& J. Tomey. The Development of Political Attitudes in
Children 114, 158-171. 217-220 ( 1967); V. 0. Key. Public
Opinion an<l .\mcrican Democracy 323-343 ( Hl61 ).'
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical
· A, :San :!1,/01110 Ind. S1·/11,o/ Dist . Y. Rodny11ez. 8ttprn. t'l'C·ogniied.
there t8 no 111e011,;1:::tmc.v between our recognition of the vital ,1gnificance
of publil' c•durat 1011 allCI our holding- that :t<·c·c·~, to Pdu<'ation i~ not g-uaraull'l'd b~· rhe C'on~tit11t10n. Id .. at ::!0-:15.
' Thl' <·t11T1<·ular n•q111r<·m<•nl, of :,.;pw York', p11hlie ,whoo! ,,_,·::'t<·n1 rC'tll•c•I ,
some of !he wa~·s a public· ,:('!1001 ~ystern promote,: the development of th<'
under:;!anding that 1s prereqmsit•e to mtelligent partic1pat1on in tJ1e
clC'mocmtic proee>'s. The ~chools are required to provide instruction "to
promote a spirit. of patriotir and civic serv1cP and obligation and to foster
in the children of the ,;fate moral and intPllectual qualities which are
e,.:...:ential in preparing to meet the obligation, of citizenship m peacr or in
war, . . .'' X. Y. Educ. L. § ROI (1) (:VIcKinney 19i0). Flag and other
patriotic· exnei,P>' also ar<> pre,.;rribrd. a.~ loyalt~· i~ a rharaclPri>'tic of
citizPn>'hip e:<,e11t1al to the pm·wrvation of a c·mmtry. Id.,§ ROZ. In addition , rrqui1wl cour,<"" mcfodt· C'lassrs in civic:<, l'nitrd Stntee and Krw York
hi"'tory. and pr111riph of AnwriC'an govPrmnent. Id.,§ ;3204 (::!) (a) (1), (2).
Although private i-ehool,.; also are bound by motit of the~e requirements,
tho State ha,; a "' ronger mtrrest in ensuring that the schools it most
direetly control>', and for wh1rh 1t heaIB tlw c·o~t, 11rc a,- 1'1fe<"tive as
po""ihle in tea<'hinJ? t lw,·p <"our:·w,·.

.,
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part in developing students' attitude toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct. day-today contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the
students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to students. They are responsible for
presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is
both comprehensible and inspiring. No amou11t of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate
the personal qualities a teacher brings to beat· in achieving
these goals. Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus. through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he sets, a teache,· has an
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, a.nd a citizen's social responsibilities.11 This influence is crucial to the continued good
health of a <lemocracy.10
n Although the finding:-; of scholar:,; who havi> writtl'n on tlw :subject are
not conclu:siv<>, they generally reinforre the commonl:>~nse judgment, and
the experience of most of us, thnt a teacher exert:; con:;iderable influence
ovier the development of fu!'damental social attitudei; in studenti;, including
tl10:se attitudes which in the broade~t seni;e of the term may be viewed as
political. See e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt , Political Sorializntion
158-1G7 (1969) ; R. Hess & J . Tomey , The Development of Political
Attitude1:1 in Children 162-163, 217- 21, (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens· Right
to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Scl10ols, 85 Yale L. J . 90,
90-104 (1975) .
10 Appellees contrnd that restnction of 1111 alien·~ freedom 1o leach rn
public schools is contrary to principles of diversity of thougl1t and
neademic frf'rdom embodif'd 111 t11e First Amrndment. See also N otc ,
supra, n. 8, a1 106-109. We think the attempt to draw an annlogy
bl'tween choice of citizcn~l11p and political expres:;ion or freedom of
a~sociation ii; wide of the mark, as the argument would bar an~· effort hy
th~ State to vrol\\ote 1iarficular value8 and attitudes toward goverumr!lli.
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Furthermore. it is clear that all public school teachers. and
not just those responsible for teaching the courses rno~t
directly related to goYernment. history. and civic duties, should
help fulfill the broader fu11ction of the public school system.n
Teachers. regardless of their specialty. may be called upo11
to teach other subjects. including those expressly dedicated
to political and social subjects.'" More importa11tly. a State
properly may regard all teachers as having an obligatio11
to promote civic virtues and u11derstanding in their classes.
regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may
take account of a teacher's function as an example for stutlcuts. "'hich exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light of the foregoing considerations. \\'C think it
clear that public school teachers come well withi11 the "governmental function" principle rccog11ized in Sugarman and Foley.
Accordingly. the Co11stitution requires 011ly that a citiienship
requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. M 'urgia, 427 l '. S. :107.
314 ( H)7(5)
S('rtion :3001 (:n doe:; not lllh1b1t appellt>eti from rxpre:;:;ing fn'<'ly tllt'1r
politiral or l-iOC'ial ,·iC'W:, or from a:-:-ociat inl! with whonH·1·c·r tlir~· pk:1:-1• .
('f. Givha11 , . 11'es tern Line Cumwl. 8rlwo/ Dist . l". 8. - , (1979); Mt. llealthy City School Dist. ,·. Doyle. -129

r.

S. 27-1 (l!~77) ;

l'ir-keri11r1 \'. Boa rd of Hd ucatio11. :1!-J 1 l '. S. 5(i:1 ( HJ(j.<.; ). Xor :1 rP app<·llN•s (h:,:eour:q~l'd from joiniug with otlwr~ to adrnnct' ,,:irtirular politif':11
end::;. Cf. 8helto11 ,·. 'l'w·ker. :m-1 U. S. 479 (1957) . Thi' on!.,· a~ c·rtl'd
libl'ft~· of appc·IIC'P~ withheld b~· tlw Xew York l:'tat11tt' i~ tlw opport11111t~·
to t(•ach in thr Statr'~ ~rhool,- ~o long as ih('~· PIC'r:t not 10 bPrOllll' ritizt·n~
uf this ('01mt1y. Thi:,: 1~ not a liberty that 1:- arrordl'd co11~tituti011:tl
prof Petton .
11 At tlw prm1ar.1· school lewl. for whieh both a pp~·llt·c·~ :;ought <·t>ri iffration, tra(·hr1 • :trt' r<':spon:;ible for all of thr barn• currieul111n.
'" In :'\rw York, for ('Xampl(•, all <·c•rtiffrd lt'acl1Pr:,:, i11cl11di11g tho~c· 111 ilH'
~1·c-011dar~· srhool:-, an' n•quin'd to lJl' a,·a1lal>lt' for 11p ro fin• hour- of
trarhing a WPPk Ill ~ubjerts out:-idc• thrir ~prl'iahy. ~ X . Y . C'cclt• of
Rule~ ~ HPgul:1rio11,- § /<0.2 (l')
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III
As the legitimacy of the State's interest i11 furthering the
educational goals outlined above is undoubted. it remains only
to consider whether ~ 3001 (3) bears a rational relationship
to this interest. The restriction is carefully framed to sf'rve its
purpose. as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have
~demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain t·nited Rtates citi. zenship. 1 " Appellees. and aliens similarly situated. in eff<:'ct
have chosen to classify themselves. They pref Pr to rrtain
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it l'ntails
of primary duty and loyalty." They havp rPjrctRcl tlw ope11
invitation extended to qua.lify for eligibility to teach by
applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New
York, acting through their elected representatives. havP mnde
a judgment that citizenship should be• a qualificatiou for
teaching the young of the State in the public schools. and
~ 3001 (3) furthers that .1udg11H:'11t.1"
Revcr.~ed.
rn See 11. 2, infra.
A~ 011r ca;;e;; hav!' emphas1zPrl. n•"irlPnt aliP11, 1m~· tax<-'" . ,t-'l'Vl' i11 ill<'
armed forces. 1111d ha.ve made ,-ig11ific:rnt. eontributio11;; to our eou11try in
privMc and public endeavor:;. See In re Griffiths. 41a l'. S. 717, 72'.?
(1978) ; Sugarman v. Dougall, 41a U. S. 534, (i45 (H)i:3): Gru!tam v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 3ifl (1971). No don ht many of them, am!
we do not exclude appellees, woultl make excellent public ~rhool tra('hers.
But the legi~lature, having in mind the importanC'e of rducario11 to :-tate
and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Bducalio11. :H7 ll .•. -l83,
493 (1954), may det,ermine eli1dbilit~· for the kc~ po~iti011 in (li:-chargiug
that function on the assumption that ge11erall!I p(•r,;on~ ll'ho arc• ('iti,wn,,
or who havE' not derliue<l the 01>port1111it~· tu ~1·Pk l'nitPd 8tate, l'itizl'n~hip,
are better qualified tlrnn are tho:-(· who have l'll·cted io l'l'm:1111 alil'llS.
We note 111 this connection that regulation~ promulgated pur~uant to
§ 3001 (3) do provide for situations where a particular alie11'1< ;;pecial
qualificati0m1 as a teacher . ouhvPigh the polic.,· primarily ,;c·r\'ecl b~· the
statute. See 8 N . Y . Code of Hules & Hc•gulntion~ § i-0.2 (i J ( 1) . Tiu• St ate
informs us, howeYer, that the authorit~· conferred by th1,; rc·gulution has
not been exercised. Brief for Appellant 7 n . *.
ir. Appt-llf't'i< argtw that t)I(' t,tatc (·annot rntionally c•xrludP alirn~ frorn
11

..

i (i-1'01'-0 I ' I \ I () . .
.\\JBA('H

1· .

\OH\\. ll'H

I,).•

teaching po,itwn,; :111d ~-1:'1 , fll'rtmt th1•m 10 , 1111 • for :ind ,-11 on 1·nt:11n
lu!'al "rhool lionrcl:-. W1· noH·, ~ir:-t. th:11 1111· ~t:111'·:- ll'gi:-l:1t11n· ha~ 1101
1·xprr~,.J~· rn<loro('d thi,- polir.,·. l!:11lwr, :1ppl'lla11t ., :1:- ,111 :1cln1ini,tr:1tiv1·
m:itfpr havr int1•rprf-'tl'cl tilt' :-tat11t1· gon·rnini.: \1·w York { 'i1_,. ·" 1111iq111·
c·om1t11111it~· school boarcl:-, \ . Y. bl11!'. L:iw § :2590-l' \\l1·Ki1111('~· ~11pp.
Hlii--1Hi9), to _JH'l'lllit aliPn.- who '.II"(' 111(' Jl:11'~·111, of p,_il,lil" :-C'hool :<lt1d1•11t,- \ t)
to partH·1pat1 · 111 tlll':-<· hoard:-. ;:-i1•1 · .-\pp . :!, , :2!1. \\ 1· :d:-o 111:1.,· :1.-,111111·.
wi1ho11t havin)!; 10 cl1·rid1·. that tlwn · j,.. .1 rati1,11:il h:1:-i:- for :1 di"ti1)('1ion
IJ1•IW<'<'II 1l'a!'h1•r:- :tlld l10:1rd IIH'llil>PI':- ha:-l'd on 1lu•ir n·:-p(·<·liv1· rl',;po11siJ,ilitil',. Ahho11gh po:-"1's:-i11g :-t1h:-t:111ti:d t'('~p1111:-il,ilit~· for IIH· ad111i11i,-11·11rio11 of llw "<'hook boanl 111t'rnl,c•r, n·al'h nu d:i"'t':-, :111cl ran·I~· if 1·,·cr :(I'(.:
known or 1<le111 ifiPu b~ the .,r11d('111" .
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NOTBI: Where It la teaalble, a a7Uabaa (headnote) wU1 be released, aa 18 being done In connection with thla case, at tbe time
tbe opinion le lseued. Tbe ayllabu1 constitutes no part of tbe opinion
of tbe Court but baa been prepared b7 the Reporter ot Declillona for
tbe convenience of tbe reader. See UnOed Stole, Y. Dttrcrit Lta111fler
Oo., 200 U.S. 321,337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE
Syllabus

AMBACH, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STAT]
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v.
NORW.ICK ET AL.
,APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR •.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Pauc proof of syllab·U$ as
a7iproved.
·
Lineup included.
Lineup still to be ·
added. Plrnsc :;rnd
linrup to Print Shop
when avail:-tblo a.nd
a copy to me.
{nolhe1· c~py of paoe proof oj
1llabus as apvrovcd to
howI,i1w11p, which h:1:; now
been adde<l.
1
Additional changes
in ;:,yllabus.
IfaNHY PuTiEL, jr.

Reporter of Decisions.

L

No. 76-808. Argued January 10, 1979-Decided April-, 1979
A New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school
teacher of any person who is not a United States citizen unless that
person has manifested an intention to apply for citizenship, held not to
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pp. ;t-12-.
(a) As a general principle some state functions are so bound up with
the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of
the process of self-government. Accordingly, a State is required to
justify its exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions only "by
a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to
be protected and the limiting classification." Foley v. Conneli,e, 435
U. S. 291, 296. Pp. 5-6.
(b) This rnle for governmental functions, which is an exception to
the stricter general standard applicable to classifications based on
alienage, rests on important principles inl1erent in the Constitution.
The distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant
to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of
a State, and the references to such distinction in the Constitution itself
indicate that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in
the structure of our government. It is because of this special significance
of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions
of government, have wider latitude in limiting the participation of
11-oncitizens. Pp. 6-7.
(c) Taking into consideration the role of public education and the
degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that
role, it is clear that public school teachers come well within the "govern•
I

,,

II

AMBACH v. NORWICH
Syllabus

mental function" principle recognized in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S.
634, and Foley v. Connelie, supra, and, accordingly, the Constitution
requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in
the public school bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Pp. 7-11.
(d) Here, the statute in question does bear a rational relationship to
the State's interest in furthering its educational goals, especially with
respect to regarding all teachers as having an obligation to promote civic
virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of tho subject
taught. P. 12.
417 F. Supp. 913, reversed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and STEWART, WHITE, and REHNQUIS'r, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined.
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This case presents the questioo/whether New York
may impose.! citizenship requiremen y"upon its public school
teachers.

A three-judge district court in the Southern

~I

,

District of New York held ~this requirement / e xcluding
resident aliens :;1violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the exclusion of aliens / from fields of
priva ~

employment)

enerally serves no legitimate state
and our decisions make clear/ that
limit participation of aliens ~

.

.o

certain governmental funct1ns.

"

Only last Term we upheld New York's citizenship
requirement with respect to police officers,/ because of the
important role of the police functio ry1in the exercise of
governmen~ i ~ · For essentially the same reasons, we
think teaching in the public schoo1s; 'a1so constitutes a
governmental function/ that may be confined to citizens.
Teachers, both through the instruction they give/ and the
example they set, shape the basic attitudes of children
toward our democratic form of governme~t, ):;_..,d the
..CV

'V /

ff~

. ..- -

political process~ of this countr,1 and the obligations of
American citizenship.

aA-~~~
~dL.t"~

2.

A State rationally may decide/ that only those
persons who have made an unequivoca3:., 1egal commitment to our
form of government/ t hrough the ! le of citizenship; 'should be

'

entrusted with this important public responsibility.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court below.
)

.

We also note that the resident aliens who brought
this suit could
have qualified to teach/ under the New York
1
law/ by applying for United States citizenship.

They ~ ~
~

free to do this, but preferred to retain their citizenship
allegiance to other countries.
Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall
and Mr. Justice Stevens have joined.

·1

,.

.,

Richmond Times Dispatch, May 3, 1979

Aliens as Teachers
By one of its paper-thin divisions,
the U. S. Supreme Court ruled 5-to-4
recently that a state may refuse
to employ as a public school teacher
an alien who is eligible for United
States citizenship but who refuses to
apply for It.
The majority opinion was written
by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., former chairman of both the Richmond
School Board and the Virginia State
Board of Education. The decision is
of interest in Virginia because Board
of Education regulations state that
an applicant for certification·as a
school teacher must be a citizen.
The four dissenters - Justices
Harry A. Blackmun, William J.
Brennan Jr., Thurgood Marshall and
John Paul Stevens - described as
"irrational" the New York law at
issue in the case.
"Is it better to employ a poor
citizen-teacher than an excellent
resident alien teacher?'' they asked.
"Is it preferable to have a citizen
who has never seen Spain or a Latin
American country teach Spanish to
eighth graders and to deny that opportunity to a resident alien who
may have lived for 20 years in the
culture of Spain or Latin America?''
But Justice Powell emphasizedrightly, we think - that a teacher's
influence extends beyond the
academic subject matter.
"Within the public school
system," he wrote, "teachers play a
criticai part in developing students'
attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citizens in
our society.... A teacher serves as a

role model for his students, exerting
a subtle but important influence
over their perceptions and values.
Thus, through both the presentation
of course materials and the example
he sets, a teacher has an opportunity
to influence the attitudes of students
toward government, the political
process, and a citizen's social
responsibilities. This influence is
crucial to the continued good health
of a democracy."
The New York Jaw, as Justice
Powell pointed out, applies only to
aliens who manifest no intention of
becoming U. S. citizens. Such
people, he said, "prefer to retain
citizenship in a foreign country with
the obligations it entails of primary
duty and loyalty."
The majority opinion is a
reasonable one. It does not, of course, say to the states that they must
em ploy only citizens as public school
teachers. It says, rather, that if a
state itself wants to impose such a
restriction, there is nothing in the
U.S. Constitution to forbid it.
In Virginia, the Board of
Education's citizenship regulation
apparently has relatively little practical force as it is now being administered. From what we have
been able to lear.n, education officials have been under the impression that the requirement might not
withstand a court test, and for that
and other reasons the State Department of Education has been almost
automatically granting one-year
certificates, on application of local
school superintendents, to aliens
otherwise qualified. A state ~tatute
permits such waivers from board
regulations.

We do not necessarily suggest any
basic change in the department's
practices in regard to this matter,
but department officials might want
to take another look at those practices in light of the recent court
ruling. Many waivers are unquestionably justified, such as those
given In connection with teacherexchange programs. But rather than
automatically granting a superin·
tendent's request in every case, the
department might want to consider
whether it is always wise to certify
an alien who has lived in this country
. for years but whose interest in the
United States is not sufficient to im, pel him or her to give up foreign
citizenship and become a naturalized American.

